Modeling Peacekeeping: The Case of Canada Examined by Abraha, Senai
Kennesaw State University
DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University
Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects
4-2015
Modeling Peacekeeping: The Case of Canada
Examined
Senai Abraha
Kennesaw State University, sabraha@kennesaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/etd
Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abraha, Senai, "Modeling Peacekeeping: The Case of Canada Examined" (2015). Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects. Paper 662.
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
MODELING PEACEKEEPING: THE CASE OF CANADA EXAMINED  
 
By  
SENAI ABRAHA 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD DISSERTATION   
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
International Conflict Management in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at 
Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, Georgia  
 
 
2015  
 
  
  i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 
Senai Abraha 
2015 
 
 

 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The philosopher, Elbert Hubbard once said: “never explain, your friends do not need it 
and your enemies will not believe you anyway”. Accordingly, I will just confess that the positive 
aspects of this thesis have been the product of genuine cooperation. A lot of noteworthy 
individuals have sacrificed their valuable intellectual, moral, and material assets to make this 
project successful.  
It was my privilege to have worked with, Dr. Richard Vengroff, the chair of my 
dissertation committee, who gave me an unwavering support and guidance. My dissertation 
committee crew: Drs. Carter, Vaught, Benjamin, and Smith have also tirelessly given me 
thousands of feedback as I developed and refined my arguments. I attribute the credit for this 
study to my dissertation committee members while bearing full responsibility for its flaws. 
I also wish to extend my gratitude to the Clendenin family for awarding me an awesome 
scholarship that not only waived my tuition fee but also secured me with adequate funding to 
cover my research expenses for two years.  
It would be an understatement if I say that my family has enabled me to complete this 
study. I am not sure if a single sentence would suffice to testify that my wife, Maki, convinced 
me to enroll in this PhD program alongside with her, maintain an excellent GPA, nail the 
comprehensive exam, and complete this dissertation against all odds. She has redefined the story 
of my life.  My mother, Alemnesh, rightfully deserves the credit for this paper as has always 
been there for me in good and bad times: “it’s all because of you momé!” My sisters, brothers, 
and friends, thank you for the delightful dialogue, laughter, and courage!  
 
 
 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
This research introduced a comprehensive model for explaining why countries participate 
in peacekeeping by studying Canada’s peacekeeping decisions. The history of Canadian 
peacekeeping since 1947 presented an ideal case because of the significant fluctuation in its 
involvement from being a leading peacekeeper to a token contributor. It adopted Waltz’s schema 
to explain this fluctuation at the systemic, domestic, and individual levels of analyses. Most of 
the literature on Canadian peacekeeping decisions employed systemic level analyses such as 
national interest and international cooperation without taking into account the impact of domestic 
political and socioeconomic environment, and the role of leadership personality in peacekeeping 
decisions. This study tipped this imbalance by assessing the role of public opinion and leadership 
personality on Canadian peacekeeping decisions using a mixed research method. The evidence 
on public opinion showed that, with the exception of the Trudeau and Mulroney administrations, 
other Canadian governments didn’t consult public opinion in making peacekeeping decisions. 
Subsequently, the results on leadership personality indicated that Prime Ministers exhibiting 
personality traits associated with peaceful foreign policy did not commit greater number of 
peacekeepers than the Prime Ministers who did not reflect those attributes. The study concluded 
that Canadian peacekeeping decision is best understood by analyzing the dynamic interaction 
between the Cold War and the war on terror at the systemic level, the budget deficit and national 
unity at the domestic level, and the personality of Canada’s leaders at the individual level. 
 Key words: Canadian peacekeeping decision, International Relations, Public Opinion, 
Leadership Personality.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
International peacekeeping has grown substantially. UN peacekeeping, for example, has 
boomed from a humble beginning of around 30 troops in 1947 to over 100,000 today (Global 
Policy, 2011; UNDPKO, 2013). Except in the early 1960s, the number of UN peacekeepers 
between 1947 and 1992 never exceeded 20,000. In mid-1990s, however, the figure quadrupled to 
around 80,000 only to decline below 20,000 in the late 1990s and resume a steady growth since 
the year 2000 (See Figure 1.1). This study addresses what factors explain the variation in 
peacekeeping commitment by focusing on why and how a very significant actor in international 
peacekeeping like Canada decides to participate in peacekeeping missions. This will give us 
insights into how and why other democratic nations choose to participate in this process. 
 
Figure 1. 1 Size of UN Peacekeeping forces 1947-2012 
Source: Global Policy (2011) and UNDPKO (2013) 
The rationale behind why and how countries engage in peacekeeping may be explained 
by framing peacekeeping participation as an outcome of foreign policy decision making. Mintz 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
1
9
4
7
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
7
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
7
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
2
Size of UN Peacekeeping Forces: 1947-2012
Size of UN Peacekeeping
Forces: 1947-2012
 
 
 2 
& DeRouen (2010, p. 3) defined “foreign policy decision making (FPDM)” as the choices 
individuals, groups, and coalitions make that affect a nation’s actions on the international 
stage… [where the decisions] are characterized by high stakes, enormous uncertainty, and 
substantial risk.” When countries decide to send their troops abroad to participate in international 
peacekeeping, they are engaging in a risky behavior entailing multidimensional tasks (ranging 
from separating conflicting parties to monitoring an election) whose outcomes are uncertain 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Wall, 2011; UN, 2003). Framing peacekeeping policy as a foreign 
policy decision allows one to utilize different theories and methods in the field of foreign policy 
analysis (FPA) to explain why countries decide to engage in peacekeeping operations.  
There are two major ways of analyzing FPDM. These are the actor-specific approach 
(which focuses on a single country as a case study) and comparative foreign policy analysis 
(which is a cross assessment the foreign policies of many countries) (Hudson, 2007). In this 
study I will adopt the actor-specific approach to foreign policy analysis by selecting Canada as a 
case study and explain why and how different Canadian governments decided to participate or 
not participate in peace operations. Before doing that, however, it is appropriate to justify why 
Canada deserves to be studied as a case. 
Historically, Canada played a significant role in launching the first multinational 
peacekeeping forces during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson earned a 
Nobel Peace Prize for this effort (Carroll, 2009). Between 1956 and 1988, Canada participated in 
thirteen UN led peacekeeping missions and contributed 88,000 peacekeepers (Dorn, 2007).  
Canada ranked among the top ten countries in terms of troop contributions to UN 
peacekeeping until 1996 (Dorn, 2007). But in 1997, the number of Canadian UN peacekeepers 
fell below 200—making up only 0.1 percent of the total UN peacekeepers (Dorn, 2007). Before 
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1997, the average Canadian troop contribution to UN peacekeeping was ten percent of the total 
(Dorn, 2007). As of August 2014, Canada contributed only 0.12 percent, i.e., 118 peacekeepers 
(84 police, 13 military experts, and 21 troops) of the total 97,655 (11,460 police, 1721 military 
experts, and 84,474 troops) UN peacekeeping forces (UN, 2014). Canada’s financial contribution 
to UN peacekeeping has also dropped from $94 million in 2008 to $15 million in 2014 (Fiorino, 
2014). Today, Canada has abandoned UN peacekeeping and is more involved in NATO led 
peace enforcement missions as witnessed “in the war in Afghanistan, the airstrikes on Libya, and 
the deployment of a troop contingent to Ukraine” as well as the fight against Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) (Fiorino, 2014).   
Meanwhile, nowhere has peacekeeping been a part of national identity as it has become 
in Canada. Canadians have issued a dollar bill and a coin, erected a statue, and opened museum 
and a park venerating peacekeeping (McKay & Swift, 2012). They also named their main 
international airport and their Foreign Affairs office after Lester B. Pearson (McKay & Swift, 
2012). Moreover, public opinion on peacekeeping has consistently remained strong (Granatstein, 
2012).  
A poll conducted by Nanos (2010) showed that “Canadians preferred UN peacekeeping...  
(7.2 out 10 where 10 is a very high priority)” as the top priority that armed forces should have 
followed compared to other realms of cooperation like North American security cooperation 
(6.7), defense of the Arctic (6.2) and the NATO commitment (6.1). Canadians gave least priority 
to combat missions (5.1). This aversion to combat was reiterated in a more recent poll by Angus 
Reid (2012) in February 2012 where 40% of its respondents thought Canada’s engagement in 
Afghanistan was a mistake while 36% thought it was the right thing. However, when asked if 
they approved of Canada’s decision to keep “950 soldiers in Afghanistan until 2014 in a strictly 
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non-combat role to help Afghan military”--which is framed as a peacekeeping role, 54% 
approved while 39% disapproved. 
So, why, despite strong public support, did Canada abandon its leading role in 
peacekeeping after 1997? And, why did Canada embrace peacekeeping from 1956 to 1996? A 
number of leading Canadian scholars argue that peacekeeping was a myth. In particular, the 
sentimental values held by the general public that Canada is a neutral player was based on false 
premises. Instead they stress on the fact that Canada has participated in two World Wars and has 
been an active NATO and NORAD member whose mettle has been tested in Afghanistan 
(Granatstein, 2012). For them, peacekeeping has always been, even during Canada’s peak 
engagements, a subordinate task to more serious commitments in NATO. Others worry that the 
Canadian government, especially the current one led by Prime Minister Harper, is deliberately 
tarnishing Canada’s peacekeeping identity, costing it a temporary seat at the UN Security 
Council in 2010 (McKay, 2012). A poll conducted by Abacus Data (2010) showed that 
Canadians considered a temporary seat at the UN Security Council as “very important” (33 
percent) and “somewhat important” (33 percent).  
Although many scholars argue that Prime Minister Harper had deliberately abandoned 
peacekeeping, they didn’t make a systematic analysis of his reason for doing this. As a matter of 
fact, scholars didn’t explain the reasons why other Canadian leaders embraced peacekeeping by 
employing theories from political psychology. There is hardly any study on the relationship 
between Canadian leadership personality and their peacekeeping decisions. However, given the 
enormous executive power Canadian Prime Ministers wield over their government, the study of 
their personality and its effect on their peacekeeping decision is worth conducting. 
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This study addresses the question why the Canadian governments since 1947 decided to 
send peacekeepers abroad by focusing on the role of public opinion and foreign policy 
disposition of Canadian leaders based on their personalities. It is divided into seven chapters. The 
following chapter reviews the available literature on peacekeeping decisions at the systemic, 
domestic, and individual level of analysis with the aim of identifying controversies and gaps 
deserving further research. The third chapter explains how it employs mixed research method to 
test the research question by conceptualizing and operationalizing the dependent (Canadian 
peacekeeping participation) and independent (public opinion and foreign policy disposition of 
Canadian Prime Ministers) variables. The fourth chapter conducts a descriptive review of 
Canadian peacekeeping history to briefly show the development of Canadian peacekeeping from 
the beginning until its current state. The fifth chapter addresses the impact of public opinion on 
Canadian peacekeeping decisions since 1947. The sixth chapter examines the role of Canadian 
leadership personality on peacekeeping decision by asking whether Prime Ministers having 
personality traits that indicate a disposition towards peaceful foreign policy exhibit a greater 
commitment to peacekeeping than Prime Ministers identified as being disposed towards warlike 
foreign policy. Finally, the seventh chapter summarizes the salient aspects of the study by 
making valid conclusions.  
The overall goal of the study is to model peacekeeping decisions by framing it as part of 
a foreign policy decision-making. This model allows researchers to study peacekeeping decisions 
systematically at the systemic, domestic, and individual levels of analysis. The study selected 
Canada as a case study for at least three reasons. First, the degree of variation in Canadian 
peacekeeping participation has been significant. Canada was a pioneer as well as a leading 
peacekeeping nation until it began to substantially reduce Canada’s commitment after the mid-
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1990s. Second, no country has incorporated peacekeeping as symbol of national identity as much 
as Canadians have. In addition to a consistently strong public opinion support for peacekeeping 
and earning the Nobel Peace Prize twice (in 1957 for Lester Pearson and in 1988 for UN 
peacekeepers), Canadians have enshrined peacekeeping symbols in their coins, dollars, stamps, 
statutes, airports and major government buildings. Third, despite Canadian government’s retreat 
from peacekeeping, Canada’s peacekeeping experience and reputation, lack of colonial ties, 
bilingual and well equipped troops still make Canada as an ideal candidate for keeping the peace 
in the turbulent world of today. These factors justify the pursuit of this study for use by 
academicians as well as policy makers. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Peacekeeping has often taken a central place in the Canadian foreign policy discourse. In 
light of the foreseeable disengagement of Canadian forces in Afghanistan, the “debate 
concerning the role of peacekeeping in Canadian foreign affairs is sure to be rekindled” (Preece, 
2010, p.1). Even as conservatives push for military confrontation against the ISIS (Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria), NDP and Liberal leaders voice their opposition while certain scholars see this 
conflict as Canada’s opportunity to renter peacekeeping through the United Nations (Hamilton, 
2014). Several factors explain Canada’s decision whether to participate in peacekeeping 
missions. These factors can be systematically addressed using Waltz’s three image schema. This 
schema has systemic (international relations), domestic (government and non-government actors) 
and individual (leadership) levels of analysis (Waltz, 1954/2001). 
The three image schema introduced by Waltz is comprehensive in the sense that he 
identified all levels necessary to explain foreign policy. However, Waltz failed to give all levels 
equal importance (Moravisck, 1993). Waltz gave priority to the systemic forces explaining state 
behavior and held the various domestic and individual forces explaining state behavior abroad 
constant. He preferred to treat states as unitary rational actors whose main goal is the pursuit of 
power. Putnam (1988) challenged this assumption by introducing the two level game model. 
This model has two boards where diplomats from two or more countries interact on one board 
and domestic actors (state/non-state) from two or more states interact on the second board. 
Putnam argued that all foreign policy decisions are an outcome of constant bargaining of leaders 
playing at the diplomatic and domestic boards.  
Putnam’s “two level game” sheds light on the significance of domestic and individual 
actors. He showed the important role played by individual leaders as they played on the 
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diplomatic and domestic boards simultaneously.  However, Putnam doesn’t explain what types 
of leaders are disposed to peaceful/warlike foreign policies. If one needs to understand why 
certain Canadian leaders send peacekeepers while other do not, one must address this gap. 
Political psychologists like Margaret Hermann (2006) provided interesting insight to fill this gap 
by profiling the personality of political leaders at a distance by analyzing their speeches and 
interview transcripts.  
As will be explained in detail later, Hermann (1980; 1987; 2006) introduced seven 
leadership traits assessment (LTA) criteria to evaluate political leaders. According to Hermann, 
political leaders disposed to War tend to be motivated by power, perceive issues as mutually 
exclusive (black and white as opposed to grey), have nationalist orientation (Winter, 2006). She 
also described them as being introverted and less trustful than leaders who are disposed towards 
peace. Overall, Hermann’s LTA is useful in profiling political leaders at distance. Herman’s 
attempt to connect LTA with foreign policy outcomes by classifying leaders into peace/war 
disposition is also a move forward. Nonetheless, an attempt has not yet been made to see whether 
peace disposed leaders exhibited a visible role in peaceful endeavors like peacekeeping. More 
importantly, no study attempts to explain Canadian governments’ decision to send peacekeepers 
by examining the personality profile of their leaders.  
All in all, a comprehensive understanding of Canadian peacekeeping requires equal 
consideration of all factors at the systemic, domestic and individual levels of analysis. The 
following sub sections explore available literature explaining Canada’s decisions to participate in 
international peacekeeping.  
Systemic Analysis: Explaining Canadian Peacekeeping using IR Theories 
The Realist Lens of Canadian Peacekeeping 
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The intellectual origin of realism can be traced as far back as Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C). According to Keohane (1986), realism has “three key 
assumptions: (1) states (or city-states) are the key units of action; (2) they seek power, either as an 
end in itself or as a means to other ends; and (3) they behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, 
and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms” (1986, p. 7). Hence, realists consider 
nation states as sovereign and autonomous actors whose main goal is the pursuit of power (Onea, 
2012). They also believe that “power determined how [a state] behaves in various international 
relationship and what ideas it espouses in international discourse” (Nau, 2012, p. 61-62).  
Several scholars concur that realism explains Canadian peacekeeping decisions. As 
Marteen (2008) put it:  
Peacekeeping is thus a tool to be used by the so-called realists, who wish to influence 
international outcomes but lack the power to gain such influence any other way. In 
Canada’s case, peacekeeping gives Ottawa a lever in the United Nations that can be 
used to constrain the United States” (2008, p.167).  
 
Nonetheless, there is disagreement on whether Canada was engaged in peacekeeping to 
fight Communism (Mullenbach, 2005), serve or contain great powers (Riddel-Dixon, 2007), or 
increase its power by shouldering a unique role like peacekeeping that the Permanent Members of 
the UN Security Council couldn’t assume (Robinson, 2012).  
The above differences arise from varying interpretations of power and are also the reason 
why several schools of realism exist today. Lebow (2010) defined classical realism as “an approach 
to international relations that….recognizes the central role of power in politics of all kind, but also 
the limitations of power and the ways in which it can readily be made self-defeating” (2010, p. 
59). Classical realists define “political power as a psychological relation between those who 
exercise it and those over whom it is exercised” whereby the former (the wielder of power) is 
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deemed to confer benefits or threats and legitimize their “love for men or institutions” 
(Morgenthau, 1948/1993, p. 23). Canadian realists define national interest in terms of the 
preservation of national integrity, “especially between the two founding nations [Francophones 
and Anglophones]; socioeconomic prosperity and harmony with but independence from the United 
States” (Massie, 2009, p. 628); securing Canada from terrorism (also from serving as a terror base 
for attacking the United States); and maintaining sovereignty in the Arctic region (Sloan, 2005). 
They often criticize Canadians’ infatuation with peacekeeping by arguing that peacekeeping was 
not a moral crusade but a rational decision to secure Canadian national interests that aim at 
preventing regional conflicts from escalating into thermonuclear confrontation between 
superpowers and preserving the unity within Western alliance (Delvoie, 2000). Hence, for classical 
realists, Canadian peacekeeping is worthwhile to the extent it serves national interest.  
Neo Realists, on the other hand, introduced a systematic approach to international relations 
by dividing it into human nature, state behavior, and the relationship in the society of states (Waltz, 
2001). In the society of states, Canadian neo-realists consider Canada as a principal power whose 
“military, economic, resource and diplomatic” capabilities place it in the top tier among powerful 
countries (Jung, 2009, p.23). For the reasons described by Kirton, Canada has a “principal role in 
establishing, specifying and enforcing international order” (Jung, 2009, p. 23). As Canada’s power 
and influence has decreased since the 1980s, the appeal of this perspective has also declined (Jung, 
2009).  
Defense realists understood power in terms of security (Nau, 2012) where “survival is best 
attained by pursuing just enough power to maintain a ‘balance’ [so that] no one other power or 
coalition of power can threaten the system and one’s national security” (Cha, 2003, p. 10). Defense 
realists believe that a nation should undertake “ambitious military and diplomatic strategies to 
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increase security” (Balzevic, 2009, p.59). Accordingly, “Canada’s involvement in Cold War-era 
UN and non-UN peacekeeping” was intended to “deter a war with the Soviet Union, and to fighting 
that war if deterrence failed” (Maloney, 2007, p.101). Hence for Maloney (2002): 
Canada never was a neutral participant in the United Nations, which was itself a Cold 
War battleground with the Soviets. UN peacekeeping was only one of Canada’s Cold 
War tools, and was conceived as part of a strategy to stave off communist influence in 
critical portions of the Third World and to freeze international crises in place so they 
did not escalate into nuclear war (Maloeny, 2002). 
 
Offensive realism is based on Organiski’s Power Transition Theory (PTT), which describes 
the international system in terms of hierarchical rather than anarchical constellation of power 
among states. Organski’s Power Transition Theory classifies countries into great, major, middle 
and minor powers (Organski & Kugler, 2011). In this pyramidal structure, great powers cooperate 
with their allies in other categories to establish and sustain international law, institutions, and 
norms for the rest to follow. Their potential rivals endure this phenomenon until they gain 
sufficient strength to challenge the status quo and attain hegemony (Levy & Thompson, 2010). As 
Neack (1995) put it: 
UN peace-keeping developed out the thwarted global political aspirations of a single 
state. At the close of the World War II, Canadian statespersons undertook an 
aggressive campaign to establish a special status for Canada and other ‘middle power’ 
states in the new United Nations…Middle powers could do this through so-called 
‘middle power diplomacy’, an approach to diplomacy aimed at mitigating interstate 
tensions and conflicts in order to prevent the possibility of war between great 
powers…Out of these deliberations came the first formal UN peace-keeping operation. 
Soon after, UN peacekeeping became the ‘prerogative’ of middle powers (Neack, 
1995, p. 183) 
 
In a similar vein, Jung (2009) portrayed Canada as a satisfied middle power whose role in 
international peacekeeping is intended to preserve the existing world order. But there is a debate 
on whether Canada should remain content in the middle or should strive to become a principal 
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power (Holmes, 2007; Dewitt & Kirton, 2007). In either case, the rationale for Canadian 
peacekeeping is the maintenance of world order.  
Many factors distinguish middle powers from other powers. Behringer (2012) identified 
geographical location (centered in between two major countries), functional role (mediator), 
capability/strength, and behavioral (preference for international rather than unilateral action) as 
alternative definitions of middle powers. These features can be assessed by conducting a 
comparative study of countries under different categories of power (Cooper, 2011). A satisfied 
middle power like Canada, for example, would adopt a foreign policy that is in harmony with a 
dominant power such as the United States. 
The section has explained the realist perspective of Canadian peacekeeping. All realists 
understood Canadian peacekeeping in terms of promoting its power. Realists rejected altruistic 
interpretation of Canadian peacekeeping which stressed on a genuine commitment to 
international cooperation. For classical realists, Canadian peacekeeping was an outcome of its 
interest to preserve its own national unity and the solidarity among its Western allies. For 
neorealist, Canada was involved in peace operations in order to emerge as a principal power in 
the post-Second World War global environment. For defense realists, Canadian was involved in 
peacekeeping to contain the spread of communism in conflict ridden states. For offensive 
realists, Canadian peacekeeping role was a middle power diplomatic strategy aimed at 
preventing conflict among the great powers. The fundamental premises of different branches of 
realism are summarized in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2. 1 Branches of Realism 
Branches of Realism  Assumption 
Classical Realism 
(Power=Psychological 
influence) 
Starts from foreign policy level of analysis but gives more weight to 
domestic ideational and institutional factors 
Neo-Realism 
(Power=no. of poles-uni, 
bi, multi-polar) 
Starts from systemic level of analysis but focuses on distribution of 
material capabilities in anarchy while excluding hierarchy and 
hegemony 
Defensive Realism 
(Power=security) 
Starts from systemic level of analysis but pays more attention to 
intentions and interactions to institutional (information) and 
ideational variables 
Offensive Realism 
(Hegemony, hierarchy) 
Starts from the systemic structural level of analysis that focuses on 
hegemony or hierarchy, which neo-realism never really considers 
Source: Nau (2012). 
The Liberal Perspective of Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
One of the major misconceptions of realists is their assumption of nation states as unitary 
actors (Nau, 2012). In reality, nation states are not unitary actors. Instead, they are composed of 
different branches of a government holding and promoting different and often conflicting 
interests in foreign policy (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Non-state actors such as the media, 
opposition parties, private sector, public opinion, and sub-national administrations also work 
actively to influence foreign policy (Alden & Aran, 2012). Liberals, on the other hand, take 
domestic factors into account. Jackson & Sorensen (2010) summarized the fundamental 
principles of liberalism as follows: 
The theoretical point of departure for liberalism is the individual. Individuals plus 
various collectives of individuals are the focus of analysis; first and foremost states, 
but also corporations, organizations and associations of all kinds. Liberals maintain 
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that not only conflict but also cooperation can shape international affairs (2010, 
p.130) 
 
The intellectual origin of liberalism in international relations can be traced back to 
Immanuel Kant’s work entitled Perpetual Peace written in 1795. Kant believed that it is possible 
to secure a perpetual peace in the world if countries adhere to three definitive articles (Doyle, 
1997). The first article argues that, contrary to absolute monarchies, republic governments don’t 
resort to aggression because it will harm the welfare of their citizens upon whom they depend for 
votes. The second article states that perpetual peace is guaranteed when these republican 
governments submit to international law that secures the basic human rights of all people. The 
third article encourages countries to engage in international trade in order to strengthen the 
material interdependence among them and increase the risk of going to war (Doyle, 1997).  
At the systemic level, liberals believe that it is possible for nation states to coexist by 
cooperation with each other (Doyle, 2012; Mueller, 1989; Giddens, 1985). Even nations that 
strive for power could achieve synergy through collective security (Lyon, 2012). As Chapnick 
(2010) put it, “peace could be sharpened not just by power but also” through “compromise for 
the sake of peace” (2010, p. 7). Liberals also break down power into soft and hard components 
whereby economic, institutional, and cultural means of influencing others make up soft power 
(Nye & Keohane, 2012). Perhaps a liberal explanation to Canadian peacekeeping is best 
expressed by Walter Dorn as follows: 
Peacekeeping is about trying to protect people in mortal danger, providing hope in 
almost hopeless situations, and bringing peace and some justice to war-torn 
communities in faraway lands (2005, p. 7).  
The liberal perspective of Canadian peacekeeping is based on a “sense of 
internationalism or global responsibility” (Preece, 2010, p.7). As shown in Table 2.2, liberals 
attach different meanings to international cooperation. 
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Table 2. 2 Liberal Approaches and Foreign Policy Agendas 
Variant of Liberalism Foreign Policy Agenda 
Principled Liberalism The promotion of human rights, the creation of international 
society based on shared norms 
Commercial Liberalism Free trade promotion, support for open markets, attempts to 
spread capitalism as an economic system 
Neo-Institutionalism Creation, promotion and utilization of international organizations 
for governance, norm creation, and enforcement 
Democratic Peace 
Theory 
The promotion of democracy and confrontation toward non-
democratic system 
Source: Lyon (2012, p. 78). 
Principled liberals are primarily interested in human rights (Lyon, 2012). A good 
example of principled liberalism was Canada’s role in advancing the cause of human security in 
the 1990s to engage the international community in assuming the responsibility to protect 
individuals from state oppression (Axworthy, 1997). By expanding the concept of security from 
state to individuals, principled liberals undermine the “realist framework” which views “state 
security” as “paramount” (Chandler, 2007, p.59). Axworthy summarized the rationale for human 
security as follows:  
The meaning of security has been transformed…Hobbled by economic adversity, 
outrun by globalization, and undermined from within by bad governance, the 
capacity of states to provide this protection has increasingly come into 
question…The state has, at times, come to be a major threat to its population’s rights 
and welfare-or has been incapable of restraining the warlords or paramilitaries-rather 
than serving as the protector of its people. This drives us to broaden the focus of 
security beyond the level of the state and toward individual human beings, as well as 
to consider appropriate roles of the international system to compensate for state 
failure (Axworthy, 2001)  
 
Commercial liberal theory explains state behavior by examining the domestic and 
international economic changes which affect its wellbeing (Moravcsik, 2002). Commercial 
 
 
 16 
liberals believe that “countries with deep trade links with a civil war country have a greater 
interest in seeing a peacekeeping intervention, particularly when the war threatens economic 
production and trade” (Rost & Greig, 2011, p. 174). For major trading countries like Canada, 
therefore, peacekeeping serves as a public good that provides stable conditions for the 
international flow of goods and services (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997). Any conflict that occurs 
worldwide would thus be deemed as posing a threat to international trade and worth abating via 
peacekeeping (Cox, 1994).  
Institutional liberalism pertains to a “view that cooperation in world politics can be 
enhanced through the construction and support of multilateral institutions based on liberal 
principles” (keohane, 2012, p. 152). Institutional liberals would describe Canada as a founding 
member of the United Nations, having a vested interest in collective security (Chapnick, 2005). 
Canada has played a key role in strengthening the United Nations by expanding the General 
Assembly to include newly independent countries in the 1970s (Stairs, 2011). It has also 
succeeded in making sure that ten seats are reserved for non-permanent Security Council 
members on a two year rotating basis whereby members are elected based on their contributions 
to international security and other UN purposes (Stairs, 2011). Moreover, Canada has led in the 
conception and establishment of the first UN traditional peacekeeping force and made substantial 
contributions to UN peacekeeping without incurring arrears (Dorn, 2007). 
The democratic peace theory (DPT) strand of liberalism considers democracy as a key 
ingredient to sustainable peace (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Since democratic states rarely go to 
war, its proponents suggest that peacekeeping should include democratization (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2006). The conflicting parties also demand assistance in building democratic regimes 
(Diehl, et.al. 2012). Canadian institutions “like the North-South Institute, the Parliamentary 
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Centre, the Forum of Federations, Rights & Democracy, CANADEM, and Election Canada” are 
actively engaged in this mission (Axworthy, 2011, p. 219). Studies on Cold War (1974-1991) 
military interventions (Kegley & Hermann, 1996) and post-Cold War (1993-2001) peace 
operations (Lobovic, 2004) show that “a country’s level of democracy accounts for why and how 
much” it “contributed to these operations” (2004, p. 910). Democratic countries like Canada 
would, therefore, be more active in peace operations because they are more interested in 
spreading democratic ideals across the world.  
 In sum, liberals explain Canada’s participation in peacekeeping in terms of cooperation. 
The basis of this cooperation differs from humanitarian causes (principled liberalism), 
international trade (commercial liberalism), collective security (neo-institutionalism) or 
spreading democracy (democratic peace theory). Although they pay more attention to domestic 
sources of foreign policy (as in democratic peace theory) than realists do, they still generalize the 
goal of states to be cooperation. In other words, the impact of shift in societal norms, the 
bureaucratic bargaining within governments, the influence of business class, etc. on 
peacekeeping decisions are not given sufficient consideration.  
Constructivist Perspective of Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
Constructivists are more interested in the “how” aspect of foreign policy decisions than 
they are in the “why” aspect (Folker & Badie, 2012). Unlike liberals and realists, constructivists 
don’t think there is an objective explanation for selecting one foreign policy goal above another. 
Unlike realists and liberals who believe that “power” and “cooperation” have an objective reality 
(material basis), constructivists see power and cooperation primarily as concepts created 
(constructed) by thinkers and societies, or, as Wendt (1999) put it “by ideas and culture” (Wendt, 
1999, p. 371).    
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 Constructivists are more interested in the process (the “how” aspect) of foreign policy 
decision. More precisely, they examine how agents (political leaders, for example) introduce 
new ideas and disseminate them within their political circles and across the populace to 
transform them into institutionally-backed structures, which in turn, legitimizes and spreads 
those ideas on a much bigger scale (Breuning, 2012). Constructivists are more interested in 
understanding how the concept of peacekeeping came forth, developed and consolidated itself as 
a norm dictating government behavior inside the Canadian society and foreign policy circle. 
As Ban Ki Moon (2012) put it, “[P]eacekeeping is not mentioned anywhere in the United 
Nations Charter…[S]ince the day of…Dag Hammarskjöld, peacekeeping has been a flagship of 
the United Nations activity.” But, at first, even Mr. Hammarskjöld was skeptical about the idea 
when Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson proposed peacekeeping as a solution to 
resolve the Suez Crisis in 1956 (Urquhart, 1993). When Pearson left for the United Nations to 
propose the idea, the cabinet members, the opposition parties, and the general public were 
against the idea because they did not want to betray their European allies (Caroll, 2009).  
Prime Minister St. Laurent did, however, encourage Pearson to propose the idea to the 
UN while he staved off domestic resistance (Caroll, 2009). Yet, “the embittered reaction in parts 
of Canada helped speed the Liberals’ electoral demise in 1957” (Bothwell, 1999, p.27). At the 
same time, however, Pearson won the Nobel Prize, which made “Canadians into the world’s 
leading believers in peacekeeping” (Granatstein, 2002, p. 347). Since then, “any government that 
refused a chance to join in seemed certain to suffer attack from the public and the press” (2002, 
p.358). Canada’s decision to participate in peacekeeping operations was thus established as a 
norm whereas failure to participate in peacekeeping missions became deviant or strange decision 
(Mackay & Swift, 2012). 
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According to Nossal & Bloomfield (2008), the global accolade over Canadian 
peacekeeping “entrenched” an already existing “internationalist strategic culture” that was in 
place since 1945 (2008, p. 299). Nevertheless, Nossal (2007) believed that public opinion plays a 
critical role in foreign policy through “administration setting, policy setting, agenda setting, and 
parameter setting” (2007, p. 170). A 2010 Nanos’ poll indicated that most Canadians want their 
troops to primarily serve in peacekeeping missions as opposed to combat missions (Koring, 
2012). This public attitude towards peacekeeping remains strong today. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the general public has a realistic perception 
of Canada’s current international role (Anker, 2005). With only 31 troops and 119 police serving 
along with the 94,090 UN peacekeepers (as of December 2012), Canada’s contribution in 
peacekeeping is at a historically low level (UNDPKO, 2012). Moreover, Canada also lost its bid 
for a seat at the UN Security Council to Portugal, which Stairs (2011) attributed to, inter alia, a 
less experienced diplomatic team. Despite this loss, a Leger Marketing Poll conducted in 2012 
reported that Canadians still think they maintain a good reputation worldwide (Cheadle, 2012).  
Moreover, the awareness level of Canadians regarding the military operations conducted 
by Canadian Forces (CF) remains low. A poll in 2003 showed that only 41% of Canadians could 
identify two global operations (peacekeeping or non-peacekeeping) conducted by Canadian 
Forces accurately (Anker, 2005). Besides, Canadians did not implement their support for 
peacekeeping by asking their governments to either increase troops or allocate more resources 
for peacekeeping (Marten, 2008).  
There is also a cultural divide among Canadians at the sub-national level, which is 
fortified as a federal state structure. This divide is also reflected in attitudes towards 
peacekeeping. Rioux (2004) conducted a public opinion survey, the result of which indicated that 
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Québécois tended to be more supportive of UN or French Canadian led peacekeeping missions 
than their English counterparts. Québécois are said to have “antimilitaristic” and “anti-
imperialistic” attitudes towards foreign policy (Massie, et. al, 2010). They have managed to 
influence foreign policy considerably through the relatively large size of the Québécois 
electorate, some of the French Canadian Prime Ministers, and the deference given to Quebec in 
order to preserve national unity (Massie, et. al, 2010). Hence, Canada’s overall support for 
international peacekeeping could partly be attributed to the Québécois who, on the basis of their 
culture, history, population size and political circumstance, are strong supporters of international 
peacekeeping.  
Cosmopolitan Perspective of Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
Instead of attributing cultural diversity as the source of global anarchy of states, as 
classical realists argue, cosmopolitans believe that local diversity should be celebrated and used 
to reinforce universal obligations of individuals to one another (Nau, 2012; Appiah, 2006). 
Cosmopolitans are not satisfied with the current state peacekeeping operation whereby the 
strength of a mission rests on the goodwill and support of nation states. Instead they call for a 
new generation of peace operation (See Table 2.3) that enables the United Nations to have its 
own permanent peacekeeping force (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Wall, 2011). 
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Table 2. 3 International Relations Perspectives of Peacekeeping: Theory and Application 
IR 
Theories 
Realism Liberalism Pluralism  Cosmopolitanis
m 
Critical 
theory 
Preferred 
Peace 
Operation 
Stabilization 
Forces 
Multidimension
al 
Peacekeeping 
Traditional 
Peacekeeping 
Permanent UN 
Peacekeeping 
Forces 
Democratic 
& 
Transparent 
UN (Pugh, 
2004) 
Source: Modified from Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (2010, p. 424)  
The idea of a permanent UN peacekeeping force was proposed by the United States in 
1946 (Goldstein, 2012). But the Soviets did not think this was a good idea as they feared it would 
complicate the Cold War divide further (Johnson, 1997). After the Cold War was over, some of 
the initial operations in Somali, Rwanda, and Bosnia proved catastrophic (Anan, 2012). So, in 
search of an alternative, the Canadian government submitted a study to the United Nations in 
1995, which, inter alia, suggested the “need for a permanent multinational, rapid response 
headquarter” (Behringer, 2012, p. 41) to monitor a “standby and readily available UN Peace 
Operations” without violating the consent of conflicting parties (Koops, 2011, p. 400).  
Canada’s proposal did not trigger sufficient enthusiasm among member states. As a 
result, Canada and six “likeminded” European countries established the Standby High Readiness 
Brigade for the UN in 1996 (Behringer, 2012). The Brigade served in the aftermath of the Ethio-
Eritrean war in 2000. It was, however, closed in 2009 because there was little need for traditional 
peacekeeping (Behringer, 2012). Although SHIRBRIG was a step forward in the cosmopolitan 
agenda, it did not adapt to the post-Cold War transformation of conflict from inter-state to intra-
state direction (Hewitt, 2012). Its confinement to traditional peacekeeping diminished its demand 
which led to its liquidation.   
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Critical Perspective of Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
Critical theories are based on the Marxist-Leninist notion that internal conflicts are 
propelled by class struggle (capitalists vs. workers) whereas international conflicts are triggered 
by competition among profit seeking multinational corporations (Lenin, 1913; Marx & Engles 
(1848), 201). There are two major theories within this school. The Dependency school argues 
that rich countries have prospered by creating an economic system that makes poor countries 
dependent on them (Wiarda & Kryzanek, 2012). On the other hand, the World System theory 
classifies countries into core, semi-periphery and periphery states where the core states 
monopolize production, thus leaving the semi-periphery and periphery states to engage in 
providing raw materials and labor intensive products (Wiarda & Kryzanek, 2012). So, as Engler 
(2009) put it, Canadian peacekeeping is a means of advancing the interest of the core group 
(multinational corporations, imperial powers, etc.) rather than vulnerable people at the periphery. 
According to critical theorists, effective international peacekeeping can only be 
established when the existing global trade system and institutions undergo a radical 
transformation (Pugh, 2004). They believed that this requires liberating global institutions from 
the control of rich and powerful states (Pugh, 2004). Once this is ensured, critical theorists 
propose a small and agile team of international peacekeepers whose focus is mainly that of 
prevention rather than post-conflict reconstruction (Pugh, 2004). Until these conditions are put in 
place, critical theorists would be skeptical of international peacekeeping as serving narrow 
corporate or imperial interests. 
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Domestic Level of Analysis of Canadian Peacekeeping Decisions 
 
There are three major theories under the domestic level of analysis. These are state-
centered, society-centered, and state-society centered theories (Moravcsik, 1993). State-centered 
theories focus on the roles of and interactions among different actors within the executive branch 
of the government. The bureaucratic politics model and rational choice theories explained below 
are examples of this approach. Society-centered theories, on the other hand, stress on the 
influence of the general public and different non-governmental organizations on foreign policy 
decision making. One example is the public opinion section discussed below. Third, the state-
society-centered theories cover the interactions among the executive branch of the government 
and the masses through their representatives in the parliament. In other words, they examine the 
role of the legislative branch of government in foreign policy (Moravsik, 1993). The following 
sections will investigate different theories within these three levels of domestic levels of analysis.  
Bureaucratic Politics and Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
Proponents of bureaucratic politics argue that foreign policy is the partially unintended 
outcome of political bargaining among government bureaucrats (Jones, 2012). Bureaucrats are 
involved in providing information to the top-level decision makers, suggesting alternative 
measures, and implementing them (Allison & Halperin, 1971). At the same time, they also work 
hard to preserve their relevance or essence (what they stand for), protect their “turf” (their 
functional/expertise advantage), and lobby for more resources-allocation from the executive 
branch (Brummer, 2013, p. 4).  
Bureaucrats play an active role in the decision to participate in peacekeeping. For 
example, when the UN wants to ask Canada for troops, it sends the request to “Canada’s military 
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adviser at Canada’s permanent mission to the UN in New York, who then sends it along to 
Ottawa and the Department of National Defense and also to Foreign Affairs” (Taber, 2013). So, 
at least three departments, namely: the Prime Minister’s Office, the Department of Defense and 
the Foreign Affairs interact in the decision to send peacekeepers abroad.  
According to Marten (2008), “it is the culture of the foreign ministry bureaucracy that has 
played an important role in determining the tenor of Canadian peacekeeping over the years” (p. 
181). The domination by the Foreign Affairs office was consolidated by Pearson who insisted 
that bureaucrats, including Parliamentarians, should leave diplomacy for diplomats (Chapnick, 
2010). Yet, the Department of Defense managed to stave off some invitations like that involving 
Namibia in 1978 (Dawson, 2012). It also resisted the Foreign Affairs’ advocacy of human 
security soon after the Cold War ended (Dewitt & Plante, 2004). Ever since the Cold War ended, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development (DFATD) advanced “commitment 
to the practice of global citizenship” via “value based foreign policy” while the Department of 
Defense and Canadian Forces (DND/CF) “pursued missions and roles that stressed the military’s 
primary role as a combat-capable force” to defend Canada and “contribute to international 
security” (Desroisiers & Lagasse, 2009, p. 675). In regards to peacekeeping training, the 
Canadian Forces have adjusted the manner in which they conduct pre deployment peacekeeping 
training based on their accumulated over the past several decades (Grant-Waddell, 2014).  
During the Cold War period, the military training on peacekeeping has focused on basic 
combat (which concentrated on physical fitness), occupational specific skill development, and 
refresher courses like driving, weapons training, first aid, etc. After the Cold War ended, 
peacekeeping operations became more complicated as intra-state conflicts proliferated. As a 
result, the Canadian Forces gradually realized that it was necessary to incorporate additional 
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training pertinent to peacekeeping prior to deployment over extended period of time. As 
peacekeeping became a multidimensional task involving civilians and police components, the 
mission of Canadian peacekeepers also changed from separating conflicting parties to a closer 
interaction with the local population. This transformation obliged Canadian Forces to acquire a 
set of additional skills including: 
Negotiation and mediation techniques, general knowledge of the workings and 
mandate of the United Nations, a thorough knowledge of the Rules of Engagement, 
civil-military cooperation, humanitarian aid issues, stress management training and 
mission-specific training in local customs, culture, and language (Grant-Waddell, 
2014, p. 326). 
 
In sum, advocates of bureaucratic model believe Canadian peacekeeping decision is an 
outcome of the bargaining, compromise and conflict among different government departments 
such as the DFATD, DND and the Prime Minister’s Office. The DFATD has often dominated 
Canadian peacekeeping decisions. However, the DND has had an occasion to successfully 
challenge DFATD’s decisions while adjusting the training of Canadian peacekeepers as 
peacekeeping became more complex. The Prime Ministers have sometimes tipped the balanced 
whenever the two departments held opposing perspectives. 
Individual Decision-making in Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
The role of political leaders in peacekeeping decision is significant. Powerful individuals, 
i.e., “those with vested authority-- by a constitution, law or general practice to commit or 
withhold the resources of the government” (Hermann, 2001, p. 58) play a critical role in foreign 
policy decision making. In Canada, “decisions on whether and to what extent Canada should 
participate in UN peacekeeping missions are normally made at the cabinet level” (UNAC, 2013). 
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But the Canadian cabinet is assembled by the Prime Minister ,who, therefore, has the final say on 
whether Canada will be engaged or not. 
For example, when a Tuareg-led Islamist rebellion in Mali escalated in March 2012 
(Look, 2012), the UN Security Council issued a Chapter VII resolution to enforce peace to 
“counter the increasing terrorist threat in Mali” (UNSC, 2013). France responded to this call by 
sending troops on ground (Irish & Felix, 2013). While these developments took place, the 
Canadian Defense minister hinted that Canada might lend some support (Taber & McCarthy, 
2012). In contrast, the Foreign Minister said that Canada would not be engaged in Mali (Rennie, 
2012). At last, the Prime Minister settled the issue by declaring that Canada would lend France a 
transport plane and some vehicles but would not commit troops on the ground (Clark & York, 
2013).   
There are two major approaches to understanding how these political leaders make 
important decisions. The rational school argues that decision makers attempt to maximize their 
self-interests by calculating costs and benefits (Dottorato, 2011). The behavioral school attempts 
to excavate the cognitive and psychological factors that influence political leaders in making 
decisions (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). These approaches impart important insight on the role of 
Canadian political leaders in making decisions to participate/not participate in peacekeeping. 
The Rational Choice Theory and Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
The proponents of rational choice theory believe that decision makers do make (should 
make) cost-benefit calculations before they send peacekeepers abroad. Rational Choice theorists 
employ game theory and rational choice models to study how actors use the information they get 
to advance self-interest with less emphasis on moral standards (Alden & Aran; Mesquita, 2010, 
Goon, 2011). When leaders receive invitations to participate in peacekeeping, they calculate the 
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marginal utility of intervention by taking into account their preferred alternatives (intervention, 
letting others intervene or appeasement); the associated risk (death, casualty, damage, etc.) of 
intervention; and the national capacity (force size, logistical capabilities, etc.) to handle the task 
(Dottorato, 2011).  
Canada has identified a set of criteria to assist the government in making a rational choice 
to send peacekeepers abroad. The criteria listed below serve as indicators for the Canadian 
government to make rational decision on whether it is beneficial or costly for Canada to engage 
in peacekeeping.  
 A clear statement of the nature and extent of participation and the potential for achieving 
Canadian foreign policy objectives; 
 Analysis of the political, humanitarian, and military situation in the country/region of 
conflict; 
 An assessment of the physical risks to Canadians and of the probable duration of 
involvement; 
 The financial costs and other implications for Canada; 
 An assessment of whether government guidelines for participation are being followed; 
and 
 The different ways in which Canada could participate and an assessment of the lessons 
learned from participation in previous missions (CAG, 1996). 
 
In addition to the above, Granatstein (2011) suggested that, in order for Canada to 
participate in peacekeeping, members of the UN Security Council should demonstrate a “strong 
political will to act,” the “host nation (s)” should express their desire to pursue peaceful 
settlement of dispute, and Canadian forces should have a clear “exit strategy” (2011, p. 462). But 
the rational model “overstates the orderliness or linearity of” individual/group decision making 
process (Levy & Thompson, 2010, p. 132). The decision makers involved in Canadian 
peacekeeping will have difficulty in getting sufficient information on all criteria listed above 
(CAG, 1996). Even if they get sufficient information, they will need to reach consensus with 
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each other as they represent different interests and have different personalities (Hermann, 2006). 
The following section addresses the role of personality in Canadian peacekeeping decision. 
Political Psychology: The role of leadership in Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
When the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1957 to Lester B. Pearson for his role in resolving the Suez Crisis, it stressed that it was not 
giving the award the politician or the diplomat but to the individual who depicted rare personal 
qualities in the arduous struggle of restoring peace. As Gunnar Jahn (1957), the Chairman of the 
Nobel committee put it: 
It can perhaps be said that what Lester Pearson has done to prevent or stop war 
would not have been possible had he not been an active politician. That, of course, 
may be disputed. What I want to emphasize is that the Peace Prize has not been 
awarded to the politician or to the secretary of state as such, but to the man Lester 
Pearson because of his personal qualities- the powerful initiative, strength, and 
perseverance he has displayed in attempting to prevent or limit war operations and to 
restore peace in situations where quick, tactful, and wise action has been necessary to 
prevent unrest from spreading and developing into a worldwide conflagration (Jahn, 
1957).    
   
Mr. Jahn’s remark shows that personal qualities like “powerful initiative, strength, and 
perseverance [as well as] quick, tactful, and wise action” are decisive attributes that a leader 
should muster in restoring world peace. Subsequently, Mr. Jahn (1957) proceeded to summarize 
the birth and upbringing of Mr. Pearson but concluded that this detail “reveals nothing 
concerning what he has accomplished, how he has tackled the tasks with which he has been 
confronted, or why he has solved problems in the manner he has”. This aspect of leadership 
quality is the domain of political psychology. Political psychology offers a useful insight in the 
understanding of foreign policy decisions, including peacekeeping decisions. Unfortunately, 
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however, Levy (2013) lamented that most scholars of international relations have hitherto 
devoted their energy to the study of systemic and domestic factors which affect foreign policy:  
Political psychology occupies an uncertain space in the study of international 
relations and foreign policy. Longstanding but gradually receding conceptions of the 
international relations field as a series of paradigmatic clashes among realist, liberal, 
Marxist, and constructivist approaches, or even between rationalism and 
constructivism, leave little if any room for the beliefs, personalities, emotions, 
perceptions, and decision making process of individual political leaders. Many of the 
leading research programs in international relations field today-including realist 
balance of power and transition theories, the bargaining model of war, democratic 
peace and capitalist peace theories, and a variety of institutional theories-give little or 
no casual weight to the role of individual political leaders. Debates in international 
political economy commonly centered around system, state, and society-centered 
approaches while neglecting the individual level altogether...Constructivist 
approaches, which should in principle be open to the inclusion of psychological 
variables, have until recently given little attention to individual agency (Levy, 2013, 
p. 1)   
 
Scholars analyze the personality of political leaders using two methods known as 
idiographic and nomothetic approaches. When they directly analyze data from interviews, 
behavioral analysis, etc. without employing pre-specified personality categories, they are 
following an idiographic approach (Schafer, 2012). For instance, in his biography on Pearson, 
Cohen (2008) used Roland Michener’s description of Lester B. Pearson where he said: “Mike 
[Pearson’s nick name] was a delightful companion and personality [who]…was informal, 
approachable, [and] not aged by his war experience” (2008, p. 42).  On the other hand, when 
they use cognitive/psychological categories to profile leaders, scholars are following a 
nomothetic approach. Suedfeld et.al (2001) profiled Lester B. Pearson’s cognitive complexity by 
collecting his written verbatim (spoken or written) to determine the extent to which he 
differentiated (perceived more than one perspective to a given issue) and integrated (understood 
the relationship between the various perspectives) information and found out that Pearson 
exhibited high integrative complexity during the Suez Crisis where he “successfully negotiated 
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an end to the fighting and established the concept and reality of UN peacekeeping” (Suedfeld, 
2001, p.7). 
Political psychologists employ several personality categories other than 
cognitive/integrative complexity to profile leaders. They do this by classifying personality into 
three main branches, namely: motives, cognitive beliefs, and temperamental/interpersonal traits 
which Winter (2006) defined below:   
Motives: the different classes of goals towards which people direct their behavior. 
Power, achievement, and affiliation are among the most frequently studied motives. 
Cognitions and beliefs: specific beliefs, attitudes, and values, as well as more general 
styles. 
Temperament and interpersonal traits: consistent individual differences in style 
features, such as energy level, sociability, impulse control emotional stability, and 
styles of relating to others (2006, p. 35). 
Margaret Hermann made an important contribution to the study of personality and 
foreign policy decision making by introducing two sets of personality traits which categorize 
leaders based on their disposition towards peaceful or warlike foreign policy (Winter, 2006). 
According to Hermann, leaders disposed towards peaceful foreign policy (PFP) can be 
characterized as having: affiliation motivation, self-esteem, high integrative complexity, 
extraversion, and trustful (Winter, 2006). By contrast, leaders disposed towards warlike foreign 
policy depict power motivation, nationalism, self-confidence, low integrative complexity, 
dominance competitiveness, and distrust (Winter, 2006) (See Table 2.4). 
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Table 2. 4 Leadership personality and foreign policy disposition 
 Peaceful Foreign Policy 
Disposition (PFP) 
Warlike Foreign Policy  
Disposition (WFP)  
Motives Affiliation motive Power Motive 
Cognitive beliefs Self-esteem Nationalism, Self-
Confidence 
Cognitive Style High Integrative Complexity Low Integrative Complexity, 
Optimistic Explanatory Style 
Temperament and 
Interpersonal Traits 
Extraversion  
Trust 
Dominance Competitiveness  
Distrust 
Source: Winter (2006, p. 46) 
 It is possible to measure the PFP and WFP traits using Hermann’s Leadership Trait 
Analysis (LTA) indicators (See Table 2.5). The only exceptions are self-confidence and self-
esteem. According to Hermann, self-confidence is the sum total of self-esteem and self- efficacy 
(Winter, 2006). However, the LTA doesn’t offer a measurement technique for self-esteem or 
self-efficacy (Hermann, 2006). Due to this, self-confidence and self-esteem cannot be 
operationalized using LTA to gauge the disposition of leaders towards PFP or WFP. But the 
remaining traits listed in Table 2.4 could be measured using Hermann’s LTA. 
The need for power variable can be measured using Hermann’s LTA. In the profiler plus 
software, Hermann provides the average need for power score (Mn.=26, SD=.05) for 284 world 
leaders. Hence, the WFP disposed leaders depicting high need for power can be identified if they 
score above average (N=284, Mn<.26, SD=.05) in need for power whereas PFP disposed leaders 
having affiliation motivation can be identified if they score below average (N=284, Mn<.26, 
SD=.05) in need for power (See Table 2.5).  
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The nationalism variable associated with WFP leader can be operationalized using 
Hermann’s in-group bias. Hermann described nationalist leaders as individuals who prioritize 
“the maintenance of national sovereignty and superiority the most important objective of a 
nation” (Hermann, 1980, p. 8-9). Meanwhile, she defined in-group bias as “a view of the world 
in which one’s own group (social, political, ethnic, etc.) holds center stage [whereby] there are 
strong emotional attachments to this in- group, and it perceived as the best” (Hermann, 2006, p. 
214). These definitions indicate that nationalism is a political manifestation of in-group bias. 
Nationalist leaders, i.e., political leaders harboring a high conviction to “the maintenance of 
national sovereignty and superiority [as] the most important objective of a nation” exhibit a high 
in-group bias towards their nation state. Hence, if leaders exhibit above average (N=284, 
Mn>.15, SD=.05) in-group bias, they can be identified as nationalist leaders (See Table 2.5).  
Integrative complexity can also be operationalized using cognitive complexity score 
available in Hermann’s LTA index because these are identical (synonymous) concepts. 
According to Hermann, cognitive complexity is personality category explaining an individual’s 
cognitive style assessing the degree to which an individual differentiates the various aspects of a 
given issue and integrates them into a whole system (Post, Walker & Winter, 2006). Individuals 
with high cognitive/integrative complexity tend to see things as grey, rather than black or white. 
When compared with the 284 world leaders sampled in Hermann’s LTA profile, leaders who get 
above average conceptual complexity score (Mn <.59, SD=.06) can be identified as exhibiting 
higher conceptual/integrative complexity than other leaders. 
Similarly, the extraversion versus dominance competitiveness traits listed under PFP and 
WFP can also be operationalized using Hermann’s task versus relationship orientation scores 
found in LTA profiling method. Hermann derived these traits from Bales (1950) who classified 
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leaders based on their level of extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Winter, 
2006). Etheredge (1978) described an extroverted individual as “emotionally outgoing, loves 
crowds, [and] enjoys contact with many kinds of people. Leisure time spent with people” (1978, 
p. 438). Leaders that are relationship oriented exhibit extraversion because their primary goal is 
the preservation of harmony within their group. On the other hand, leaders that are task oriented 
are ready to compromise the harmony within their group if they are convinced that it will 
advance the goal of their group. Furthermore, a study done by Etheredge (1978) showed that 
“leaders judged to be high in extraversion supported cooperation with the Soviet Union, while 
more introverted leaders argued against cooperation” (Winter, 2006, p. 45). Their extraverted 
personality, therefore, induces relationship oriented leaders to pursue a peaceful foreign policy. 
On the other hand, when compared with relationship oriented leaders, task oriented leaders tend 
to exhibit dominant competitiveness. This trait disposes them towards confrontational or warlike 
foreign policy (Winter, 2006). 
Hermann’s LTA technique available in profiler plus software also measures distrust for 
others. It does this by assigning an average score (Mn=.13, SD=.06) on distrust of others for 284 
world leaders. So, if leaders scoring below average (N=284, Mn<.13, SD=.06) could be 
identified as having low distrust of others whereas leaders getting above average score (N=284, 
Mn>.13, SD=.06) in distrust of others may be identified as perceived as exhibiting high distrust 
of others (See Table 2.5).  
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Table 2. 5 Operationalization of WFP and PFP traits using Hermann's LTA profiling method 
LTA Personality Variables 
with average score for 
world leaders (N=284) 
Leaders disposed towards 
peaceful foreign policy 
(PFP) 
Leaders disposed towards 
warlike foreign policy 
(WFP) 
In group bias 
(Mn= .15, SD=.05) 
Low 
(Mn< .15, SD= .05) 
High 
(Mn>.15, SD= .05) 
Need for power 
(Mn= .26, SD= .05) 
Low 
(Mn< .26, SD= .05) 
High 
(Mn>.26) 
Conceptual Complexity 
(Mn= .59, SD=. 06) 
High 
(Mn< .59, SD=. 06) 
Low 
(Mn >.59, SD=. 06) 
Task Orientation 
(Mn= .63, SD= .06) 
Low 
(Mn< .63, SD=. 06) 
High 
(Mn>.63, SD=. 06) 
Distrust of Others  
(Mn= .13, SD= .06) 
Low 
(Mn< .13, SD=. 06) 
High 
(Mn>.13, SD=. 06) 
Source: Hermann (1999) 
Hitherto, scholars have not tried to utilize the operationalizing of WFP and PFP traits to 
understand peacekeeping decisions. The operationalization technique summarized in table 6 
enables one to determine whether leaders disposed towards PFP or WFP are more committed to 
international peacekeeping. This gives one an opportunity to analyze peacekeeping decision at an 
individual level of analysis.    
Operational Code 
Operational Code was introduced for the first time by Nathan Lietes (1951) who studied 
the political strategy of the Bolshevik Party based on the writings of Lenin and Stalin i.e. via 
qualitative content analysis. Leites did this by focusing on “the relations between the Party and 
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the outside world rather than the Party’s internal relations” (1951, xi). Leites attempted to 
generalize the principal belief systems of the Bolsheviks across twenty dimensions including 
their: orientation on the past and toward the future, organization, conduct in defeat and victory, 
deception, violence, retreat, and deals. The study of the Operational Codes of the Bolsheviks 
would, according to Leites (1951), prevent one from being misled by their “extreme reserve and 
deceptiveness toward the outside world” (1951, p. xiii), to shed light on the “strategy and tactics 
of socialism-communism” (1951, p. xiv), and to show that Bolsheviks believe that the 
“contemporary situation in international affairs to be explainable when its prototype can be 
found in Russian, or Party, history” (1951, p. xv).  
In 1967, Alexander L. George further refined Lietes’ Operational Codes by classifying 
the implicit and explicit beliefs of political actors into “two sets of questions—one a more 
general set of ‘philosophical’ issues, and other more specifically oriented to ‘instrumental’ or 
policy questions having to do with goals-means relationships (1967, p.vi) (See Table 2.6).  
Table 2. 6 Political and Instrumental beliefs of Political Actors  
Philosophical Issues Instrumental or Policy Issues 
1. What is the “essential” nature of political 
life? Is the political universe essentially 
one of harmony or conflict? What is the 
fundamental character of one’s political 
opponents? 
1. What is the best approach for selecting 
goals or objectives for political action?  
2. What are the prospects for the eventual 
realization of one’s fundamental political 
values and aspirations? Can one be 
optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on 
this score; and in what respects the one 
and/or the other? 
2.  How are the goals of action pursued most 
effectively? 
3.   Is the political future predictable? In what 
sense and to what extent? 
3.  How are the risks of political action 
calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
4.   How much “control” or “mastery” can one 
have over historical development? What is 
4.  What is the best “timing” of action to 
advance one’s interest? 
 
 
 36 
one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” 
history in the desired direction? 
5.   What is the role of “chance” in human 
affairs and in historical development? 
5. What is the utility and the role of different 
means of advancing one’s interests? 
Source: George (1967, p. vi-vii) 
George believed that these beliefs can be examined “on the basis of different kinds of 
data, observational opportunities, and methods generally available to political scientists” (1967, 
p. 6). George offered two techniques for assessing the role of operational codes in the decisions 
of political actors. The congruence procedure compares the consistency between the actor’s 
beliefs and his subsequent action whereas the process tracing procedure studies each of the steps 
taken by the political actors to identify what options she/he considered and which one’s she/he 
selected as a feasible course of action (Walker, 1990). Holsti (1970) further developed Operation 
Code by introducing a more distilled coding categories that classified political actors across six 
belief systems (See Table 2. 7). 
Table 2. 7 Belief Systems of Political Actors  
What are the 
fundamental sources 
of conflict? 
What is the fundamental nature of the political universe? 
Harmonious [Conflict is temporary] Conflictual [Conflict is 
permanent] 
Human Nature A: Conflict is caused by human 
misunderstanding and 
miscommunication. 
D: Conflict is a permanent 
condition caused by human 
nature. 
Attributes of Nations B: Conflict is caused by warlike 
states, miscalculation and 
appeasement are the major causes 
of war. 
E: Conflict is a permanent 
condition caused by 
nationalism. 
International System C: It is possible to restructure the 
state system to reflect the latent 
harmony of interests. 
F: Conflict is a permanent 
condition caused by 
international anarchy. 
 Source: Walker (1990, p. 408-11) 
Several scholars have utilized Operational Code to explain the philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs of world leaders (Walker, 2007; Walker &Schafer, 2000, 2006, 2007; Malici 
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& Malici, 2005; Feng, 2005; Marfleet, 2000; Crichlow, 1998; McLellan, 1971; Holsti, 1970). In 
a more recent study, O’Rielly (2012) assessed the attitude towards nuclear proliferation of two 
pairs of Indian (Indira Gandhi and Vajpayee) and South African (Vorster & De Klerk) using 
Operational Code and concluded that opposing belief systems of these leaders have determined 
their governments’ pursuit of nuclear programs. 
According to Marteen (2008) top officials in the government bureaucracy and political 
parties heavily influence Canadian peacekeeping decisions. Most importantly, Marteen argued 
that Lester B. Pearson has played a critical role in shaping the organizational culture of the 
Foreign Affairs of Canada. If this is the case, the belief system of Lester B. Pearson becomes 
more crucial in understanding Canadian peacekeeping decisions. Marteen (2008) noted: 
The engine of Canada’s decision over the years to repeatedly be a troop-lender has 
been a long standing, internal organization at Foreign Affairs Canada (CAC), 
formerly known as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT). This bureaucratic culture is traceable to the impact of a powerful 
individual who set the course of this organization in the 1950s, Lester B. Pearson ( p. 
167-68).  
There are very few studies which examine the Operational Code of Canadian leaders. 
There are two dissertation thesis that have been done on Canadian leaders. Lawrence (1974) 
wrote a PhD dissertation entitled “The Operational Code of Lester Pearson”. Michael (2005) did 
a Master Degree thesis entitled “Philosophical similarities and instrumental difference: an 
operational code analysis of Lester B. Pearson, Pierre E. Trudeau and Lloyd Axworthy”. 
Unfortunately, these studies are not accessible online. A further study needs to be done to 
explain the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Canadian leaders and the impact on their 
peacekeeping decisions.  
Conclusion 
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The chapter reviewed the literature on Canadian peacekeeping decision at the systemic, 
state, and individual levels of analysis. It showed how different theories offer varying 
interpretations of Canadian peacekeeping decisions. These different interpretations don’t 
necessary contradict each other. For example, by engaging in peacekeeping, Canadian 
governments have preserved the Western alliance, deterred communism, and earned a strong 
reputation as a symbol of cooperation. The contradictions arise when one tries to decipher why 
Canada retreated from peacekeeping. Is it because it didn’t see the need to maintain global 
cooperation? Or, is it because peacekeeping no longer secures regional alliance in the post-Cold 
War world order?    
At the systemic level of analysis, scholars offered different explanations for Canadian 
peacekeeping role. Realists were divided. Classical realists, for instance, explained Canadian 
peacekeeping in terms the preservation of national interest. Neo-realists, on the other hand, 
understood it as a natural expression of Canada’s ascent as a principal power. Furthermore, 
defense realists thought Canadians kept peace to deter communist expansion. Unlike realists, 
liberals believed Canadian peacekeeping was a gesture of cooperation rather than a tool for the 
preservation of national power. Yet, the Liberal version of cooperation varied. For principled 
liberals, Canada kept peace to promote democracy and human rights. For commercial liberals, 
Canada kept peace to remove hurdles to the free flow of goods and services worldwide. For 
institutional liberals, Canada kept peace because it was an active member of the United Nations. 
In contrast to realists and liberals, constructivists don’t think that it is possible to provide an 
objective interpretation of Canadian peacekeeping role. Instead, they are more interested in 
understanding how the concept of peacekeeping emerged and evolved over time. 
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This study also reviewed different domestic level explanations behind Canadian 
peacekeeping engagement. Advocates of the bureaucratic school, for example, believed that 
Canadian peacekeeping role is an outcome of the bargaining and negotiations between different 
government branches promoting different departmental interests. Others point to the fact that the 
Canadian government decides to participate in peace operations because of the strong Canadian 
public sentiment towards peacekeeping. But this argument faces problem when accounting 
Canada’s recent retreat from peacekeeping. Is Canada’s recent exit from peacekeeping the result 
of public frustration with the endeavor? Or is it the outcome of Canadian government’s neglect 
of public opinion? Or, is the answer more complicated than that? 
Just like the systemic and domestic levels of analysis, scholars also provided different 
explanations for Canadian peacekeeping at the individual level of analysis. The literature showed 
that leadership plays a decisive role especially when the bureaucracy is stuck in a stalemate. 
When the Canadian governmental departments confront each other on a given peacekeeping 
decision, the Prime Minister has a final say due to his executive power. Proponents of rational 
choice theory don’t believe this kind of stalemate is common because the Canadian government 
makes peacekeeping decisions based on a preset of criteria designed to increase the benefits and 
reduce costs associated with peacekeeping engagements. However, it is difficult to solicit 
sufficient information to meet all of the preset criteria.  
But if the Prime Minister has the final say, then his/her personality also matters. That is 
why this chapter reviewed the contribution made by political psychologists like Margaret 
Hermann (2006) who introduced a method of assessing the three major aspects of personality 
(motivation, cognition/belief, and interpersonal communication/temperament) to profile political 
leaders. Hermann further indicated that it’s possible to categorize leaders’ foreign policy 
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disposition (whether it’s peaceful or warlike) by identifying a list of measurable personality traits 
associated under each category. This raises an interesting question: are some Canadian leaders 
committed to peacekeeping because they have a personality traits which disposes them towards 
peaceful foreign policies? But there is no literature which examines the role of leadership 
personality on Canada’s peacekeeping decisions. This aspect of the relationship between foreign 
policy disposition and peacekeeping decisions in Canada will be treated widely in chapter six.  
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES 
 
Research Question and the Measurement of the Dependent Variable 
 
This study builds an integrative model that explains Canadian peacekeeping decisions at 
the domestic and individual levels of analyses. The research question is: “Why does Canada 
decide to participate in peacekeeping?” The dependent variable to be explained is “Canadian 
participation in peacekeeping.” This study adopts the United Nation’s definition of peacekeeping 
which is the provision of “security” as well as “political and peace-building support to help 
countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace” based on three principles, 
namely: “consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and 
defense of the mandate” (UNDPKO, 2013). Peacekeeping is thus a multidimensional task which 
requires soldiers to: 
 Maintain peace and security 
 Protect civilians 
 Facilitate political process   
 Assist in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants 
 Support the organization of elections, and 
 Project and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law 
(UNDPKO, 2013). 
A country’s participation in peacekeeping can easily be measured by counting the 
number of civilians and troops working under the UN or other regional organization. These 
figures can be retrieved from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNDPKO, 2013) dataset as well as other (hardcopy or online) secondary sources. 
Different hypotheses are tested by tapping theories across multiple disciplines. In order to 
exploit richer data and conduct stronger analysis, the study will use a mixed method approach 
(See Figure 3.1), which is a complementary application of quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Creswell, 2010).  
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Historical Approach  
 
Before proceeding to hypotheses testing, the study briefly explores the history of 
Canadian peacekeeping since the end of the Second World War. It employs the historical method 
via “radical simplification, which is “a concerted effort to interrogate the complexities and 
idiosyncrasies that have shaped the [Canadian peacekeeping] historical milieu” using three 
strategies: rational action, materialism and functionalism (Quirk, 2008, p.254). It traces how 
different Canadian governments sought to maximize their utility (rational action) by adjusting 
their contribution to peacekeeping over time under the rubric of limitations in material 
capabilities (materialism) and institutional norms and responsibilities (functionalism) (Quirk, 
2008). 
These data are collected from five sources of historical evidence summarized as follows: 
 Primary sources: original documents (online and hardcopy) generally held by 
public and private archival collections like the Canadian War Museum, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Development (DFATD), the Department of 
National Defense (DND), the Senate and Parliament as well as multilateral 
organizations including the United Nations Association of Canada (UNAC), the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and the 
Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); 
 Secondary sources: work of historians and other social scientists 
 Running records: agency reports and case notes;  
 Recollections: autobiographies, memoirs, oral histories and 
 Artifacts: art works, symbols and photographs (Danto, 2008, p.5). 
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Level of Analysis 
The research seeks to derive an integrative model of peacekeeping by testing two 
independent variables at the domestic and individual levels of analysis.  
Domestic Level of Analysis: Public versus Elite Opinion 
 
At the domestic level, the study will test the following hypothesis: 
H1 Public Opinion has a significant influence on Canada’s decision to participate in 
peacekeeping because its democratic system of governments obliges its executive 
branch to adopt foreign policies reflecting the popular will so as to stay in power by 
winning election. 
The above hypotheses can be tested by first assessing the trend of public opinion surveys 
on specific missions over the last six decades to generalize whether there is strong or weak 
support for peacekeeping and explain why by examining alternative interpretations. Vengroff 
et.al. (2003), for example, attribute public support to the consolidation of postmodern values like 
cosmopolitanism. Then, I will make a parallel account of the opinion from the executive (foreign 
and defense policy elites) and the legislative (senators, parliamentarians and political party 
platforms) branches of government by looking at whether they acknowledge public influence in 
international peacekeeping their speeches, interviews, public statements, and parliamentary 
debates pertinent to general or specific peacekeeping operations. In other words, I employed a 
sequential mixed method which is a quantitative method followed by qualitative (Creswell, 
2010). 
Individual level of analysis: Leadership Personality and Peacekeeping Policy Outcome  
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At the individual level of analysis, I have derived an integrated hypothesis based on 
Hermann’s integrative model of personality as summarized in the Table below review section.  
Table 3.  1 Indicators for War Versus Peace Disposed Leaders 
LTA Personality Variables 
with average score for 
world leaders (N=284) 
Leaders disposed towards 
peaceful foreign policy 
(PFP) 
Leaders disposed towards 
warlike foreign policy 
(WFP) 
In group bias 
(Mn = .15, SD= .05) 
 
Low 
(Mn < .15, SD = .05) 
High 
(Mn >.15, SD= .05) 
Need for power 
(Mn = .26, SD = .05) 
 
Low 
(Mn < .26, SD= .05) 
High 
(Mn >.26, SD = .05) 
Conceptual Complexity  
(Mn= .59, SD =. 06) 
 
High 
(Mn < .59, SD= .06) 
Low 
(Mn >.59, SD = .06) 
Task Orientation 
(Mn = .63, SD = .06) 
 
Low 
(Mn < .63, SD= .06) 
High 
(Mn >.63, SD = .06) 
Distrust of Others  
(Mn = .13, SD = .06) 
 
Low 
(Mn < .13, SD= .06) 
High 
(Mn >.13, SD = .06) 
 
Based on the above model, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H2 Leaders whose personality traits reflect low in-group bias, high need for 
power, high conceptual complexity, low task orientation, and low distrust of 
others are more supportive of international peacekeeping. 
The hypothesis has five dependent variables: low in-group bias, high need for power, 
high conceptual complexity, low task orientation and low distrust of others. Their definition 
(conceptualization) and measurement coding (operationalization) are stated below. 
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Conceptualization of PFP attributes   
 
 In-group bias: is a view of the world in which one’s own group (social, political, 
ethnic, etc.) holds center stage. There are strong emotional attachments to this in- 
group, and it perceived as the best (Hermann, 2006, p.214) 
 Need for power indicates a concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring 
one’s power; in other words, it is the desire to control, influence, or have an 
impact on other persons or groups (Hermann, 2006, p. 203) 
 Conceptual complexity: is the degree of differentiation that an individual shows in 
describing or discussing other people, places policies, ideas, or things. The 
conceptually complex individual can see varying reasons for a particular position, 
is willing to entertain the possibility that there is ambiguity in the environment, 
and is flexible in reacting to objects or ideas. In the opposite manner, the 
conceptually simple individual tends to classify objects and ideas into good-bad, 
black-white, either-or dimensions; has difficulty in perceiving ambiguity in the 
environment; and reacts rather inflexibly to stimuli (Hermann, 2006, p. 208-09) 
 Task orientation: suggests the relative emphasis a leader places in interaction with 
others on dealing with the problems that face the government as opposed to 
focusing on the feelings and needs of relevant and important constituents. For 
leaders who emphasize the problem, moving the group (nation, government, 
ethnic group, religious group, union, etc.) forward toward a goal is their principal 
purpose for assuming leadership (Hermann, 2006, p. 211). 
 Distrust of others: involves a general feeling of doubt, uneasiness, misgiving, and 
wariness about others-an inclination to suspect the motives and actions of others 
(Hermann, 2006, p. 215) 
  
Operationalization of PFP attributes 
  
 In-group bias: In coding for in-group bias, the unit of analysis is a word or phrase 
referring. The score for in-group bias is the percentage of times in an interview 
response that a leader refers to in groups that meet the criteria just outlined. 
 Need for power: Coding for need for power focuses on verbs. Is the speaker with 
this proposed action attempting to establish, maintain, or restore his or her power? 
Some of the conditions where the need for power would be scored are when the 
speaker (1) proposes or engages in a strong, forceful action, such as an assault or 
attack, a verbal threat, an accusation, or a reprimand; (2) gives advice or 
assistance when it is not solicited; (3) attempts to regulate the behavior of another 
person or group; (4) tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else so long 
as the concern is not to reach agreement or avoid disagreement; (5) endeavors to 
impress or gain fame with an action; and (6) is concerned with his or he 
reputation or position (Hermann, 2006, p. 203) 
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 Conceptual complexity: in coding for conceptual complexity, the focus is on 
particular words-words that suggest the speaker can see different dimensions in 
the environment as opposed to words that indicate the speaker sees only a few 
categories along which to classify objects and ideas (Hermann, 2006, p. 209) 
  Task Orientation: in coding for task focus…attention is directed towards 
counting specific words, in this case words that indicate work on task or 
instrumental activity, as well as words that center around concern for another’s 
feelings, desires, and satisfaction (Hermann, 2006, p. 211) 
 Distrust of others: in coding for distrust of others, the focus is on noun and noun 
phrases referring to persons other than the leader and to groups other than those 
with whom the leader identifies. Does the leader distrust, doubt, have misgivings 
about, feel uneasy about, or feel wary about what these persons or groups are 
doing? Does the leader show concern about what these persons or groups are 
doing and perceive such actions to be harmful, wrong, or detrimental to himself or 
herself, an ally, a friend, or a cause important to the leader? If either of these 
conditions is present, the noun or phrase is coded as indicating distrust (Hermann, 
2006, p. 215-16). 
 
Sampling Leaders 
The first step in testing this hypothesis is selecting a sample. The study will select four 
Prime Ministers (Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, and Harper) for three reasons. First of all, these 
Prime Ministers were in office after the Second World War when Canadian peacekeeping was an 
established norm. Second, they stayed in office long enough to make several peacekeeping 
decisions. And, third, there is abundant data of their interview transcripts readily available 
exceeding the 5,000 word threshold needed to meet Hermann’s LTA validity criteria (Hermann, 
2006). Accordingly, I have collected over 35,000 words of interview transcripts given by the 
four Prime Ministers during their tenure in office from Canadian and American press outlets 
found on the internet. With the exception of Harper’s interview transcripts (12,350 words), I 
gathered Trudeau’s (5100 words), Mulroney’s (8500 words), and Chrétien’s (10,000 words) 
from Canadian media sources. I inserted these transcripts in the Profiler Plus software to 
determine their Leadership Trait Assessment (LTA) score relative to world leaders. It is 
important to compare Canadian Prime Ministers with world leaders (and not just with Western 
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leaders) because peacekeeping is an international endeavor that preoccupies world leaders to 
varying degrees. Then the study triangulated the findings from the quantitative analysis with 
qualitative evidence widely treated in the historical chapter to ensure validity. Having done this, 
it then proceeded to see if the Canadian Prime Ministers whose personality exhibit PFP 
disposition also demonstrate greater commitment to international peacekeeping. In order to 
assess the level of commitment to international peacekeeping, the study examined the number of 
peacekeepers these leaders sent abroad during their tenure in office.  
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed how it employs a mixed method research design to answer: “why 
does Canada decide to participate in peacekeeping?” (See Figure 1.1). It formulated two 
hypotheses based on the Almond-Lipmann consensus and Hermann’s leadership trait assessment 
theory. The first hypothesis stipulates that public opinion influences Canada’s decision to 
participate in peacekeeping whereas the second hypothesis argues that Canadian Prime Ministers 
whose personality attributes show a disposition towards peaceful foreign policy are exhibit a 
greater commitment to international peacekeeping. In order to test these hypotheses, the chapter 
explained how it utilizes both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The intended goal of this 
study is to help the researcher as well as other academicians and policy makers to better 
understand the impact of public opinion and leadership personality in governments’ (including 
Canada’s) decisions to send peacekeepers abroad. As a prelude to testing the two hypotheses, the 
following chapter offers a brief sketch of Canada’s peacekeeping history, which is a descriptive 
study intended to just inform readers on the evolution of Canadian peacekeeping rather than 
explain their peacekeeping decisions. 
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CHAPTER 4: BRIEF HISTORY OF CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING 
 
Canada has contributed significant number of peacekeepers to the United Nations and 
paid huge sacrifice in the process. It has provided over 120,000 peacekeepers to the United 
Nations where 122 Canadian peacekeeper have died in 16 peacekeeping missions (See Table 
4.1). Today, Canada ranks as the 61st out of 120 countries for contributing 116 peacekeepers to 
the UN. On the other hand, Canada ranks as the 9th top financial contributor to the UN for 
providing 2.98 percent of the 2013 total UN peacekeeping budget of $7.54 billion (UN, 2013a). 
Although Canada had been a leading peacekeeping nation since 1948, its personnel contribution 
to the UN continued to decline since 1997. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section reviews how Canada embarked 
on the realm of peace operations from 1948 to 1956. The second section discusses Canada’s 
leadership in peacekeeping from 1956 to 1978. The third section explores how Canada dealt with 
the resurgence of peacekeeping from 1988 to 1998. The fourth section dwells on the decline and 
fall of Canadian peacekeeping after 1998. And, finally, the fifth section summarizes the 
noteworthy aspects in the history of Canadian peacekeeping. 
Table 4. 1 Number of Canadian Peacekeepers fatalities by mission as of November 30, 2014 
Year Mission Canadian 
Fatality 
2004 MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) 9 
1999- MONUC (UN Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo) 1 
1960-64 ONUC (UN Operation in the Congo) 3 
1993-96 UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) 1 
1974 UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force-Israel/Syria) 4 
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1956-1967 UNEF (UN Emergency Force-Egypt/Israel) 53 
1964-2006 UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) 29 
1993-96 UNMIH (UN Mission in Haiti) 1 
1999-2002 UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) 2 
1949 UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan) 
1 
 UNOHCI 2 
1992-95 UNOSOM (UN Operation in Somalia) 1 
1995-99 UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment Force) 1 
1992-95 UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force-Croatia) 11 
1992-93 UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia) 
1 
1948-49 UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) 2 
 Total 122 
Source: UN, 2014a 
Canada and the birth of peacekeeping 
 
Canada played an active role in the birth of peacekeeping due to major international and 
domestic transformations following the Second World War. The culmination of the Second 
World War led to the birth of new nations. However, their transition to nationhood was rough for 
at least three reasons. First, the former colonial powers didn’t want to transfer full control. 
Second, the new nations couldn’t agree over the division of some territories. And, third, the 
effort by the two post-War superpowers to align the new nations to their own side divided the 
leaders and triggered civil wars. These factors boosted the demand for peacekeepers. The 
transfer of power from King to St. Laurent transformed Canada’s foreign policy from 
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isolationism to internationalism. After King retired, Canada no longer hesitated to shoulder 
international responsibilities by sending peacekeepers abroad.  
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the Canadian government was not 
interested in getting involved in European conflicts. Prime Minister King thought that Canada 
has neither the will nor the capacity to intervene in European conflicts. In a House of Commons 
debate on March 1939, King stressed that Canada should embrace the resurgence of nationalism 
worldwide by focusing on nation building at home rather than following Britain in wars:     
In many, but certainly not in all cases, this growth of national feeling has 
strengthened the desire for a policy which its defenders call minding one’s own 
business and which its critics call isolationism. Assuming, it is urged, that Canadians 
like other people will put their own interests first, what do our interests demand, 
what amount of knight errantry abroad do our resources permit? Canada, it is 
contented, is not a country of unlimited powers, it has not the capacity to stand 
indefinite strains. We have tremendous tasks to do at home… (King, 1939/1973, 
p.10). 
Despite King’s intention to protect Canada from international conflict, Canada was 
dragged into the Second World War because Germany, Italy, and Japan were too dangerous to 
appease. When the Second World War ended in 1945, King delegated the task of managing 
External Affairs to Louis St. Laurent. Unlike King, however, St. Laurent believed that Canada 
should play an active role in world affairs. St. Laurent declared this radical shift towards 
internationalism during the Grey Lecture which he gave on June 1947 by outlining the five 
pillars of Canada’s post-War foreign policy as: the preservation of Canadian unity, respect for 
political liberty, abiding by the rule of law, abiding by Judeo-Christian values, and the sharing of 
international responsibilities. St. Laurent believed that Canada’s security is guaranteed if it plays 
an active role in international organization by saying: 
I know that there are many in this country who feel that in the past we have played 
too small a part in the development of international political organizations….If there 
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is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is this: security 
for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international 
organization (St. Laurent, 1947).  
Canada stepped up to share its international responsibilities when the United States 
included Canada in the UN temporary commission (UNTCOK) to supervise election in Korea 
without prior consultation (Stairs, 1968). The United States wanted to withdraw from Korea by 
transferring power to Koreans by organizing a national election and thought that Canada’s 
participation in the UNTOCK would facilitate its interest (Stairs, 1968). Although the UN 
General Assembly welcomed the US proposition, the Soviets, who controlled the northern 
portion of Korea, refused to cooperate with the UNTCOK (Stairs, 1968). When this happened, 
the US proposed that elections should take place in Southern Korea, the area which it occupied. 
Canada, together with Australia, objected to this plan and threatened to withdraw because they 
thought it would divide the country for good. When the UNTCOK commission members took a 
vote, four (China, India, El Salvador, Philippines) favored election, two members (France and 
Syria) abstained, and two (Canada and Australia) opposed it. As a result, Canada decided to 
accept the majority’s verdict and agree on South Korean election (Stairs, 1968). 
The St. Laurent administration also carried out Canada’s international responsibility by 
selling King’s NATO idea. This idea was originally coined by Britain in 1947 to deter possible 
military encroachment by the Soviets (Reid, 1967). Canada preferred to commit its troops solely 
to UN led military operations but was unable to do so because that authority was reserved only 
for the members of the UN Security Council. As the head of Canada’s External Affairs, Escott 
Reid (1947/1973) indicated that Canada was left with an opportunity of expressing its concerns 
only at the General Assembly meetings. On August, 1947, i.e., one month after Reid expressed 
 
 
 53 
his frustration, Canada was selected as one of the 11 countries in the UN Special Commission on 
Palestine (UNCOP) (Moghalu, 1997).  
After deliberating on the fate of the Jewish state recognized in Palestine following the 
Belfour Declaration of 1917 and the Arab communities in Palestine, the UNCOP decided on the 
separation of the two communities over a two year transition plan administered by the UN, 
whereby Jerusalem would be controlled by the UN. This decision provoked anger and violence 
among Palestinians, and prevented the plan from being implemented (Urqhart, 1993). On May 
1948, however, the British left Palestine, the Jewish people established the state of Israel, and the 
Egyptians ushered the way for Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to intervene in Palestine. 
Although the UN declared a cease-fire deadline on June 11, 1948, it was ignored. On September, 
1948 the UN chief negotiator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was killed by Israeli’s Stern Gang 
(Goldstein, 2011). Hence, the responsibility of setting the ground rules for UN’s first military 
observer group (UNTSO) fell on the shoulders of the acting UN mediator at the time, Ralph 
Bunche. Urquhart (1993) wrote:    
[The UNSTO] was the first UN military-observer group-indeed, the first UN 
peacekeeping operation-and there were no precedents for it. The first and most basic 
principle was strict impartiality and objectivity. Bunche also insisted that the 
observers should be unarmed, something alien to the traditional military mind. He 
believed that this was vital for the observers’ own safety and would put them above 
the conflict they were monitoring, whereas carrying individual weapons would only 
endanger them. Bunche’s rule became the accepted practice in all UN Observer 
missions (p. 161)  
On December 1948, the UN established the UNMOGIP to monitor the border dispute 
between India and Pakistan. The two countries were separated on August 1947 as per the Indian 
Independence Act ratified by both countries. The Act authorized the people in Jammu and 
Kashmir to determine where they belonged and they decided to remain within India. After this 
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took place, however, India accused Pakistan of agitating the people in the region to revolt by 
submitting its complaint to the UN Security Council. Pakistan denied this allegation. Instead, it 
blamed India for illegally occupying the region. As a result, the UN formed the Observer Group 
in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by assigning 69 military observers in the region on December 
1948 to monitor the situation.  
If Prime Minister King had not retired in 1949, Canada would not have participated in the 
UNMOGIP because he was not eager to engage Canada in international conflicts. Also, had St. 
Laurent and Pearson not succeeded King to become Canada’s post-War leaders, Canada would 
probably have declined to participate. Both St. Laurent and Pearson were strongly interested in 
involving Canada to share the burden of the United Nations. As Caroll (2009) wrote:  
[King’s] Cabinet, in the words of one senior official, was “allergic” to the idea. By, 
1949, however King had retired and his ironclad grip on Liberal policies has been 
loosened. The issue was eventually referred to the new prime minister, Louis St. 
Laurent, and the secretary of external affairs, Lester B. Pearson…[The two] were a 
new breed of Canadian politician-internationalists-and were more than happy to 
expand Canada’s role in the world. Four officers were duly dispatched to UNMOGIP 
in 1949 (Caroll, 2009, p. xviii-xix) 
Accordingly, Canada contributed four military observers to the UNMOGIP, including the 
chief of the mission. Brigadier General H.H. Angle died in plane crash while leading the mission 
on July 1950. He is the first Canadian soldier who died in a peacekeeping operations (Conrad, 
2011). General Angle is also the highest ranking Canadian military officer who lost his life in a 
peacekeeping operation (Dorn, 2005).  
In 1953, the newly appointed Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag 
Hammarskjöld, requested Canada to contribute troops to the UNTSO mission to contain the 
growing tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors (MacKay & Swift, 2012). Canada 
readily accepted this invitation by assigning Major General E.L.M. Burns, who served as the 
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former commander of the Canadian Corps in Italy to lead the mission. Initially, General Burns 
thought that the mission was as futile as “trying to stop a runaway truck on a steep hill by 
throwing a stone under the wheel” (Granatstein, 2002, p. 343). Later on, however, he appreciated 
his experience by saying that he “learned something about the attitude of Asian, Middle Eastern, 
and South American people towards the monster of the age, Imperialism” (MacKay & Swift, 
2012, p.140).   
According to Maloney (2002), the Canadian government decided to participate in the 
UNTSO in order to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting the different stands between the 
United States, which supported Israel, and Britain, which was in favor of the Palestinians, in the 
Middle East. In the meantime, Mackay and Swift (2012) noted that Canada’s primary interest 
was that of supporting the United Nations by implementing its Charters. The fact that Canada 
was invited to participate in the UNTSO it shows that Canada didn’t have any ulterior motive 
other than supporting the United Nations. If Canada had some latent interest, it would have 
requested the UN to get involved in UNTSO. Perhaps reconciling the difference between the US 
and the UK might have been one factor that led Canada to get involved in UNTSO after it was 
invited. In any case, even if Canada wanted to strengthen the relation between its allies by 
preventing a Soviet interference, it doesn’t mean that Canada doesn’t support the UN. The 
Canadian government could have pursued its national interest without compromising its support 
for collecting security. In any event, however, Canada only contributed 11 observers to the 
mission. Hence, regardless of its intension, its impact on the mission could at best have been 
very limited.  
Canada made a numerically significant contribution to peacekeeping for the first time to 
the International Control Commission (ICC) in 1954 by sending 150 peacekeepers (Conrad, 
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2011). The ICC was a non-UN peacekeeping mission established by Great Britain, the United 
States, China, and the Soviet Union in the former French colony of Indo-China, which includes 
today’s Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The ICC was set up to facilitate the smooth dissection of 
Indo-China into the three sovereign countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Canada joined as 
a representative of the Western block just like Poland was a representative of the Communist 
bloc and India represented the non-aligned states.  
Although Canada contributed over 170 troops to serve in two UN sponsored, and in one 
non-UN led peacekeeping operations, its primary military occupation between 1950 and 1953 
was focused in the UN authorized peace enforcement mission to liberate the newly founded 
Republic of South Korea from North Korea’s invasion. This debacle can be traced back to 1949, 
when the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949, and the great powers vetoed its 
admission to the UN, leading to the Soviet boycotting of the UN. At the same time, the Chinese 
encouraged North Koreans to invade South Korea, which enabled the US to succeed in 
convincing the UN Security Council to ratify the first UN-led peace enforcement mission 
composed of 375,000 multinational troops to repel North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. 
Canada quadrupled its 5,000 troops, fought in Korea until it ended on July, 1953, where 312 
Canadians died in action; 94 died in battle related causes, 1,202 got wounded; and 32 were taken 
as prisoners of war.  
The principal reason for Canada to make the above sacrifice rests in its strong 
commitment to the UN Charter. On the other hand, the circumstance that allowed the UN to 
function was the Soviet Union’s temporary boycott of the United Nations over protest regarding 
the banning of China’s new communist regime from the United Nations. Pearson summarized 
this fact during two House of Commons debates on August and September 1950 as follows: 
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If the issue raised by the attack on the Republic of Korea was clear, so was our 
obligation under the charter of the United Nations. That obligation, I should say 
once, is to the United Nations alone, and to our own security….We consider this to 
be no academic matter, but to be a very important principle…. 
What happened in June in the Security Council because of the rather fortuitous 
absence of the U.S.S.R. and because of the initiative and leadership of the United 
States of America, changed the whole character of the United Nations, at least for the 
time being, and changed it for the better (Pearson, 1950/1973, p. 65). 
Basically, Canada has already given up on committing troops to the UN because of the 
Cold War gridlock. Due to this, Canada’s military was focused on defending North America and 
the Arctic. As Pearson (1950/1973) explained it, until June 1950, Canada never thought it could 
play a critical military role within the UN: 
Canadian defence policy…until June of this year, had been based on the concept of 
providing a small, highly skilled, regular army, charged with responsibility of doing 
its immediate share of North American defence, especially in the Arctic, and 
designed to be capable of rapid expansion in the event of a general war which require 
Canada to be defended outside of Canada. The furnishing to the United Nations on 
short notice of expeditionary forces capable of quickly deployment in distant areas 
wherever acts of aggression might take place had not, I admit, entered into our 
planning as it had not entered into any other country (Pearson, 1950/1973). 
 
In conclusion, the birth of new nations after Second World War and the beginning of the 
Cold War increased the demand for peacekeeping. Domestically, King’s retirement and St. 
Laurent’s accession as a Prime Minister changed Canada’s foreign policy from isolationism to 
internationalism. As a result, Canada readily accepted UN’s invitations to participate as a peace 
observer in UNMOGIP (in India and Pakistan), in UNTSO (in Israel and Palestine), and in the 
ICC (in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). Canada also played a significant role in the UN peace 
enforcement mission in Korea by sending 20,000 soldiers to reverse the Chinese-North Korean 
invasion of South Korea in 1950. But the UN Security Council endorsed this mission because the 
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Soviet Union boycotted the UN when other members of the Security Council vetoed the 
admission of Communist China in the United Nations.     
Canada leads peacekeeping: The Suez Crisis and its aftermath 
 
Canada made the most important contribution to peacekeeping during the Suez Crisis. 
The crisis was triggered by Nasser’s plan to establish Egypt as a leading military power in the 
Middle East (Aburish, 2004). Initially, Nasser sought to solicit military aid from the United 
States. However, this plan failed because of the Jewish lobby in the United States. So, Nasser 
made a $250 million arms deal with Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia in exchange for 
Egyptian cotton (Carroll, 2009). Nasser planned to generate funding by expanding Egyptian 
irrigation system. In order to attain this goal, Nasser had to expand the Aswan Dam. Initially, 
Nasser wanted to solicit $400 million from the World Bank and $200 million from Great Britain 
while extracting a $900 million worth of Egyptian labor (Carroll, 2009). However, the West 
suspended funding because of his arms dealing with the Soviets. Therefore, he decided to 
nationalize the Suez Canal in order to generate sufficient funding to build the Aswan Dam by 
evicting the predominantly British (44 percent) and French investor owned Compagnie 
universelle du canal maritime de Suez (Carroll, 2009).  
Although the West was angered by the nationalization of the Suez Canal. But it was 
divided on how to address the issue. Eighteen countries including Canada, the United States and 
Australia advocated that Nasser should be pressured to pass down control of the Suez Canal to 
the United Nations. By contrast, Britain, France, and Israel wanted to overthrow Nasser by 
invading Egypt (Thomson, 1967/1973). Great Britain hoped for Canada’s military assistance in 
 
 
 59 
the event of military confrontation with Egypt. However, Canada’s leaders urged them to settle 
the dispute through the United Nations (Thomson 1967/1973).  
During a NATO conference on September 3, 1956, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Selwyn Lloyd, hinted to Pearson, the secret plan it hatched with France and Israel by telling him: 
“if things drag on, you know, Israel might take advantage of the situation to move against 
Egypt…They’d probably win, Nasser would go, and most of our troubles would be solved for 
us” (Thomson, 1967/1973, p.76). Pearson rejected this plan by saying:  
Ingenious idea [but] it won’t work. A few Arab leaders are sitting tight on the fence 
now. An Israeli attack would unite them all behind Nasser. I hope you won’t do any 
urging in that direction. The repercussions would be terrible (Thomson, 1967/1973, 
p.76) 
Canada’s stance on the Suez was, according to Pearson, “the most dramatic 
indication…that Canada had really come of age… [It] set the seal on the development of our 
independence in foreign affairs” (Carroll, 2009, p.37). On October 24, 1956, Britain, France, and 
Israel made a secret plan in Paris for Israeli paratroopers to attack Egypt on October 30, 1956, 
and for Britain and France to intervene under the pretext of enforcing a cease-fire. On the same 
date, the US submitted a draft resolution to the UN its members to suspend all aid to Israel until 
it exited Egypt. The Soviet Union also supported this plan. But Britain and France vetoed the 
resolution. As a result, the case was passed down from the UN Security Council to General 
Assembly for a final vote.  
The next day, St. Laurent sent a telegram to his British counterpart that Canada supported 
the sanctions on Israel. However, he also dispatched Pearson to New York on November 1, 
1956, to meet the US Secretary of State, J.F. Dulles and mend the fracture between Canada’s 
closest allies. During a dinner meeting, the two diplomats exchanged the following words: 
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[Pearson:] We’re interested in helping Britain and France…I would like to make it 
possible for them to withdraw with as little loss of face as possible, bring them back 
into alignment with the United States… 
[Dulles]: That’s not possible at this time…They’ve damaged the whole cause of 
freedom by placing us in an inferior position morally to the Communists. We could 
be having a showdown with Russia right now over this Hungary situation [for 
overthrowing the Hungarian government] but for their actions (Thomson, 1967/1973, 
p. 81)  
After meeting Dulles that evening, Pearson called St. Laurent to ask for his approval that 
Canada would best achieve its aim if it abstained during the General Assembly voting the next 
morning, on November 2, 1956, and persuade British and France to accept Canada’s plan of 
placing UN forces in Egypt. After calling members of his cabinet, St. Laurent agreed with 
Pearson. Accordingly, 65 nations supported the US plan, five countries (including France, 
Britain, and Israel) opposed it, and six countries (including Canada) abstained (Thomson, 
1967/1973). After the vote was taken, Pearson addressed the General Assembly and explained 
the ceasefire resolution was insufficient to guarantee political resolution of the dispute without 
placing UN forces in the border between Egypt and Israel (Pearson, 1956/1973).  
During his UN General Assembly address on November 2, 1956, Pearson said that 
Canada regretted its abstention for two reasons. The first cause of regret was Canada’s failure to 
support Britain and France, which he explained as follows: 
…I confess to a feeling of sadness, indeed, even distress, at not being able to support 
the position taken by two countries [Britain and France] whose ties with my country 
are and will remain close and intimate…two countries which are Canada’s mother 
countries…(Blanchette, 2000, p. 40) 
The second reason why Pearson regretted his abstention has to do with the resolution’s 
failure to address the aftermath of the return to status quo. As the extract from his statement 
show, Pearson pointed out the resolution doesn’t provide any post-cease fire/post-withdrawal 
solution.  
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The resolution does not provide for a cease-fire…But alongside cease-fire and 
withdrawal of troops, it does not provide for any steps to be taken by the United 
Nations for a peace settlement… 
I believe there is another omission from this resolution…The armed forces of Israel 
and Egypt are to withdraw, or, if you like, to return to the armistice lines, where 
presumably, if this is done, they will once against face each other in fear and hatred. 
When then? What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? 
Are we to return to status quo? Should a return to a position of security or even to a 
tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, 
charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which the United 
Nations armistice commission would be powerless to prevent and possibly even to 
investigate (Pearson, 1956/1973, p.84).  
Pearson clearly grasped the fact that, unless addressed adequately, ceasefires could 
relapse to violence. In addition to outlining this insight in a clear manner, Pearson also proposed 
an ingenious solution that furnished the conditions necessary for addressing disputes adequately, 
namely: peacekeeping forces. Pearson explained his proposed panacea that he had wished for the 
resolution to accommodate, as follows: 
I therefore would have liked to a provision in this resolution-and this has been 
mentioned by previous speakers-authorizing the Secretary General to begin to make 
arrangements with member governments for a United Nations force large enough to 
keep these borders at peace while a political settlement in being worked out…My 
own Government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a 
United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force (1956/1973, p.84). 
Thus, Pearson uplifted the idea of peacekeeping from its UN bureaucracy domain as seen 
in the UNTSO to the world stage. If Pearson did not invent the concept of peacekeeping, he was 
the first politician who appreciated its use, and sold it to world leaders. Pearson familiarized 
peacekeeping, which has been practiced in a limited manner by UN’s negotiators like Ralph 
Bunch, to world leaders, and, by doing so, he managed to upscale the size and resources of 
peacekeeping. Following this, the opposition at the House of Commons as well as the leading 
Canadian newspapers like the Globe and Mail, Calgary Herald, and Maclean’s criticized 
Pearson for abandoning Canada’s mother countries (Britain and France), for following the US 
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lead, and for suggesting an imaginary UN police force rather than NATO to keep the peace in the 
Suez (Granastein, 1973, Carroll, 2009).  
Meanwhile, the US redrafted another resolution in line with Pearson’s idea and asked him 
to submit it to the General Assembly under Canada’s draft resolution (Carroll, 2009). After 
making few reviews, Pearson submitted a draft to the General Assembly which got ratified by 
the General Assembly without facing a single opposition, with 57 support and 19 abstention as 
GA Res. 99 (ES-I) on November 2, 1956. The resolution assigned the Secretary General of the 
UN the following tasks. 
…to submit to it [the General Assembly] within forty-eight hours a plan for the 
setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international 
United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in 
accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution (Carroll, 2009, p.56).   
Based on the above instruction, the UN issued another resolution 1000 (ES-I) which set 
the framework of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF) on November 5, 1956. This resolution 
assigned the Canadian General E.L.M. Burns as the “Chief of the Command [authorized] to 
recruit, from the observer corps of UNTSO, a limited number of officers who were nationals of 
countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council, and…to 
undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the permanent 
members of the Security Council…” (UN, 2003). Hence, Canada’s top leader (St. Laurent), top 
diplomat (Pearson), and top general (Burns) coalesced to mastermind (proposing and selling the 
idea of peacekeeping among nations) and facilitate (by recruiting multinational peacekeepers and 
commanding them) the peaceful resolution of the Suez Crisis through peacekeeping. Pearson 
was awarded the Nobel Prize for the vital role he played to end the Suez Crisis peacefully. 
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In 1957, St. Laurent’s Liberal party was defeated by the Conservatives led by 
Diefenbaker. As a leader of an opposition party, Diefenbaker criticized the Liberal party for 
abandoning Great Britain to stand with the United States during the Suez Crisis of 1956. But this 
objection was focused on Suez Crisis rather than against peacekeeping itself. Diefenbaker 
believed that peacekeeping is essential for containing the escalation of conflict. At the same time, 
however, Diefenbaker also thought that the stability created by peacekeepers could trigger 
procrastination among conflicting parties who may overlook the urgency of addressing their 
differences by writing: 
It is my general view that peacekeeping forces have their uses in preventing brush-
fire wars from becoming widespread conflicts. But they are at best a stop gap 
measure. Political questions can only be settled politically, and often peacekeeping 
forces work against political settlement in that they alleviate the urgency to find 
solutions to the problems that necessitated the creation of peacekeeping force in the 
first place (Diefenbaker, 1976, p. 128) 
Regardless of his skepticism over peacekeeping, Diefenbaker engaged Canada in three 
peacekeeping operations. The largest of these missions was the United Nations Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC) whereby Canada contributed 1,910 peacekeepers. The Congo erupted due to the 
power struggle between Congolese elites exacerbated by Belgium’s interventions. After Congo 
became independent in 1960, the Congolese troops began to terrorize the white population in the 
country. As a result, “Belgium responded by sending forces to reoccupy the country and helping 
Congo’s richest province Katanga, secede” (Weissman, 2014). Lacking the power to stabilize his 
country, Lumumba pleaded with the UN to send peacekeepers and stop the violence. As a result, 
the UN established the ONUC on July 1960 “to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist 
the [Congolese] government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance” 
(UN, 2001). The mission involved up to 20,000 personnel, including 1,910 Canadian 
peacekeepers (Conrad, 2011).      
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Scholars interpreted Canada’s decision to get participate in the ONUC in terms of 
Canadian public pressure, preventing the Soviets from getting involved in Congo, and the 
assurance that Canada will risk itself by sending combat troops. Granatstein (2002) believed 
strong public opinion pressured Canadian leaders to engage in Congo. Besides intensive 
coverage by leading Canadian newspapers, Spooner (2009) pointed out that a poll collected in 
1960 showed the general public considered the crisis in Congo to be the second most alarming 
incident to Canadians following the Soviet threat. But it is difficult to establish this argument 
based on a single poll result.  
On the other hand, Maloney (2002) argued that Canada participated in the Congo to 
pursue the Cold War by other means. The fact that Diefenbaker (1972) was staunch anti-
communist is indisputable. As he put it in his autobiography, “neutrality may be expedient for 
some countries. It is not for us. Canada’s geopolitical position denies it…Canada’s interest are 
promoted by staying in the circle [NATO] it belongs, by contributing to the strength and wisdom 
of that circle” (1972, p. 137-38). However, as demonstrated in his refusal to support the Kennedy 
administration during the Cuban missile crisis, Diefenbaker was not unconditional loyalist to the 
West. In the case of Congo, despite its NATO membership, Diefenbaker rejected Belgium’s 
request to establish a military base in the Congo and support Kassavubu, the secessionist leader 
in the Katanga province.  
A third explanation regarding Canada’s initial hesitation and subsequent decision to join 
the ONUC was given by Spooner (2009) who argued that Canada participated after making sure 
that its troops will not be involved in combat operations. He wrote: 
The government was keen to limit the possibility of Canadian casualties. This largely 
explains Diefenbaker’s initial reticence; he mistakenly assumed the UN would ask 
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Canada for combat forces. His change in attitude is attributable to the subsequent 
clarification of the UN’s request: Canada was asked to contribute only non-combat 
personnel. The government also placed restrictions on where army and air force 
personnel could serve within the Congo, to further reduce the change of casualties 
(2009, p.222). 
Whether the government submitted to public opinion, protected Western interest, or 
shouldered non-combat responsibility, Canada’s participation in the ONUC remains the largest 
single contribution to date. Apart from this mission, the Diefenbaker administration also sent 77 
observers to UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, and provided 11 personnel to 
the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) in 1962. After winning over 
Pearson’s bid for election in 1958 and 1962, Diefenbaker was finally defeated by the Liberals in 
1963. Although he tried to come back in 1963 and in 1965, he did not succeed (Cohen, 2008). 
Two weeks after becoming Prime Minister, Pearson travelled to the US and hammered a deal 
with John F. Kennedy to equip Canadian Forces with a nuclear weapon (Clearwater, 1998). This 
initiative led Trudeau to abandon his decision to join the Liberal Party for two years. During the 
same year, Canada sent 50 observers to Yemen (UNYOM).  
In 1964, Canada was to engage in its longest peacekeeping service in Cyprus (Conrad, 
2011). Because of its strategic location, Cyprus has remained under the control of powerful 
empires for 3,500 years until it became independent from the British in 1960. Its first President 
who was a Greek dissent, ratified a constitution that was not favorable to the Turkish minority. 
This disagreement triggered a conflict in 1964 and caused the United Nations to establish the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) whereby Canada contributed up to 1,000 battalions 
to the mission. Until 1993, around 25,000 Canadians have served in the UNFICY (UN, 2006). 
Although Pearson dispatched Canadian peacekeepers to Cyprus swiftly, he was disappointed by 
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the lack of enthusiasm among other countries for peacekeeping. In an op-ed entitled “A New 
Kind of Peace Force” which he wrote for Macleans on May 2, 1964, Pearson lamented: 
How long must the United Nations go on improvising in times of crisis? How long is 
the burden to be carried by a few member states, while too many others merely stand 
by, or obstruct? 
…How long must we wait before the UN makes provision in advance to deal with 
these local crises before they become general wars? I believe that arrangements to 
prevent the spread of “brushfire wars” can be and must be made; we must have a 
force that can do this brushfire job, and do it well (Pearson, 1964/1973, p. 151). 
Besides the dearth of participating countries, Pearson also resented the lack financial 
commitment by non-participating countries. He attributed this lack of interest in strengthening 
peacekeeping to the Soviet opposition and the suspicion of certain countries of imperialist 
ambitions (Pearson 1964/1973). According to Pearson, the NATO was established because the 
UN Security Council was rendered dysfunctional by the Cold War rivalry. In the same way, 
Pearson (1964/1973) argued that middle powers could and should strive to establish a separate 
peacekeeping force ready to serve the United Nations whenever crisis occurs by asking:  
Why should they not discharge their own responsibilities individually and 
collectively by organizing a force for this purpose, one formally outside the United 
Nations but ready to be used on its request?  
To do so would require a number of middle powers, whose credentials and whose 
motives are above reproach, to work out a stand-by arrangement among themselves 
consistent with the United Nations charter (Pearson, 1964/1973, p. 153). 
Unfortunately, the middle powers did not set up a stand-by force until 1997 where they 
formed the SHIRBRIG (Stand-by High Readiness Brigade) which they dismantled on June 30, 
2009 after serving in one mission. However, as Pearson would note and regret later, international 
peacekeeping wasn’t only weakened by resources but also due to a limited mandate. In 
particular, Pearson was not satisfied by the principle of consent which entitled countries to admit 
or evict peacekeepers as they saw fit.  
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Pearson would once again encounter this problem in the same place where he was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing peace thought peacekeeping. In 1967, the Egyptian 
President evicted the UNEF forces from his country and staged a concerted war against Israel 
together with Syria and Jordan and was defeated in six days. As a result, Israel occupied the 
Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.   
Pearson retired in 1968 and was succeeded by Trudeau. Unlike Pearson who made 
peacekeeping Canada’s top priority, however, the Trudeau administration relegated 
peacekeeping to a fourth place among Canada’s defense priorities (CDP, 1971). This decision is 
mainly the result of Canada’s frustration over its mediation experience in Vietnam since 1954 
where it was accused of bias towards the US-backed South Vietnam government. It was also 
associated with Canada’s disappointment over its eviction from Egypt which resulted in another 
Egyptian-Israeli war five years later in 1973. 
On October 1973, Egypt teamed up with Syria and staged a surprise attack against Israel 
to restore the Israeli occupied territories. Despite initial retreat, Israel succeeded in defeating 
Egypt and surrounded its 3rd Army. This forced Egypt to plead with the Soviet and the US to 
enforce a ceasefire by sending troops. This gave birth to the second UN Emergency Force 
(UNEF II) was established in 1973. Initially, Egypt did not want Canada to participate because o 
its strong ties with Great Britain. Later on, however, it was later convinced by the UN Secretary 
General that no other country aside from countries like Canada could provide an effective 
logistic officers for the mission. Canada, therefore, provided 850 of the total 6500 peacekeepers 
to the UNEF II (Conrad, 2011).  
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In the meantime, the fighting on the Syria-Israel border intensified. This led the United 
Nations to form the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on March, 1974. Canada 
contributed only 19 peacekeepers to this 6,000 massive force. This mission incorporates 1,378 
peacekeepers and continues to operate to date (UN, 2013). Subsequently, the Palestinian 
Liberation Front based in Lebanon attacked Israel, triggered Israeli reprisal, and culminated in 
Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon on March 1978. As a result, the Lebanon government 
appealed to the UN Security Council which, in turn, set up the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) to facilitate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, to restore peace and security, and 
reinstate the government. Canada contributed 850 peacekeepers to the total UNIFIL 
peacekeeping forces of 6,000. This mission also continues to this day where 10,741 UN 
peacekeepers from 38 countries remain stationed in Lebanon (Conrad, 2011).  
On September, 1978, Israel signed the Camp David Accords with Egypt. This treaty 
ensured that Egypt would regain the Sinai Peninsula in return for promising never to intervene in 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This was followed by a peace treaty between the two countries 
which constituted an agreement to admit U.N forces and observers to be placed in their common 
border. Egypt’s request for UN peacekeepers was turned down by the United Nations Security 
Council because of the Soviet Union’s veto on May, 1981. This led the U.S, Israel, and Egypt to 
sign a protocol establishing the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) on August 1981 
(Ghali, 1993). 
Trudeau’s administration in Canada welcomed the peace treaty but declined to engage 
Canada in the MFO because the United Nations did not endorse it. In addition, Canada’s foreign 
minister, Mark MacGuigan, stated that he “was not ultimately disposed to offer any moral 
support to [Israel’s Prime Minister] Begin or to do any favors to an unduly aggressive Israeli 
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government” (MacGuigan & Lackenbauer, 2002, p.158). By contrast, Canada’s undersecretary, 
Allan Gotlieb, believed that Canada should participate in the MFO. However, MacGuigan noted 
that “the prime minister [Trudeau] was even less disposed than I [MacGuigan] to accommodate 
Begin” (MacGuigan & Lackenbauer, 2002, p.159). Further, Trudeau (1993) also recalled in his 
memoir that his relations with the Israeli prime minister has been “strained” since 1978 when he 
turned down Begin’s request to change Canada’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem 
(1973, p. 214). These tensions convinced Canada not to get involved in MFO.   
The Mulroney government which took power in 1984 reversed Trudeau’s decision to 
abstain from MFO by providing 140 troops and nine CH-135 Twin Huey tactical transport 
helicopter in 1985 because he believed that declining “to participate, while several other 
Canadian allies were doing so, would have been viewed negatively” (Tessier & Fortmann, 2001, 
p.118). The MFO is still operational today with 1673 serving from 13 countries whereas 
Canada’s participation has dropped to just 28 peacekeepers (Conrad, 2011). The MFO was the 
only mission where Canada participated during Mulroney’s first term in office. After Mulroney’s 
second term in 1988, however, UN peacekeeping revived after a decade of dormancy. As the 
following section will elaborate, after 1988, international peacekeeping increased in volume and 
complexity. 
Canada embraces the resurgence of UN peacekeeping 
 
From 1948 to 1978, the UN launched thirteen peacekeeping operations. All of these 
conflicts were associated with decolonization. Most of them, five out of thirteen, were 
established in the aftermath of the Israel-Arab wars. Between 1978 and 1988, the UN 
peacekeeping became dormant mostly because of the Cold War related gridlock in the UN 
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Security Council (Pearson, 1964/1973). As the Cold War tensions declined in the late 1980s, the 
UN launched 13 peace operations. Canada welcomed this change and participated in all of the 13 
UN peacekeeping missions, including in three non-UN peace operations in Nigeria (OTN 1968-
70), in Vietnam (ICC, 1954-74), and in Egypt (MFO, since 1986) (CF, 1998). 
The UN peacekeeping operation increased in volume and complexity after 1988 due to 
huge transformations in the supply as well as the demand for peacekeepers (Bellamy & 
Williams, 2010). On the supply side, the end of the Cold War made UN Security Council more 
efficient and allowed more countries to get involved in peace operations (ibid). The global mass 
media revolution also exposed the appalling nature of the raging conflicts worldwide to the 
Western public and their governments (Ibid). On the demand side, the post-Cold War 
environment was dominated by several intrastate conflicts that required external intervention 
(Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Hence, in the period between 1988 and 1994, the United Nations 
launched more peacekeeping operations (20 missions) than it did during the previous forty years 
(13 mission) (UN, 2013a). At the same time, the total number of UN peacekeepers between 1989 
and 1994 grew by more than seven fold from 11,000 to 75,000. Furthermore, the scope of the 
missions also expanded beyond the traditional task of separating conflicting parties to include: 
 Help implement complex peace agreements, 
 Stabilize the security situation, 
 Reorganize military and police, and 
 Elect new governments and build democratic institutions (UN, 2013a). 
 
The Mulroney administration embraced the surge of peacekeeping from the outset by 
providing over 4,400 peacekeepers in 12 UN peace operations between 1988 and 1993 (Conrad, 
2011). Canada devoted the largest number of its peacekeepers in Somalia. After the Somalians 
became independent from the British and Italians in 1960, they elected a President who ruled 
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over the country for eight years until he was assassinated in 1968 (Njokou, 2013). This power 
vacuum triggered a military coup d’état led by Colonel Siad Barre. Barre ruled over Somalia for 
twenty two years until he fled to Nigeria following a civil war which erupted in 1991.   This 
vacuum created two major factions led by the interim President and the defense, who fought in 
the street of the capital.  
The civil war in Somalia killed 300,000 people from of starvation and exposed 5 million 
to hunger. The UN set up the UNOSOM I on April 1992 in order to address this tragedy by 
providing humanitarian relief (UN, 2003). Canada contributed 750 military personnel to this 
mission (Conrad, 2011). Four months later, President Bush offered to mobilize US- led troops to 
facilitate UN’s delivery of humanitarian aid, received UN approval, and established the UN Task 
Force (UNTAF). Canada provided over 1,500 troops to UNITAF’s peacekeeping force (Conrad, 
2011).After the major factions in Somalia signed a peace accord in Ethiopia on March, 1993, the 
UN launched UNOSOM II whose primary task included disarming, demobilizing, and 
reintegrating combatants. Canada offered only 7 personnel to this mission.  
Overall, Canada supplied over 2,240 peacekeepers to stabilize Somalia (Conrad, 2011). 
Unfortunately, this great contribution was eclipsed after a handful of Canadian Airborne 
personnel tortured and killed a Somali teenager whom they allegedly caught stealing items at 
their camp (Razack, 2004). The media broadcasted the rampant racism which afflicted these 
soldiers and caused massive uproar among Canadians. The Chrétien administration set up a 
commission to investigate the case. However, the Commission went beyond the case to examine 
the interdepartmental conflict within the government bureaucracy and spent $15 million in two 
years (Chrétien, 2007). As a result, the Chrétien administration closed down the Commission in 
1995.   
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Six months after the Somalian debacle, a violent conflict erupted in the former 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was an amalgam of over twenty ethnic groups and three religions 
(Christian orthodox, Muslims, and Roman Catholics) created by the allied forces in 1918 (Meier, 
2013). The Yugoslav monarch signed a pact with Germany but was overthrown by the military. 
This provoked Germany and Italy to invade Yugoslavia and empower Croat elites who 
massacred the Serbs (Meier, 2013). As a result, a number of guerilla factions mushroomed in 
Yugoslavia until the communist faction led by Tito prevailed in 1945. Tito eased up the 
nationalist tensions by creating autonomous provinces (West, 1995). After Tito died in 1980, the 
provincial presidents ruled over Yugoslavia for ten years on a rotating basis. However, beginning 
with ethnic Albanians’ demand for Kosovo’s independence in 1981, various ethnic groups also 
called for a cessation. Accordingly, Slovenia and Croatia attained independence on June, 1991. 
The attempt by the Yugoslavian government to preserve unity by force triggered an etho-
religious civil war (Banac, 1993).  
Canada responded to the crises by calling for international intervention in countries 
where human rights were abused. On September 1991, Mulroney delivered an important speech 
at Stanford University where he said: “we favor re-thinking the limits of national sovereignty in 
a world where problems no borders” (Mulroney, 1991). Subsequently, Mulroney’s newly 
appointed foreign minister, Barbara McDougall, urged the UN to set aside “its principle of non-
intervention in order to end the conflict in Yugoslavia” on July, 1991 (Gammer, 2001, p.80). The 
UN formed a Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on February 1992 where Canada contributed 15 
peacekeepers to this mission (Conrad, 2011).  
The UN decided to increase its UNPROFOR capacity in order to ensure a secure flow of 
relief aid. Accordingly, Canada dispatched two mechanized battalions composed of 1500 troops 
 
 
 73 
to a town called Visoko where the Serbs, the Muslims, and the Croats fought for control 
(Conrad, 2011). But there was no peace to be kept by Canada in this town. Instead, they 
encountered hostile forces who kidnapped 450 UN peacekeepers, including 55 Canadian troops 
(ibid). This led the NATO to contemplate an airstrike against these forces in Yugoslavia. While 
this crisis was taking place, the Liberals under Chrétien won an election on October, 1993.   
On December 28, 1993, Serbian soldiers captured 11 Canadian peacekeepers, “lined them 
up against a wall and opened fire above their heads” (Sudetic, 1993). This angered Chrétien 
(2007) who insisted on pulling all peacekeepers out of Yugoslavia. On January 1994, NATO 
members gathered in Brussels to decide on whether they should wage an air strike against 
Bosnian Serbs. Chrétien (2007) opposed this proposal vehemently: 
I took a strong issue with a U.S proposal to launch airstrikes against the Bosnian 
Serbs. Air strikes, I believed, would only incite the Serbian forces to retaliate against 
the Canadian peacekeepers whom they had trapped in the “safe area” around the 
town of Srebrenica. “If you think air strikes are so necessary militarily,” I told 
Clinton during the NATO meeting, “fine, but try them somewhere else.”…In the 
face of my strong objection, the United States backed down, and we later joined 
France and the United Kingdom in preventing the Americans from lifting the arms 
embargo by threatening to withdraw our forces from Bosnia (2007, p.88-89). 
Later on, however, Canada agreed to NATO airstrike which ensued on late 1994. Once 
again, the Serbs kidnapped UN peacekeepers and used them (Canadians included) as human 
shields. Nonetheless, the UNPROFOR finally managed to ensure a ceasefire agreement between 
the Bosnian government and its two challengers, namely: the Croat and Serbian rebels residing 
in Bosnia. The UNPROFOR then broken down into UNCRO (United Nations Confidence 
Restoration Operation in Croatia), UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force), 
and UNPF (United Nations Peace Force) on March 31, 1995 to assure operational effectiveness. 
NATO’s Stabilization Force (NATO-SFOR) also entered the former Yugoslavia with a 
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maximum strength of 30,800 where Canada contributed 1,230 troops (Conrad, 2011). The 
increasing riskiness of peacekeeping in the 1990s, obliged Canada to retreat from the endeavor.  
The Decline of Canada’s Peacekeeping Role 
 
The Chrétien administration was not eager to send Canadian troops to peacekeeping. Its 
main concern was addressing the domestic budget deficit by curbing the resources allocating to 
foreign aid, the diplomatic corps, and military (Nossal, 1998). However, Chrétien didn’t stop the 
ongoing peacekeeping missions started by his predecessor. Accordingly, Canada was actively 
involved in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Although Chrétien was not interested in getting 
involved in Haiti, East Timor, and Ethio-Eritrean missions, he was later convinced by his allies 
such as the United States (in Haiti) and the Netherlands (in the Ethio-Eritrean border). Also, 
Canada wouldn’t have been involved in East Timor, if the Indonesian President didn’t call for 
the UN to intervene there. Except for these missions, Canada’s overall contribution to UN 
peacekeeping mission under the Chrétien administration fell to a historic low level.  
One of Canada’s most important peacekeeping missions under the Chrétien government 
was executed in Haiti. This small country has been subjected to foreign occupation and brutal 
dictatorships for 500 years until President Aristide won in a free election with 67 percent of votes 
on December, 1990 (VA, 1991). Nine months later, General Cedras staged a coup and overthrew 
Aristide who, in turn fled the country. The US led the international community and put heavy 
pressure on the dictator until he finally agreed to readmit the President to power on July 1993. 
Later on, however, General Cedras changed his mind until September 1994 when the UN 
authorized multinational force composed of 6,000 troops was led by the US in ousting the 
dictator (UNMIH, 1996).  
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President Clinton asked Chrétien to join the UN authorized multinational forces. But 
Chrétien (2007) declined be telling him: “we didn’t see deposing dictators as our role in the 
world. We preferred to try to make the economic sanctions work and, if an invasion proved 
absolutely necessary, to go into Haiti afterwards to help in its reconstruction…” (2007, p.90-91). 
Hence, from 1993 to 1996, Canada only put a naval embargo over Haiti’s military dictatorship. 
But, after the tensions cooled down in 1996, Canada sent 750 peacekeepers to serve under UN’s 
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) (Conrad, 2011).    
Three years after the Haiti crisis, Canada was called upon to participate in another small 
island in the Pacific Ocean, East Timor. Timor was colonized by Portugal in 1600 until 1749 
when its western part was taken over by the Dutch in 1749 (UNTAET, 1999). The Eastern half 
remained under Portuguese control until they left in 1974. In 1975, East Timor’s political party 
known as Frelitin declared independence but was defeated by Indonesia which annexed it until 
1998 when its longtime dictator, Suharto, resigned. On March 1999, Indonesia agreed to stage a 
referendum for East Timorese. Together with Portugal, Indonesia also authorized the UN to 
supervise the process. This resulted in the formation of the UN Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNAMET) on June 1999. Soon after the referendum took place, violence erupted 
between independence and integration supporters. On September 12, 1999, the UN Security 
Council authorized an Australia led multinational force (INTERFET) (UNTAET, 1999). 
Canada got involved reluctantly in the INTERFET. On September 9, 1999, Canada’s 
foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, cautioned that “we have to be conscious of a peacekeeping 
force landing there and being opposed by the Indonesian military. I don’t think that would be a 
very sound policy” (Hataley & Nossal, 2004, p. 10). Canada’s concern over Indonesia’s consent 
was offset when it became clear that the Indonesian President was preparing to ask for UN 
 
 
 76 
intervention on September 12, 1999. As a result, Canada committed 650 troops to serve as 
peacekeeper in East Timor. 
A year after committing troops in East Timor, Canada was involved in yet another 
peacekeeping mission in the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), 
established on June 2000 (UN, 2009). The war between the two countries erupted in 1998 over 
border dispute because there was no clear border demarcation in place when Eritrea seceded 
from Ethiopia in 1993 through popular referendum after waging an independence war for over 
thirty years. The two countries agreed to a cease fire in 2000 after 70,000 people died and 
370,000 Eritreans and 350,000 Ethiopians plunged into humanitarian crisis (Economist, 2003; 
UN, 2009). Although Canada never intended to participate in UNMEE, the Netherlands declared 
that it will not engage in UNMEE unless the Canadians joined them. Chrétien (2007) recalled 
how Canada decided to send 450 troops to UNMEE as follows: 
In 2000…President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria was mediating the conflict 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea in his capacity as chair of the Organization of African 
Unity and wanted UN observers to supervise a peace settlement. The Dutch were 
interested, but only if Canada agreed as well. Prime Minister Wim Kok and I 
discussed the matter and we decided that our countries would participate together, as 
we had in Bosnia. Both President Bouteflika and Kofi Annan, the UN’s secretary 
general were grateful that we were willing and able to move so quickly (2007, p.333) 
After the UNMEE mission, Canada’s participation in peacekeeping fell sharply. The 
following graph depicts Canada’s yearly average contribution to UN peacekeeping as a 
percentage of the total annual average number of UN peacekeeping since 1993. When Chrétien 
took office in 1993, Canada contributed 4 percent of total UN peacekeepers. Canada maintained 
this percentage for three years until 1997. However, in 1998, Canada’s average contribution 
dropped by half to 2 percent and continued to descend (UN, 2013). When Chrétien retired in 
2003, Canada personnel contribution to UN peacekeepers stood at 0.6 percent. The Martin 
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administration continued along this trend by further decreasing the number of Canadian 
peacekeepers in the United Nations to 0.2 percent (ibid). When Harper took office in 2006, 
therefore, Canada’s total contribution to the UN peacekeeping was already insignificant. Perhaps 
the most notable change during Harper’s term was the fact that Canada’s police contribution to 
UN peacekeeping was greater than its military contribution (CP, 2013). As of January 31, 2015, 
Canada provides 80 police force, 11 military experts, and 22 troops to the UN peacekeeping, 
which is 0.001 percent of the total 104, 496 peacekeepers serving the UN (UNDPKO, 2015). 
 
Figure 4. 1 Average Percentage of UN Peacekeepers from Canada 
Source: UN (2013) 
While Canada retreated from peacekeeping, the total number of UN peacekeepers 
continued to rise at an increasing rate since 2000. The total average number of UN peacekeepers 
in 1999 was 12,581 (UN, 2013). This figure almost tripled in 2000 where the total average 
number of UN peacekeepers increased to about 33, 759. From the period when Chrétien stepped 
down (2003) to the time when Harper became a Prime Minister in 2006, the total average 
number of UN peacekeepers almost doubled from 39,118 in 2003 to 75, 658 (UN, 2013). The 
total average of peacekeeping continued to increase since 2006 where the total average of UN 
peacekeepers in 2013 has almost tripled to 94, 713 (See Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4. 2 Total average number of UN Peacekeepers (1993 -2013) 
Source: UN (2013) 
Canada’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping remains small when compared with other 
G8 members. Its contribution to the UN is better only when it’s compared to US and Russia, 
both of whom provide only 104 peacekeepers to the UN and rank 64th out of 120 countries as of 
2013 (UN, 2013). By contributing 1,339 personnel and ranking 22nd out of 120 countries, Italy is 
the top G8’s UN peacekeeper, followed by France (995 peacekeepers and 26th rank), the United 
Kingdom (281 peacekeepers and 48th rank), and Japan (196 peacekeepers, 54th rank) (UN, 2013).  
Canada’s contribution of 116 personnel among the 12 remaining members of the G20 
countries is also very small. Of course, there are G-20 states like Mexico and Saudi Arabia which 
rank 27th and 21st respectively in terms of military strength but don’t provide any personnel to 
the UN peacekeeping (GPF, 2013). Despite having a long history as a middle power like Canada, 
Australia’s contribution to UN peacekeeping has also fallen to only 55 personnel, placing it as 
the 76th out provider of UN peacekeeping out of 120 countries (UN, 2013).  By contrast, India 
and China, which have the 4th and 3rd powerful militaries, provide 7,848 and 1,938 peacekeepers 
to the UN respectively, placing India as the third top peacekeeper and China as the 17th top UN 
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peacekeeper nation (UN, 2013). Emerging countries like South Africa (2,187 UN peacekeepers, 
13th rank), Indonesia (1,712 UN peacekeepers, 19th rank), and Brazil (1,509 UN peacekeepers, 
21st rank) are also important partners of the UN peacekeeping. These are followed by South 
Korea and Turkey which contribute 613 and 356 peacekeepers to the United Nations. So, except 
for Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Australia, the United States, and Russia, Canada’s participation in UN 
peacekeeping is the least among the G20 members (UN, 2013). 
Today, Canada’s role in contemporary peacekeeping can be categorized as what Coleman 
(2012) termed as a “token contribution” where countries make symbolic contributions to 
peacekeeping. Coleman classified Canada among token contributing states such as Finland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. These are countries which used to contribute a 
lot to UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s; but are nowadays more involved in NATO 
stabilization operations. According to Coleman (2012), these countries supplied 11,875 
peacekeepers to the UN peacekeeping in 1992. But, in 2011, they sent only 94 peacekeepers. In 
the meantime, these countries have had 93,337 troops at NATO’s International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  
Interestingly, Coleman (2012) noted, token contributions have certain advantages for the 
concerned state. At the policy making stage, token contributions eliminate the hard choice 
between sending or not sending peacekeepers to a middle ground of sending a very small number 
personnel. Also, at the operational level, token contributors are entitled to attend every meeting 
concerning the mission and stay informed. Coleman quoted how one member of the intelligence 
section at the UNFIYP described what Canada gets in return for providing just one peacekeeper 
to the Cyprus mission (UNFICYP) as follows: 
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As long as there is a Canadian contribution, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN 
goes to all meetings, is privy to all the information, and has a say in what happens 
with the mission. Whether your contingent is a thousand or it’s one, you still have a 
voice (Coleman, 2012, p. 55). 
To conclude, Canadian peacekeeping in the 21st Century has fallen to a symbolic level. 
To be exact, this decline started in 1998 and may be the result of Canada’s reaction to the 
peacekeeping scandal in Somalia and the high risk encountered in Yugoslavia. Of course, the 
domestic political (Quebec’s referendum and power politics) and economic (free trade and 
recession) factors in Canada have also diverted Canada’s attention and resources. So, until the 
conservative government took office in 2006, Canada’s retreat from peacekeeping may be 
attributed to resource and attention constraint.  
After 2006, however, the conservative government questioned the very legitimacy of 
peacekeeping as a source of Canadian pride and identity (Mackay & Swift, 2012). Instead it 
sought to replace this image by stressing of Canada’s role in international conflicts. Today, the 
Canada Forces are well equipped and experienced. They also have very little NATO 
commitment. However, as long as the conservative government stays in power, the prospect of 
Canada’s return to peacekeeping remains gloomy.   
Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrated that the history of Canadian peacekeeping has had a strong 
presence in the past, a token existence in the present, and a gloomy prospect in the future.  When 
the effectiveness of international peacekeeping was contentious, Canadian leaders espoused the 
idea, contributed troops, recruited others, and commanded missions. Lester B. Pearson played a 
critical role in resolving the Suez Crisis by recommending peacekeeping forces to stabilize the 
region. But Canadian leaders were often frustrated by the inefficiency caused by the Cold War 
related gridlock within the UN Security Council. Despite harboring skepticism over the 
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effectiveness of peacekeeping, Diefenbaker engaged Canadians in major UN peace operations, 
including the ONUC mission in Congo where Canada contributed over 1,900 peacekeepers.   
Although Pearson’s initiative to resolve the Suez was successful, Nasser expelled UN 
peacekeepers a decade later to start a war with Israel. The UNEF experience was so frustrating 
for Canada that Pearson’s successor, Trudeau, relegated peacekeeping from its top place during 
Pearson’s era to a fourth place in Canada’s 1971 defense White Paper. Nonetheless, the Trudeau 
government did not reject UN’s invitations to participate in subsequent peace operations. It even 
sent back troops to serve in Egypt under the UNEF II. If Canada had been a leading 
peacekeeping nation during Pearson’s period, it nonetheless remained as a loyal peacekeeper to 
the UN during Trudeau era. But its loyalty was not tested adequately because the UN didn’t 
launch a new peace operation from 1978 to 1988. 
As the Cold War tensions cooled down in the late 1980s, the gridlock within the UN 
Security Council cooled down. This improvement allowed the UN to launch more peace 
operations in six years (twenty missions between 1988 and 1994) than it did in the previous four 
decades (thirteen missions between 1948 and 1988). The Mulroney administration encouraged 
this development by advocating for the international community’s right to intervene in countries 
that exercise a violent repression of human rights of their citizens. Canada also took a leading 
role in peacekeeping by contributing up to 10 percent of the total number of UN peacekeepers in 
the early 1990s.  
Despite Canada’s positive response, however, the post-Cold War peace operations proved 
to be more dangerous and complicated than previous missions. In Somalia, Canada was mired in 
a scandal after some soldiers tortured Canadian peacekeepers committed a crime; in the former 
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Yugoslavia, its peacekeepers were attacked; and, in Rwanda, Canada failed to lend an assistance 
to its General who, as the commander of the mission there, was trying to stop the genocide from 
taking place. But, it was not just Canada that experienced the tragedy of failed peace operations 
but rather, the United Nations as an organization (Annan, 2012). As a result, the UN reviewed its 
overall peacekeeping practice and devised a strategy to address the challenges of peacekeeping 
in the 21st Century (UN, 2008). Based on this strategy, the UN boosted its number of 
peacekeepers worldwide. By contrast, Canada’s contribution to UN peacekeeping started to 
decline.  
After 1998, the number of Canadian peacekeepers started to decrease at an increasing 
rate. Although this decline was reflected in the numbers, the liberal governments continued to 
support peacekeeping by training peacekeepers and advocating human security. In 2006, 
Harper’s conservative government not only continued to reduce the number of peacekeepers but 
also questioned whether Canada’s role in peacekeeping has been eclipsing military history, 
which it believes to be more important. As of January 31, 2015, Canada contributes only 113 
peacekeepers to the UN, thereby taking a 69th place out of 121 nations.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON CANADIAN GOVERNMENT’S 
PEACEKEEPING DECISIONS 
 
This chapter examines the impact of public opinion on Canadian peacekeeping decisions 
from 1948 to date. Before answering whether public opinion dictates (or even influences) 
Canadian government’s decision to send peacekeepers, however, it is important to lay out how it 
is possible to determine that public opinion does in fact affect peacekeeping decision. There are 
two possible correlations between public opinion and peacekeeping decisions. Sometimes, public 
opinion has had a positive correlation with Canadian government’s peacekeeping decisions. 
More often than not, public opinion has been supportive of Canadian engagement in 
peacekeeping. So, the challenge is to determine if public opinion has triggered Canada’s active 
peacekeeping commitment or is a result of those decisions and how they are framed. There were 
also times, especially in the recent years, when public opinion has had a negative correlation 
with Canadian government’s peacekeeping decision. In these cases, the challenge is to answer 
whether the Canadian government overlooked public opinion in its peacekeeping decisions.  
Canadians have largely exhibited a positive attitude towards Canada’s participation in 
peacekeeping. However, the impact of this support on Canadian government’s decision to send 
peacekeepers abroad has varied. Although King’s administration initiated public opinion polling 
in Canada, it wanted to use public opinion to set the government agenda to influence citizens 
rather than reflect public interest. St. Laurent’s government, on the other hand, reflected public 
interest by engaging in international peacekeeping more actively. Diefenbaker didn’t want to 
abandon peacekeeping; however, he thought Canada should participate on a selective basis. 
Pearson’s policy towards peacekeeping was a continuation of St. Laurent’s internationalism 
(Bromke & Nossal, 1983/84). Evidences show that both the Trudeau and Mulroney 
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administrations (1968-1993) consulted public opinion in their peacekeeping engagements. But, 
after the mid-1990s, the Chretien, Martin, and Harper administrations, although for different 
reasons, ignored public opinion towards peacekeeping and reduced Canadian participation to 
historic low levels.  
This chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section explains how Canadian 
leaders’ desire to exercise independent foreign policy obliged them to accept their top diplomats’ 
proposal to adopt functionalism as an underlying foreign policy principle for Canada. It also 
discusses how the Second World War led Canada to utilize public opinion polls and implement 
its functionalist principle on an international scale. It goes on to explain how Canadian public 
and governments’ attitude towards peacekeeping remained similar during the Post-War years. It 
then analyzes the state of public opinion and government policy during Canada’s major 
peacekeeping engagements in Korea, the Suez, and the Congo to show that Canada’s 
peacekeeping policy reflected public interest. 
The second section demonstrates how peacekeeping setbacks in Cyprus, Congo (now the 
DRC), and Egypt cooled down public support for peacekeeping. It discusses how this led the 
Trudeau administration to demote peacekeeping to a third defense priority. It then shows how 
public support quickly revived and induced the Trudeau government to return to the Pearson’s 
policy of active peacekeeping. This section continues to explain the centrality of public opinion 
in Mulroney’s decision to boost Canada’s participation in peacekeeping in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, thereby making Canada one of the top contributors of peacekeeping forces in the 
world.  
The third section explains the public-government divide on Canada’s post-Cold war 
peacekeeping role. It shows how, despite strong public support for peacekeeping, the Liberal 
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government under the Chrétien and Martin governments decided to decrease the number of 
Canadian peacekeepers in the late 1990s. It then continues to demonstrate how the Harper 
administration intensified Canada’s retreat from peacekeeping against the strong public 
commitment to the endeavor. The section explains that Liberals neglected peacekeeping because 
they thought internationalism could be implemented through more efficient means than 
peacekeeping whereas Conservatives abandoned peacekeeping because they believed it was a 
Liberal value and achievement that Conservatives should replace with militarism (McKay, 
2012).  
The origin and interaction of functionalism, public opinion, and peacekeeping in Canada 
 
The Canadian government adopted functionalist foreign policy long before it utilized 
public opinion polling. The origin of Canada’s functionalist foreign policy can be traced back to 
the foundation of Canada as a federation in 1867 whereas Canadian government’s first attempt to 
collect public opinion dates back to 1943 (Okagaki, 1989; Page, 2006). During the decades 
where Canada’s functionalist principle consolidated itself, the role of Canada’s top diplomats 
was a more decisive factor than public opinion in shaping Canada’s foreign policy. Even after 
the government begun to collect public opinion polls, Canada’s leaders saw polls more as a 
means for setting an agenda than for making foreign policy decisions (Page, 2006).  
The origin of Canadian functionalism can be traced back to its foundation as a federation 
in 1867. When the American Civil War erupted in 1860, the MacDonald government was 
suspicious of a possible US aggression (Winks, 1988). This fear triggered a need for the 
government to play a relatively active role in North American diplomatic affairs independent of 
the British Empire. Soon after the Canadian federation was established in 1867, the Canadian 
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government signed the Washington Treaty with the US in 1871 (Okagaki, 1989). Since then, the 
Canadian government has continued to pressure the British Empire (and later the 
Commonwealth) to allow Canada to exercise an independent diplomatic role culminating in the 
establishment of Canada’s Department of External Affairs in 1909 (Gotlieb, 2013).  
The Borden administration hired Loring Cheney Christie in 1912 as a legal advisor for 
the DFATD. Christie was instrumental in laying the foundation Canada’s functionalist foreign 
policy by providing arguments for Borden in his attempt to convince the British government on 
the need for Canada to exercise an independent diplomatic role in world affairs. In light of 
Canada’s huge sacrifice in the First World War, Christie advised Borden to pressure Britain to 
allow Canada its own voice in the War effort and post-War negotiations. Borden succeeded in 
securing Canada independent seats at the Imperial War Cabinet, the Paris Peace Conference, and, 
the League of Nations.  
Canada continued to assert its diplomatic autonomy following King’s election in 1921. 
King’s undersecretary of state for External Affairs recruited more diplomats like Hume Wrong, 
Norman Robertson, L.B. Pearson, and others. These top diplomats facilitated Canada’s quest 
towards diplomatic autonomy by consolidating its functionalist approach as a foundation of its 
foreign policy. Following the imperial conference of 1926, the Balfour Report officially declared 
Canada’s right to exercise independent foreign relations (Donaghy, 2009).  
The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 pushed Canada further towards 
functionalism. In 1942, Hume Wrong, leader of Canada’s diplomatic legation to the United 
States, came across David Mitrany’s 1933 work on functionalism which stated that global 
governance would be more efficient if tasks were divided among countries in accordance with 
their capabilities, and convinced Norman Robertson who was Canada’s Undersecretary of State 
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for External Affairs during the Second World War, to adopt this principle by claiming that 
Canada deserves to have a greater power in areas (like food production) where it is making a 
relatively greater contribution. During the initial discussions leading to the formation of the 
United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks in 1942, Canada managed to incorporate Article 23 (also 
known as Canadian Clause) in the UN Charters which added six non-permanent members in the 
UN Security Council, which was originally composed of five permanent members, to serve for 
two years based on their capability and geographical location (Chapnick, 2005). This 
functionalist notion of international relations resurfaced in King’s House of Commons speech of 
1943 where he said: “representation [in international affairs] should be determined on a 
functional basis which will admit to full membership these countries, large or small, which have 
the greatest contribution to make the particular object in question” (Melakopides, 1998, p. 38).  
The Second World War in 1939 also triggered the Canadian government’s interest in 
public opinion polling. In 1943, King hired Grierson to be Canada’s Director of Wartime 
Information Board. Grierson developed an interest in public opinion polls after meeting Walter 
Lipmann in 1925 while Grierson studied mass communication at the University of Chicago. 
Lipmann argued that elites could shape mass opinion by gauging public opinion. Grierson 
rejected this notion by arguing that public opinion could serve as a means for the elite to learn 
from and reflect the interest of the masses (Evans, 2005). In this spirit, Grierson proposed to the 
Canadian government that they utilize polls. While King agreed to Grierson’s proposal against 
strong protest from his cabinet members, he declared that it would be used “to argue a point or 
policy” and that the results “must remain confidential” (Evans, 2005, p. 71). So, the Canadian 
government initiated surveys with the intention of shaping mass opinion rather than reflecting it. 
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As far as peacekeeping is concerned, the Canadian government chose to reflect rather 
than alter public opinion. Canadians supported peacekeeping long before UN peacekeeping 
began. When the Princeton based Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR) asked Canadians if 
they thought it was better to start thinking about post-War peace rather than wait until the War 
was over in 1943, 59 percent responded it was better to act proactively. Another 1943 poll by 
NORC showed that 69 percent of Canadians believed it was essential to set up “some kind of 
military police” to make sure countries obeyed international law. When Canadian Institute of 
Public Opinion (CIPO) that same year asked the public if they were willing to send Canadian 
Forces abroad to keep peace in other countries, the support from Quebec (56 percent) was lower 
than that in the rest of Canada (85 percent); nonetheless, Canadians (78 percent) were willing to 
engage Canadian Forces in future peacekeeping operations. 
Although the Canadian government’s functionalist principle dictated its active 
involvement in peacekeeping, it was also ready to consider public opinion on international 
affairs.  In September 1947, Canada’s Minister of External Affairs, St. Laurent said:  
We believe the greatest hope for our survival lies in the development of machinery 
for international cooperation. If we wish to enjoy the benefits of such a development 
we must also accept its responsibilities…I do not think that the people of this country 
would tolerate any other attitude (Smith, 1948, p. 112). 
The phrase “I do not think that the people of this country would tolerate any other attitude 
indicates that the government is aware of the fact that Canadians will not allow their government 
to shy away from playing an active part in collective security efforts which also include 
international peacekeeping. While he seemed to have acknowledged public support, St. Laurent 
also perceived that the public “sense of political responsibility on an international scale has 
perhaps been less rapid than some of us would like” (Smith, 1948). Nevertheless, he noted the 
existence of “informed citizens” that are following up Canada’s international politics when he 
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said: “we shall inevitably fall short of our objectives unless the policies of the government 
genuinely reflect the will of a large group of informed citizens who are aware of the nature of our 
commitment and who are constantly scrutinizing its consequences” (Smith, 1948).  
The Canadian government was divided over the scope of functionalism. For King, 
functionalism served national interest whereas for St. Laurent it also included sharing global 
responsibilities (Chapnick, 2000). King didn’t want to experience the public controversies which 
arose over conscription during the Second World War. Instead, he wanted to avoid public 
discussion by limiting Canada’s military engagements abroad. On the other hand, St. Laurent 
was convinced that the people would support Canada’s post-War military role of keeping the 
peace (Hilliker and Barry, 1994/1995). This division surfaced when St. Laurent agreed to send 
Canadian peacekeepers to the United Nations Temporary Commission in Korea (UNTOK) when 
King was attending a conference in Britain (Maloney, 2002). King came back from Britain and 
tried to reject Canada’s decision by arguing that Canada had no interest in Korea. St. Laurent and 
Pearson, on the other hand, argued that, as a responsible member of the United Nations, Canada 
had an obligation to contribute troops to the UNTOK (Maloney, 2002). Despite a cabinet split 
and a threat of resignation from both leaders, they decided to represent Canada in UNTOK. King 
retired the following year, St. Laurent became Canada’s Prime Minister, and Pearson became his 
Minister of External Affairs. The five pillars of St. Laurent’s foreign policy were: 
 Preservation of Canada’s unity  
 Support for political liberty 
 Respect for national and global rule of law  
 Abiding by Judeo-Christian values, and 
 Acceptance of international responsibilities 
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St. Laurent mentioned “the acceptance of international responsibility” as one of the five 
pillars of Canadian foreign policy (Mackenzie, 2012). This was, as Mackenzie (2007) put it, “a 
fundamental break with the past-as well as a harbinger of a new era of forthright internationalism 
for Canada, a “golden age” (2007, p. 469). St. Laurent reiterated these principles in the Grey 
Lecture on January 1947. That speech was drafted by Gerry Riddell, who worked at Canada’s 
UN division of External Affairs division at that time. Pearson assigned Riddell to draft the 
speech. Riddell “consulted not only his current diplomatic colleagues but also his former 
academic associates as he drafted and revised the remarks” before submitting his draft 
(Mackenzie, 2007, p. 461). Just like Canada’s top wartime diplomats shaped King’s functionalist 
foreign policy, Canada’s post-War diplomats were instrumental in shaping St. Laurent’s 
internationalist foreign policy. 
Canada’s pursuit of internationalism policy was also tailored towards an independent 
foreign policy whereby Canada distanced itself from the UK.  Almost a decade after the Korean 
debate, Colonel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. In a report he sent to St. Laurent, 
Pearson criticized Britain’s handling of the situation by writing:  
The UK government are not being very skillful in their management of these 
international problems…There seems to be a lack of imagination and skill on the part 
of those who are concerned here with the public relation aspect of UK policy moves. 
The results are often perplexing for friends of the UK and indicate, it seems to me, a 
lack of orientation and no sureness of touch…my impression is that events in the 
international field are pulling the British Government with them rather than being 
influenced and directed by that government (Caroll, 2009, p.17) 
 Initially, the Canadian government was not interested in getting involved in the Suez 
Crisis. This reluctance to engage in the matter was similar to the public opinion of the period. 
When the Vancouver Sun asked Canada’s Defense Minister Ralph Campney about Canada’s 
stance on August 3, 1956, he said the problem was “primarily European matter…not a matter 
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which particularly concerns Canada. We have no oil there. We don’t use the Canal for shipping” 
(Eayrs, 1957, p. 99). In a similar vein, when Gallup asked Canadians whether they wish to see 
Canada fight Egypt if it rejected the proposal of international control of the Suez, only 31.6 
percent of the 1,418 respondents believed that Canada should risk war as opposed to 50.5 percent 
of the respondents (including 76 percent from Quebec and 84 from British Colombia) who 
suggested that Egypt should be allowed to control the Suez (Igartua, 2001). According to Kent 
(1957), Canadians wished Britain to abandon its colonial interest without losing face.  
The occupation of the Canal by Britain, France, and Israel caused an international crisis. 
The UN Security Council stalled because of British and French vetoes. This led Pearson to 
propose in the General Assembly the installation of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force at the 
Suez Canal. After Pearson’s proposal was ratified, leaders within the Conservative Party as well 
as Canada’s major newspapers were divided over Canada’s peacekeeping proposal (Igartua, 
2001). However, a Gallup public opinion poll conducted on October 1956 demonstrated that an 
overwhelming (90.2 percent) of Canadian respondents approved Pearson’s proposal for sending 
a UN peacekeeping force to the Suez Canal.  
In June 1957, the Liberal party led by St. Laurent lost the election to the Conservatives 
led by Mr. John Diefenbaker. However, this defeat had less to do with the outcome of the Suez 
Crisis than it did with public discontentment over the Liberal cabinet affairs. The most prominent 
among these was the Liberal government’s decision to give an American owned company, 
TransCanada, an expensive contract to build natural gas pipeline from Alberta to Ontario and 
Quebec as well as the controversy surrounding Canada’s Ambassador to Egypt, Herbert 
Norman’s suicide in the midst of American allegations over communist ties (Corbett, 1957).  
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In the late 1950s, Canadians held an optimistic outlook towards United Nations 
peacekeeping. This was captured in a poll conducted by Gallup on March, 1958. When Gallup 
asked 1,110 Canadians if they believed that the prospects of UN peacekeeping worldwide were 
good or not, the plurality (47.7 percent) responded that its chances were good whereas 35.9 
percent answered its chances were fair, and only 16.3 percent responded that the prospects of UN 
peacekeeping was not good. However, the fact that 16.3 percent of the 1,110 Canadians thought 
that the UN peacekeeping had a gloomy future doesn’t indicate that they don’t want it to be 
successful. Nor does the optimistic outlook of the majority of the respondents (64.0 percent) 
imply they think it was essential for Canada to enable the UN success. Canadians’ desire to make 
the UN a success was clearly captured in two polls conducted by Gallup on November and 
September 1959. Both of these polls show that a large majority of Canadian respondents thought 
it was “very important” for their government to help the United Nations succeed (See Table 5.1). 
Only a small minority of Canadian respondents, i.e., 4 percent (on November, 1959) and 7 
percent (on September, 1959) thought that it was “not very important” to help the United Nations 
succeed. 
Table 5. 1 Public Opinion on Canada's role to help the UN Succeed 
 Is it important we try to make the U.N a success % 
 November, 1959 September, 1959 
Very Important 77 80 
Fairly Important 12 10 
Not so important 7 3 
Don’t know 4 7 
 
When the Congo Crisis erupted in 1960, the United Nations Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskjöld wanted Canada to get involved because its troops were multilingual. The Liberal 
opposition, the Press, and the Parliament pressed for Canada’s immediate participation in the 
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Congo (Spooner, 2010). When Gallup asked 708 Canadians to identify the most troubled spots in 
the world, 21.9 percent of the respondents identified Congo. Canadians thought the Congo crisis 
was more troubling than China (21 percent) or Cuba (12. 7 percent). The only troubled spot they 
thought mattered more than Congo was Russia which was identified by 42.5 percent of the 
respondents.   
Initially, Diefenbaker didn’t want Canada to be perceived as a divided country composed 
of French and British inhabitants. This contradicted his “one Canada” slogan (Spooner, 2010). 
Due to this, he was initially reluctant to get involved in Congo. Besides, Diefenbaker didn’t 
believe that Canada should participate in every peacekeeping mission automatically. Meanwhile, 
both his Ministers of Defense and External Affairs reported that Canada was militarily and 
politically ready for mission. In particular, his Minister of External Affair, Howard Green, was 
willing to send Canadian peacekeepers to the mission. Finally, the government decided to 
propose that African troops keep the peace while Canadian Forces served as signalers. Although 
the Canadian government finally sent peacekeepers to the Congo, there is no evidence that it had 
consulted public opinion as a basis for its decision. As Spooner put it: 
One External Affairs Department memo enumerated no less than ten major 
considerations in Canada’s Congo policy-[however] public opinion did not make the 
list. Moreover, cabinet documents prepared by External Affairs and National 
Defense never emphasized public opinion as a significant matter (Spooner, 2010, p. 
210). 
Even though the Diefenbaker administration did not put public opinion in its decision 
making process, its final action of sending peacekeepers to the Congo reflected public interest. 
After all, the Congo peace operation came forth only four years after Canada triumphed in 
resolving the Suez Crisis and got international accolades as a result. Unlike the Suez Crisis, there 
was no division between Canada’s political party and the press. As Tessier and Fortmann (2001, 
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p.14) observed, “the Conservatives would not be able to go against the weight of tradition and 
refuse to pursue an active peacekeeping policy”.  
The rise and fall of public discontentment towards peacekeeping 
 
The interaction between public opinion and government peacekeeping decision in the 
1960s had a common pattern. As long as Canadian peacekeeping operations succeeded, the 
public would support future operations, and Canadians governments would not attempt to evade 
further invitations. But if Canadian peacekeeping operation faced setbacks, at least for a brief 
moment, public support for peacekeeping would cool down, prompting Canadian governments to 
reevaluate Canada’s participation in future peacekeeping. One year after witnessing that the 
1,900 signalers who went from Canada faced no significant problem, 68.1 percent of Gallup 
Canada’s interviewees noted that the UN was doing a good job. Accordingly, the Pearson 
administration placed peacekeeping as Canada’s top defense priority in his 1964 Defense White 
Paper. Unfortunately, however, Canada’s peacekeeping experience in Egypt, Indochina, and 
Cyprus were unsatisfactory. Nasser expelled Canadian peacekeepers from Egypt in 1967, the 
ICC operation in Indochina remained ineffective, and Canada’s engagement in Cyprus failed to 
stave off conflict between Greece and Turkey (Brown, 1981). These events affected public 
opinion negatively and prompted the government to reevaluate its peacekeeping policy.    
A Gallup survey conducted on 680 Canadians on January, 1965 showed a slight decline 
of public enthusiasm for the prospect of UN peacekeeping. The percentage of Canadians who 
thought the chances UN peacekeeping success was successful decreased from 47.7 percent to 
47.2, the percentage of respondents who believed its chances were fair also decreased from 35.9 
percent to 30.3 whereas the percentage of respondents who claimed the prospect of UN 
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peacekeeping was “poor” increased from 16.3 percent to 22.5 percent. Similarly, the percentage 
of Canadians who believed it was important to make the UN a success also declined. On 
September 1959, 80 percent of Canadians told Gallup it was “very important” to make the UN a 
success whereas, in 1965, only 52 percent of English Canadians and 26 percent of French 
Canadians favored strengthening the UN, with the majority of French Canadians (38 percent) 
standing against strengthening the UN. The majority of labor leaders (72 percent), the informed 
public (59 percent), and political leaders (59) exhibited strong support for strengthening the UN; 
however, most (50 percent) of Canada’s business leaders were against strengthening the UN (See 
Table 5.2). It is, of course, difficult to make assertions based on these two survey results because 
the samples taken are very small.  
Table 5. 2 Canadian Public Opinion for/against strengthening the United Nations 
N=1000 English 
Canadians 
French 
Canadians 
Informed 
Public 
 
Business 
Leaders 
N=48 
Labor 
Leaders 
N=48 
Political 
Leaders 
N=48 
Favors 
strengthening 
52 26 59 31 72 55 
Ambivalent 27 37 26 18 14 25 
Against 
Strengthening 
21 38 16 50 14 20 
Source: Laulicht (1965, p. 158) 
By the mid-1960s, Granatstein (1970) vividly summarized the growing skepticism among 
Canada’s public opinion, politicians, academicians, and the press towards peacekeeping as 
follows: 
Unfortunately…Canadian opinion had turned against peacekeeping. No longer was it 
the fair-haired darling of the academics, the politicians, and the press. The professors 
had begun throwing darts as early as 1964, claiming that peacekeeping was a bar to 
armed forces training, too often restricted in its locale, and sometimes against 
Canadian and/or allied interests. Some left-wingers disliked the idea of freezing 
revolutionary situations, seeing in the interposition of third parties another 
reactionary device designed to prop up decadent and corrupt regimes. The press 
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began to worry about the terms on which Canadians might be committed to 
peacekeeping…and some columnists and writers began to urge against the 
employment of Canadians on any future operations in the Sinai or in Vietnam (1970, 
p. 416). 
In response to the rising discontent towards peacekeeping, the Trudeau government 
attempted to incorporate public interest in its foreign policy by launching different initiatives. 
The Department of External Affairs responded to this growing intellectual backlash by setting up 
a branch of academic relations (Dobel, 1970). This section organized discussion forums and 
addressed concerns from academics from various universities. The Department also sent its 
diplomatic corps to study in Canadian universities and come back with a fresh outlook. It also 
arranged an exchange program to conduct a facilitated dialogue by admitting members from 
provincial governments, businesses, and university professors (Dobel, 1970).  
The outcome of these consultations resulted in the publication of a new Defense White 
Paper on April 1969. Trudeau’s Defense White Paper policy reduced peacekeeping from a top 
place to a last priority. This was because the Trudeau administration assumed “that the Canadian 
public would welcome retreat from peacekeeping” (Dobel, 1978, p. 418). Pearson criticized the 
demotion of peacekeeping to a last priority (Bothwell, 2007). Also, the Trudeau foreign policy 
circle was not supportive of this revision. In 1967, Allan Gotlieb warned Trudeau that Canadians 
would not tolerate a departure from peacekeeping by reiterating the inherent value of 
peacekeeping and its significance to national unity: 
To many Canadians, Canada has a moral obligation to help solve the problems of the 
world. Our culture, our character, our geographic location, our prosperity-all these 
and other factors have been thought to combine to endow us with a special role in 
helping to bring peace and sanity to the world. 
What makes the decline of this role particularly serious for Canada is that it played 
an important part in forging our unity in the post-war era. Like Danes who made 
good furniture, the French who made good wine, the Russians who made sputnik, 
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Canada, as a specially endowed middle power, as the reasonable man’s country, as 
the broker or the skilled intermediary, made peace (Gotlieb, 2004, p.13) 
Indeed, several polls conducted in the 1970s and the 1980s attested to Gotlieb’s 
observation. Even when the majority (56 percent) of 2,088 Canadians surveyed by Gallup in 
November, 1973, acknowledged the impossibility of perpetual peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors, 65.6 percent said they would “approve” if the UN called upon Canada to get involved 
in a peacekeeping mission in the Middle East. After warning Canadians of a strong possibility of 
conflicts like Cyrus erupting all over the world, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) 
asked 5,000 Canadians on May, 1974, if they were “in favor of committing Canadian troops and 
funds in a UN peacekeeping role in the future”. 40 percent answered: “Yes, Canada should 
participate”, another 16.5 percent answered “Yes, on a selected basis”.   
In light of the strong public support for international peacekeeping, Trudeau’s diplomats 
realized the importance of reverting back to the Pearsonian approach of active peacekeeping. In 
1975, both Mitchell Sharp (Leader of Government in the House of Commons] and Allan 
MacEachen, Canada’s Secretary of External Affairs, declared that not only was Canada a leading 
international peacekeeper at that period, but that it would continue the Pearsonian legacy of 
activism in international peacekeeping (Dobel, 1978). Hence, as Munton and Keating (2001) 
noticed, “in the 1970s, internationalism came back, by popular demand” (2001, p. 521). 
Canadian support for international peacekeeping continued through the late 1970s. When 
Gallup asked if they backed the idea for “the United Nations to establish a more effective 
peacekeeping force, and use it when necessary” on July, 1978, 87.2 percent of its respondent 
agreed with it. It was in light of this strong public support that the Canadian government 
consented to send 150 Canadian peacekeepers to Lebanon. When the United Nations requested 
Canada to engage in a peacekeeping mission in Namibia, the Department of External Affairs 
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expressed willingness to participate. However, officials from the Department of Defense were 
concerned with the fact that Canadian Forces were overstretched and underfunded. They were 
also not happy with the Department of External Affairs’ tendency of making peacekeeping 
decisions without consulting other departments. Charles Nixon, Canada’s Undersecretary of 
Defense, proposed the reactivation of the Joint National Defense and External Task Force on 
peacekeeping so that peacekeeping decision could be decentralized. The DND also argued the 
idea of dropping airborne regiment to stabilize the situation in Namibia was too risky. Finally, 
the DND was able to convince the Canadian government to abandon its initial interest in keeping 
the peace in Namibia.  
Although Canada refused to participate in the Namibian peace operation, it was still 
active in many other peacekeeping missions across the globe. Not only were Canadians content 
with this situation, but they also expressed willingness to see their military work mainly as a 
peacekeeping force rather than serve as a regular military force (See Table 5.3). Even more than 
witnessing Canadian Forces providing domestic services like border patrol, or the provision of 
vocational and university education, the majority of Canadians wished to see them serve as a 
peacekeeping force. Between 1979 and 1982, Canadians’ preference to see Canadian Forces 
mainly as peacekeeping force increased from 37.2 percent to 39.8 percent (See Table 5.3).  
Table 5. 3 Canadians Preference on the future major role of Canadian forces 
Year Valid 
Sample 
Size 
Military 
Force 
Peace-
keeping 
Force 
Border 
Patrol 
Force 
Vocational 
traditional 
institution 
Opportunity 
for 
University 
Education 
Other 
1979 1966 24.6 37.2 9 19.2 - 4.3 
1980 2156 26.8 37.7 12.4 10.4 4.7 1.6 
1982 1998 29.2 39.8 15.1 8.3 2.9 0.9 
Source: CORA (2015) 
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In conclusion, peacekeeping setbacks encountered in Cyprus, the Congo, and Egypt 
temporarily cooled down public enthusiasm towards peacekeeping. Canada’s intellectuals also 
expressed skepticism over Canada’s constant engagement in global conflicts. This rising 
discontent pushed the Trudeau administration to revise its peacekeeping policy and demote it 
from a first place to a third defense priority. It was, however, difficult for the Trudeau 
government to ignore peacekeeping calls because public support for peacekeeping recovered. By 
the early 1980s, the number of Canadians who wished to see their military as a peacekeeping 
force was larger than the number of Canadians who wanted their Forces serve as a conventional 
military force. So, by the time, Trudeau retired in 1984, Canada remained a leading 
peacekeeping nation.   
When the Mulroney government took office in 1984, its foreign minister, Joe Clark took 
an initiative to consult public opinion to serve as a basis for Canada’s foreign policy action. As 
he recalled: 
As a new [foreign] minister in a new government, I wanted some sense of the 
international issues that were of most interest to Canadians, so we commissioned a 
poll. To our surprise, we discovered that the priority foreign policy issues for 
Canadians in the fall of 1984 was the situation in five relatively small and conflict-
plagued countries in Central America (Cost Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua). That outweighed concerns about nuclear conflict, the Cold War, the 
environment, the Middle East, apartheid and other issues (2013, p. 129-30) 
Clark (2013) suggested that Canadian government follow public opinion in its foreign 
policy decision making process when he wrote: “given the clear public interest, our government 
looked at what we could do to be more effective in Central America” (2013, p. 130). Latin 
American countries already coalesced to keep the peace in these countries by forming the 
Contadora Support Group. Clark wrote: “foreign minister Sepulveda of Mexico asked Canada, 
with our peacekeeping credentials, to provide technical advice on the Control and Verification 
 
 
 100 
Commission (CVC) to oversee the implementation of a future peace agreement” (2013, p. 131). 
The Canadian government worked on a report for a year and submitted a set of recommendations 
to CVC in 1985. The report outlined a mandate, timeframe, and set of recommendations on how 
to keep the peace in the region, how to incorporate UN oversight, and how to engage the media. 
Clark visited the region with an entourage composed of Canadian military officers experienced 
in peacekeeping to explain the implementation of the recommendations to political and military 
leaders in the region. Between 1982 and 1987, Canada increased its foreign aid to the region 
three fold. Following the signing of the Esquipullas II Agreement in 1987, Canada was also 
committed to participating in the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (1989-92) 
and the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1991-95). This Central American case 
indicates that the Mulroney administration used public opinion as a guide of its foreign policy 
from the outset. It also shows that Canada’s peacekeeping contribution diversified from direct 
contribution to indirect consultation owing to its accumulated experience in international 
peacekeeping.   
Clark also opened up Canada’s foreign policy decision-making process by including the 
Parliament and the citizenry in the process. In addition to commissioning polls, Clark also 
travelled across the country to listen to Canadians’ perspectives on foreign policy. One of the 
public debates revolved around the question: “Do Canadians agree that we should encourage a 
return to the practice of UN sponsorship of peacekeeping operations, and devote additional 
Canadian resources to the enterprise despite the frustrations involved?” (Tessier & Fortmann, 
2007, p.115). Following his tour, Clark set up a special joint committee composed of members of 
the two houses of Parliament (Wright, 2009). The committee reaffirmed the need to strengthen 
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Canada’s direct contribution to peacekeeping and diversify its role sharing its expertise with 
other countries by suggesting:  
 That the government consider making significantly greater use of the reserve 
forces for peacekeeping service, either individually or experimentally in small 
units; 
 That Canada continue to make its peacekeeping expertise available to the armed 
forces of other countries; 
 That the government continue to support training seminars on peacekeeping that 
are hosted at Canadian universities and to assist the International Peace Academy; 
 That the best approach to invitations to become involved in peacekeeping 
operations is for Canada to apply its criteria on a case-by-case basis, while 
maintaining its preference for operations under the United Nations auspices 
(Tessier & Fortmann, 2007, p. 115). 
The above points make it clear that, unlike the Trudeau administration which initially 
predicted the declining demand for Canadian peacekeepers in the 1970s, the Mulroney 
administration correctly foresaw the increasing need for Canadian peacekeepers in the late 
1980s. Perhaps this is the result of its adherence to the strong public commitment rather than an 
accurate policy analysis of the ending of the Cold War period and its consequences. In any case, 
the report showed that not only was Canada prepared to contribute a greater number of 
peacekeeping forces by involving its reserve forces, but was also ready to share its peacekeeping 
expertise by providing training to other countries directly as well as through its Canadian 
Universities and the International Peace Academy. In addition to confirming Canada’s 
willingness to engage in peacekeeping, the report also suggested that it must evaluate the pros 
and cons of each mission before deciding to participate. 
Just like the polls results of the late 1970s and 1982 depicted earlier (Table 5.3), a series 
of surveys conducted by Decima between 1986 and 1989 reaffirmed Canadians’ interest in 
seeing their military playing a greater role in international peacekeeping than anything else. The 
polls also suggest that perhaps Canadians might have anticipated the end of the Cold War and 
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their country’s bigger involvement in post-Cold War international peacekeeping. It shows that 
Canadians were least fearful of Soviet aggression and were not alarmed by a possible threat to 
their sovereignty (See Figure 5.1). Having transcended these existential threats, therefore, 
Canadians became more optimistic over the productive utilization of their Forces in the 
international peacekeeping arena. Accordingly, the majority of Canadians who wished to see 
their troops primarily as peacekeeping forces was greater than the percentage of respondents who 
feared Soviet aggression or wished for their troops to defend their borders. At the end of the Cold 
War years, therefore, Canadians were ready to embark on a greater peacekeeping role in the 
world. Environics reconfirmed Canadian commitment to peacekeeping in 1989. When it asked 
whether Canada should be involved in promoting world peace, it got an overwhelming consensus 
of 98 percent. It then asked Canadians if they agreed with Canadian military engagement in UN 
peacekeeping missions and received a 92 percent approval.  
Figure 5.1.  What should be the top priority of the Canadian Armed Forces? 
 
Figure 5. 1 What should be the top priority of the Canadian Armed Forces? 
  Source: Decima, 1986-89 
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In the 1990s, the end of Cold War increased the enthusiasm towards peacekeeping. The 
end of stalemate at the UN Security Council amplified the number of peacekeeping operations 
from 13 operations between 1948 and 1988 to 16 between 1991 and 1993 (Goldstein, 2011). The 
ability of television mass media to broadcast conflicts in marginalized parts of the globe to their 
audience also raised public awareness and pressure for quick action. The combination of these 
factors sparked a debate among world leaders on whether they should intervene in sovereign 
countries during humanitarian crises. They also questioned whether consent should be a 
prerequisite to peacekeeping intervention when states have actually collapsed as witnessed in 
Somalia and Yugoslavia.   
Before declaring its stance on the nature of post-Cold War peacekeeping intervention, the 
Mulroney government took an initiative to gauge public opinion. For instance, on November, 
1990, it launched the “Citizens Forum” by engaging 700,000 Canadians (including 300,000 high 
school students) to assess their perspective on peacekeeping whereby the final report concluded 
that there was a “substantial support for non-violence and for Canada’s historical role as an 
international peacekeeper” (Maton, 1996b). Canadian leaders were also highly exposed to 
television broadcasts on global conflicts. During the Yugoslavia crisis, for instance, Barbara 
McDougall said: “television is every bit as valuable as the academic cables you get from 
diplomats. It does have an influence…” (Gowing, 1994, p.17).  
The public support for peacekeeping, higher exposure to media, and international 
enthusiasm towards peacekeeping led the Mulroney government to advocate that the post-Cold 
War conflict environment required the international community to exercise an aggressive 
peacekeeping intervention. In events where human rights of ordinary citizens were at stake, 
Canada’s minister of external affairs, Barbara McDougall, argued that the international 
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community should be justified to override state sovereignty. After joining the U.N mission in 
Croatia in the spring 1992, Canada allocated 1,200 additional troops to the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia, and promised another 750 troops to the UN peacekeeping mission 
in Somalia (UNOSOM) (Tessier & Fortmann, 2007). 
Martin and Fortmann (1995) compiled the results of five surveys conducted by CROP 
(between December 1991 and October 1992), Decima (March 1993), Gallup (January 1994), 
Angus Reid (January 1994), and Louis Harris (February 1994) to show that, between 1991 and 
1994 the ratio of Canadians who preferred to maintain or increase peacekeepers to those who 
wanted Canada to either decrease or eliminate its peacekeeping role declined (See Figure 5. 2). 
The Figure also depicts that while the percentage of Canadians who wished to maintain Canada’s 
existing level of commitment increased, the proportion of the Canadians who wanted an even 
greater number of peacekeepers decreased substantially. Canada was a leading peacekeeping 
nation in the early 1990s. Moreover, the peace operations of the early 1990s were more 
dangerous (in case of former Yugoslavia) and sparked a scandal (in case of Somalia). In light of 
these situations, it is perhaps understandable if Canadians wanted their government to retain its 
current level of engagement rather than increase its commitment. 
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Figure 5. 2 Should Canada maintain or reduce its commitment to the United Nations 
Peacekeeping missions? (1991-94) 
Source: Martin and Fortmann (1995, p. 393) 
Public government divide: Peacekeeping after the Cold War 
 
The growing fiscal deficit in the face of increasing peacekeeping commitment of the 
early 1990s forced the Canadian government to reconsider Canadian internationalism (Rioux & 
Hay, 1998). After the Liberals took office on October 1993, they initiated public consultations 
and parliamentary hearings to review Canada’s defense and foreign policies. Just like the 
Mulroney’s government a decade ago, the Liberals also launched a Special Joint Committee of 
the House of Commons and the Senate which began hearings on defense policy since the spring 
of 1994. In addition to commissioning several expert studies, the Committee on foreign policy 
also received 551 briefs and called forth 500 witnesses in 70 meetings (Leyton-Brown, 2002).  
Unlike the unanimous voice witnessed during the Mulroney era a decade ago, the 
Committee set up during the Chrétien era was divided into two groups. The first group, known as 
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specialize on traditional peacekeeping while reducing its navy and air force to a bare minimum 
(Sokolosky, 1995). Another group counteracted this proposal by arguing that Canada should 
maintain the war fighting capability of its military due to an increasingly dangerous post-Cold 
War environment. Finally, the Special Joint Committee voted in favor of the second group which 
pledged for a stronger war-fighting force. Canada’s Defense White Paper (DWP, 1994) reflected 
this conclusion: 
…Canada cannot dispense with the maritime, land and air combat capabilities of 
modern armed forces. We must maintain a prudent military force… 
We must take account of the changing face of peacekeeping. The nature of these 
operations has changed considerably and now poses far more risks to our personnel 
(DWP, 1994, p. 3). 
In addition to the riskiness of post-Cold War peacekeeping, the White Paper also 
mentioned “the financial difficulties facing the United Nations, and declining defense budgets in 
most industrialized countries mean that the international community cannot intervene every time 
these pressures reach a breaking point” (DWP, 1994, p.12). The foreign policy document of the 
Liberals, published in 1995, was more interested in Canadian economic recovery. It coined the 
“promotion of prosperity and employment at home by selling Canadian goods and services 
abroad” as Canada’s top foreign policy priority (Leyton-Brown, 2002, p. 69). Although it also 
mentions global security as Canada’s second priority, the policy never identifies peacekeeping as 
part of this quest for global security. In fact, as a cost effective alternative to soliciting 
peacekeeping forces, the Canadian government proposed establishing a permanent rapid UN 
peacekeeping force made up of 5,000 troops (Outellet & Collenette, 1994).   
Despite the Liberal government’s retreat, Canadians continued to express their support 
for international peacekeeping. Carriére, O’Reilly and Vengroff (2003, p. 2) compiled several 
surveys conducted by Gallup and Angus Reid between 1994 and 1997 which demonstrated that 
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Canadians still had a strong commitment to peacekeeping. These polls indicated that 95 percent 
of Canadians believed that “working for peace” was either very important (75 percent) or 
somewhat important (20 percent). The polls also showed that 79 percent of the respondents 
believed that it was necessary for Canadian Forces to play an “international role in 
peacekeeping”.  
The selection of Lloyd Axworthy as Canada’s Foreign Minister in 1996 radically shifted 
Canada’s foreign policy orientation. Instead of focusing on the Atlantic region, Canada shifted to 
the Asia-Pacific region. Instead of pursuing the Pearsonian approach to peace and security, 
Canada prioritized international trade and the promotion of its values internationally. Instead of 
sticking to the principles of consent as a pillar of international peacekeeping, the Canadian 
government pushed for intervention in states that repress the human rights of their citizens which 
is a concept espoused by Axworthy as human security (Kirton, 2009). Chrétien occasionally 
swayed from this orientation instinctively as television broadcasts of refugees in Bosnia and 
Zaire (today’s DRC) were too hard to ignore (Kirton, 1997). However, even after Canada 
secured a fiscal surplus on June 1997, the Canadian government pulled out of Haiti, thereby 
reducing Canada from a leading peacekeeping nation to 24th place in terms of personnel 
contribution to the UN peacekeeping.  
While this downward spiral ensued, another survey by Environics between July and 
August 1998 affirmed that more than half of 1,485 Canadian respondents thought that it was 
either very important (57.2%) or somewhat important (34.3%) for Canada to participate in UN 
peacekeeping. When Chrétien cut down Canadian peacekeeping engagement, he didn’t 
encounter any major opposition from other political parties because the Conservatives were 
dominated by right wing adherents who, in fact, wanted to see Canada further reduce its 
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international engagements and leaders of the New Democratic Party (NDP) were “hardly 
internationalist[s] in the classical sense of that word: on the contrary, the left also advocate[d] a 
Canadian withdrawal from a fully activist internationalist presence for Canada” (Nossal, 1998, p. 
95).   
It also seems that Canadians didn’t resist the Liberal’s consistent reduction of the number 
of Canadian peacekeepers. When CROP asked them “whether [they] think Canada should be 
more involved, less involved, or maintain its current level of involvement [in peacekeeping]”, the 
majority (56 percent) said that Canada should maintain its existing level of engagement. A 
similar survey by CROP in 2002 also showed that 53 percent of its respondents wanted Canada 
to retain the same number of peacekeeping forces abroad where only 35.9 percent supported 
greater involvement. At that time, with 263 peacekeeping forces, Canada stood as the 31st largest 
contributor to UN peacekeeping forces. But it is difficult to infer that Canadians were aware of 
the ongoing reduction of Canadian peacekeepers. A survey of 1,055 Canadians conducted by 
Ipos-Reid, Dominion Institute, and the Globe and Mail, in 2003 supports the claim that 
Canadians barely knew the magnitude of Canada’s peacekeeping engagement. They 
demonstrated that only 41 percent were able to correctly identify two peace operations that 
involved Canada since 1990. 
While it is understandable that Canadians might find it difficult to follow the annual 
statistical trend of Canadian peacekeeping contribution, there is evidence showing that 
Canadians felt peacekeeping was no longer Canada’s greatest contribution to the world. The 
survey results conducted by Environics between 2000 and 2012 asking Canadians to identify 
their country’s greatest contribution to the world show that the percentage of Canadians who 
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identified peacekeeping had fallen from 36 percent in 2004 to 20 percent in 2012 (See Figure 
5.3).  
  
Figure 5. 3 Peacekeeping as Canada's most important world contribution 
Source: Paris (2014, p. 17). 
When Al Qaeda attacked the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, the Canadian 
representative to NATO immediately proposed for an Article 5 attack on that very day. Public 
opinion polls conducted between September 17 and 20 showed that 73 percent of Canadian 
respondents expressed readiness to fight international terrorism regardless of the risk it posed to 
Canadian civilians (54 percent). The poll also showed that 74 percent of the respondents 
approved how the Chrétien government handled the issue (Kirton, 2007). On October 7, 2001, 
Chrétien declared Operation Apollo by sending war ships, Special Forces, and aircraft for 
transport and surveillance to the coalition of the willing fighting in Afghanistan. The war in 
Afghanistan would last for over a decade, involving 40,000 Canadian troops, claiming the lives 
of 158 soldiers, wounding over 1,800 soldiers, and costing $18 billion (G&M, 2014).  
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Although it was clear that the war on terror would be Canada’s major military 
preoccupation in the 21st Century, Canadians never abandoned their interest in United Nations 
multidimensional peacekeeping. A survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations in 2002 indicated that Canadians were ready to see their troops play an active role in 
different aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including disaster relief, separating 
conflicting parties, and enforcing international law. The survey showed that 92 percent of 
Canadian respondents wanted their troops to serve in famine relief mission, 84 percent wanted 
them to participate in upholding international law, and 79 percent wished to see their troops 
bring peace in a civil war. By the time Chrétien left office in 2003, by providing 233 troops to 
the United Nations, Canada ranked as the 38th largest contributor to peacekeeping, just above Fiji 
(UN, 2015). Against this reality, a survey conducted by Environics on February 2004 showed 
that 67 percent of its 1,315 respondents thought it was very important for Canada to participate 
in UN peacekeeping operations. Ever since 1993, Canadians had wanted their government to 
engage in peace operations even if it entailed higher risk (See Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5. 4 Canada should participate in peacekeeping despite high risk 
Source: Paris (2014, p.19) 
The Paul Martin government didn’t pay attention to public opinion on peacekeeping. 
Following the Darfur Crisis which erupted in 2003, Paul Martin’s rhetoric failed to match his 
action. On February 2004, Martin declared Canada’s willingness to help by saying: “we will do 
whatever is required, but we cannot simply sit by and watch what is happening in Darfur 
continue” (Nossal, 2005, p. 1024). But “when the UN called for donor commitments in August 
2004, the minister of national defense, Bill Graham, indicated that Canada would not be 
contributing troops to the mission. Instead, the Canadian contribution would consist of $250,000 
in flak jackets, and other gear to the African Union troops that were to be deployed to the 
Darfur” (Nossal, 2005, p. 1025).   
In general, the Liberal governments since 1993 went contrary to public opinion by cutting 
down the number of Canadian peacekeepers at the United Nations. The justification they 
provided initially was the fiscal deficit encountered by Canada in the early 1990s. But when 
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Canada’s economy recovered in the 1990s, the Canadian government believed that was safer and 
more efficient to utilize Canada’s soft power. It attempted to restore Canadian internationalism 
by introducing new concepts such as “human security” and “responsibility to protect”. By the 
mid-2000s, Canada was no longer a significant contributor to the UN peacekeeping forces. 
When Harper became Prime Minister in 2006, he was not interested in paying at least lip 
service to international peacekeeping. Instead, he intended to redefine Canada’s historical 
narrative by replacing its image as a peacekeeping nation with a new portrait of a warrior nation. 
During the 2005, campaign, Harper’s strategist said: “we didn’t have a competing narrative. 
What are the symbols people talk about when they talk about Canada? Health care. The Charter. 
Peacekeeping. The United Nations. The CBC. Almost every single example was a Liberal 
achievement or a Liberal policy…We didn’t have any illusions about displacing the Liberal 
vision and the Liberal narrative of Canada” (Wells, 2013, p. 77). The Conservatives thus 
embraced the military, the RCMP, and other revered values such as hockey and lacrosse and 
curling as alternative avenues where they could erect their conservative narratives.  
 When he addressed the Parliament for the first time as head of government on April, 
2006, Harper (2006) stressed Canada’s  need to be strong again by saying: “this was the hard 
lesson that this country learned in two world wars-we learned it before the United States-and it 
was driven home to us again with great force on 9/11”. Accordingly, his government boosted 
Canada’s military budget to a historic high level since World War II by raising spending from 
$14.8 billion per year in 2006 to $17.9 billion in 2012 (Smith, 2014). In the meantime, Harper 
ignored the United Nations by attending three out eight General Assembly meetings. In fact, 
Harper was in New York during the UN General Assembly meeting of 2012 to receive an award, 
but he didn’t go to the meeting. During that ceremony, he criticized the UN by saying:  
 
 
 113 
We also want…governments to be good world citizens…that is, of course, not the 
same thing…as trying to count every dictator with a vote at the United Nations or 
just going along with every emerging international consensus, no matter how self-
evidently wrong- headed (Clark, 2013, p. 85) 
 Today, Canada has 68,000 troops. Of these, 400 serve in missions abroad whereby 250 of them 
are engaged as part of multinational counterterrorism force in the Arabian Sea. Canadian 
peacekeepers constitute a little over 10 percent of these 400 deployed troops. As the Economist 
observed: 
Peacekeeping, once a Canadian forte, has withered under the Conservatives, who 
have sought to rebrand Canada as a warrior nation. Of the 400 troops deployed 
abroad, just over 50 are on UN missions, including the lone Canadian representative 
in Cyprus, where Canada has contributed to the peacekeeping force since 1964” 
(Economist, 2014).  
Harper’s drastic reduction of Canadian peacekeeping contribution stands in a sharp 
contrast with public opinion. When Ipsos Reid (2008) asked 3,114 Canadians to identify the 
most important symbol which defined Canada, peacekeeping stood as the fifth most important 
national symbol following the maple leaf, hockey, the Canadian flag, and the beaver. The DND 
commissioned the same organization to conduct a survey in 2009 and discovered that 46 percent 
of its respondents supported Canada’s role as a peacekeeping nation. In 2010, Ipsos Reid again 
reported that 50 percent of its respondents wanted Canadian Force to play only a peacekeeping 
role in the world. Nanos also surveyed Canadians on October 2010 and found that 66 percent 
opposed Canada’s future role in wars like Afghanistan with the majority (22.9 percent) of the 66 
percent reasoning it has not solved anything.  
Another survey made by Nanos of 1,002 Canadians for the Globe and Mail on October 
2010 also indicates that Canadians wanted their troops to serve UN peacekeeping rather than 
play a combat role by participating in different alliances. The same survey also showed that 
Canadians were less interested in raising the military budget than they were in increasing the 
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budget for healthcare, education, and other productive endeavors. When the organization asked 
1002 respondents to rate UN peacekeeping as a future priority for Canadian Armed Forces on 
October 2010, they ranked it 7.26 out 10 points (with 10 being the highest priority). This score 
Canadians gave to UN peacekeeping was higher than the score they gave to combat missions 
overseas (5.19), defense of the Arctic (6.22), NATO (6.12) or North American security 
cooperation with the US (6.76). And when Nanos asked Canadians to identify future Canadian 
government’s budget priority, with a score of 6.62 out 10 military came last. Instead, Canadians 
wanted their government to allocate more budget for healthcare (8.63), education (8.43), 
jobs/economy (8.32), and the environment (7.88) and jobs/economy (8.32). 
Despite the government’s effort to redefine Canada as a warrior nation, Canadians 
perceived their nation primarily as a peacekeeping nation. In 2012, the Department of Defense 
commissioned Ekos to conduct a survey asking Canadians “what image or impression comes to 
mind when… [they] think of Canada’s military…?” More than a quarter of the respondents (28 
percent) identified peacekeeping the defining characteristics of Canada’s armed forces, alongside 
“good work, good qualities in preforming job” whereas “pride, patriotism” stood at 13 percent, 
followed by “protecting people” (10 percent), “Afghanistan” (7 percent), and “war” (7 percent” 
respectively (Paris, 2014, p. 20).  
Considering the fact that Harper’s government retreated from peacekeeping against the 
strong public opposition, it is only fair to ask why the people are not voting them out of office. 
One of the reasons this is not happening is because peacekeeping is not a salient agenda in 
Canadian election platforms. As far as elections are concerned, it is not international political 
affairs which dominates elections in Canada. Rather, it is the performance in the social and 
economic arena which determines a government’s longevity in power. The polls conducted by 
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Nanos and the Institute for Research and Public Policy (IRPP) in 2012 attest to this fact by 
showing that social issues like health care, education, and the environment, and economic issues 
like balancing the budget and creating jobs are more important for Canadians than international 
affairs (See Figure 5.5). 
 
 
Figure 5. 5 Canadian public rating of different government policies 
 
Even within the realm of international affairs, Ekos (2012) poll shows that Canadians (38 
percent) were in favor of a government which secures their national economic advantage. The 
global financial crisis has increased the popular interest in economic issues. When the recession 
hit Canada in 2008, the government quickly implemented tight banking regulation which 
lowered interest rates, increased cash flow, abandoned tax credits for home buyers, and 
purchased mortgaged backed securities. In addition to raising its exports by 50 percent, the 
Harper administration also created 1 million additional jobs after recession. By coming out of the 
recession in just three quarters, Canada also set a record among G7 countries (Frum, 2013). The 
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economic performance of the Conservatives, particularly curbing unemployment helped them 
win a majority of seats in the 2011 federal election (Fairie, 2014).  
But it is not just economic performance that has favored the Harper administration. It also 
appears that most Canadians are content with the Conservative management of different aspects 
of its contemporary foreign policy. A survey conducted by Abacus Data on 1075 Canadians from 
September 12 to 14, 2014 revealed that a plurality of Canadians were satisfied with how Harper 
handled Canada-US relations (43 percent), supported Ukraine (45 percent), opposed Russia’s 
involvement in Ukraine (43 percent) and Putin’s remarks on the conflict (41 percent), Canada’s 
decision to send jet fighters to Iraq to help American efforts to defeat ISIS (52 percent), 
Canada’s collaboration with other party leaders on foreign affairs (42 percent), and Canada’s 
policy on the Israel-Palestine issue (36 percent). More than a quarter (28 percent) said that Mr. 
Harper would do a better job than his opponent, Justin Trudeau (23 percent) in handling 
Canada’s foreign policy (Anderson & Coletto, 2014). 
Clearly, the Liberal leader Justin Trudeau wants to restore Canada’s lost status as a 
peacekeeping leader. However, Ibbitson (2014) argues that the international context which 
helped Canada emerge as a peacekeeping leader is no longer here. The emergence of China, 
India, and Brazil, post 9/11 war on terrorism, the failure of the Kyoto accord, the Arab Spring 
and its chaotic aftermath, the rise of violent international terrorist groups worldwide, and the 
belligerence of the Russian government have pushed Canada away from peacekeeping. In the 
context of this confrontation, Ibbitson (2014) believes that “Stephen Harper’s foreign policy…at 
least fits with the world as it is”.  
If one weighs world events in terms of peril rather than possibilities, the Suez Crisis was 
more perilous than today. The Suez Crisis divided the Western Alliance and stalemated the UN 
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Security Council. Today, Western leaders and the world community stands united in the fight 
against violent extremism. Most of the conflicting parties involved during the Suez Crisis were 
Western powers having highly sophisticated military as well as nuclear weapons. Although 
today’s extremists are also sophisticated, their capabilities are not comparable with the British, 
the French, and the Israelis on the 1950s. Mr. Pearson and Mr. St. Laurent resolved a situation 
that could have potentially led to a superpower confrontation. Besides, it is not just in the Middle 
East that conflicts are raging today. But there are also conflicts in poor and marginalized parts of 
the world where Canadians unique capabilities could make a big difference. For example, 
recently, the UN approved 12,000 peacekeepers to the Central African Republic, which is a poor 
and landlocked country of 4.6 million people. Canada could have made a big difference to this 
mission by sending a few transport crews or engineers to fix the rural roads which erode during 
the rainy season (Shephard, 2014). On his last speech before resigning his position as a Senator, 
General Romeo Dallaire expressed his frustration with the government’s reluctance to translate 
principles into action: 
In recent years, however, things have changed. Today we have 43 peacekeepers 
deployed out of a possible 110,000 peacekeepers worldwide. Today we have to 
dance around the words “responsibility to protect” and the International Criminal 
Court, and even the term “child soldiers” to protect out of fear of having to actually 
may be turn our alleged principled foreign policy into principled action…. 
Our troops are well trained, experienced and professional, not to mention bilingual, 
so they can make a significant contribution both in terms of direct operations and 
through the training of others in the mission-critical issues. We have, thanks to this 
government, the strategic lift to sustain forces in the middle of Africa where there are 
no ports. We have the logistic capability to provide the assets needed so they don’t 
run out of ammunition, food or medical supplies. We have command and control 
capability that other nations do not have to bring force together and make it effective. 
We have the planning skills to do the contingency planning and to be able to use the 
forces effectively on the ground. We have the leadership in our general officer corps 
that has acquired the ability to work within that complexity and ambiguity over the 
years and is prepared to serve (Dallaire, 2014). 
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  Having experienced the failure of peacekeeping on ground in Rwanda, Dallaire 
understood two things. His tragic experience in Rwanda taught him that paying lip service to 
human rights principles without backing them with principled action could cost millions of 
innocent lives. Besides expressing his frustration with Canadian leaders’ rhetoric, however, 
Dallaire also saw a huge potential in Canada’s recent quest of rebuilding its military since the 
war on terror. As Dallaire noted, not only has Canada built its hard power with unique 
capabilities like airlifting capabilities, but its military has gained significant experience in 
managing difficult and complex missions which could be productively utilized in peacekeeping 
missions. The Conservative stride towards militarism could perhaps benefit Canada’s future 
endeavors in peacekeeping. But, so long as the Conservatives remain in power, it is hard to see a 
positive prospect for Canadian peacekeeping. This is because Conservatives see peacekeeping as 
a fundamentally Liberal value and Liberal achievement, not Canada’s contribution to the world.     
Overall, public opinion after 1993 didn’t have an impact on Canadian government’s 
decisions to send peacekeepers abroad. The Liberals and the Conservatives cut down Canada’s 
peacekeeping contribution against a consistently strong public support for peacekeeping. But the 
justification offered by the Liberals and the Conservatives were radically different. The Liberals, 
especially under Chrétien, blamed Canada’s retreat from peacekeeping on the budget deficit. 
Nonetheless, they continued to pay lip service to internationalism without allocating resources 
needed for action. Even after the economy recovered in the late 1990s, the Liberals pursued a 
rhetorical support for human security while evading practical engagement. By contrast, the 
Conservatives under Harper believed that Canada’s peacekeeping role is part of a Liberal value 
that must be replaced with a new narrative stressing on Canada’s military valor. Hence, the 
Harper administration deliberately decreased Canada’s peacekeeping commitment and boosted 
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its combat role. Despite this, Canadians continue to vote for governments that don’t support 
peacekeeping because of their productive economic management. The Canadian economy has 
rebound from major crises in the early 1990s and late 2000s because of effective strategy 
pursued by the Liberals and the Conservatives. Moreover, even if Canadians don’t agree with 
their government’s negative approach towards peacekeeping, they do support other aspect of 
their foreign policy such as Harper’s decision to fight ISIS. Due to these factors, therefore, the 
impact of public opinion on Canadian government’s decision to send peacekeepers since 1993 
remains negligible.  
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that the role of public opinion in Canadian governments’ 
decisions to send peacekeepers has had three manifestations. The first manifestation shows that 
public opinion has not triggered Canadian governments’ earlier decisions to participate in 
peacekeeping, but played a supporting role. This was clear during King’s, St. Laurent’s and 
Diefenbaker’s period where bureaucrats took a leading role in making those decisions while 
Canadians supported their actions. Hence, during that period, there was a convergence of values 
between Canadian leaders and the general public. The second manifestation indicates that public 
opinion has triggered governments’ decisions to play an active role in peacekeeping operations. 
This was the case during the period of Trudeau’s and Mulroney’s leadership where policy 
makers made a deliberate attempt to gauge public opinion as a basis of changing (in Trudeau’s 
case) and shaping (in Mulroney’s case) their peacekeeping policy. Finally, the third 
manifestation reveals that period since the mid-1990s where the Chrétien, Martin, and Harper 
administrations reduced Canada’s peacekeeping role to a historic low level despite a consistently 
strong public interest in seeing Canada go back to being a leading peacekeeping nation. 
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During the early period of Canadian peacekeeping (1948-1965), Canadian governments 
made peacekeeping decisions that were consistent with public opinion. However, their decision 
to participate in peacekeeping rested on their strategic calculation about Canada’s role in world 
affairs. Canada’s leaders believed they could play a meaningful role in world affairs by focusing 
on functions which they could perform more efficiently than great powers. The origin of this 
functionalist foreign policy can be traced back to the establishment of Canada as a federation in 
1867. Since then, Canadian leaders sought to identify an area where they can outperform the 
great powers and claim a voice in major global decisions like the two World Wars, the League of 
Nations, and, later the United Nations. Canadian leaders saw peacekeeping as an important role 
middle powers could execute in the Post-War era. It was long after they exercised the 
functionalist principle that Canadian government begun to utilize public opinion polls. 
Fortunately, these polls showed that Canadians supported peacekeeping long before the United 
Nations practiced it. Despite initial conflict between King and St. Laurent on whether Canada 
should participate in Korea, all of Canadian governments until Pearson’s (1968) welcomed the 
strong public support for their peacekeeping policies. Although they welcomed public support, 
there is little indication showing they made peacekeeping decisions based on public opinion. 
By contrast, there is a strong evidence showing that both the Trudeau and Mulroney 
administrations (1968-1993) were influenced by public support for peacekeeping. When Trudeau 
became a prime minister in the late 1960s, Canadian peacekeeping encountered setbacks in 
Cyprus, Congo, and Egypt. In light of the strong resistance from Canadian intellectuals to 
peacekeeping, the government consulted with them. It then concluded that the global demand for 
Canadian peacekeeping would decline in the future and deprioritized peacekeeping to a third 
place in its Defense White Paper. But later on, it realized that Canadians held a strong 
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commitment to peacekeeping and reverted back to the Pearsonian approach to peacekeeping. As 
a result, Canada continued to lead peacekeeping in the early 1980s. Similarly, the Mulroney 
administration launched a series of initiatives to gauge public opinion as soon it took power in 
1984. The government quickly realized that Canadians held a strong commitment to 
peacekeeping and boosted Canada’s participation in the endeavor, thereby making Canada 
among the top ten peacekeeping contributors in the early 1990s. 
But the nature of peacekeeping changed after the Cold War. Canada encountered 
battlegrounds in the former Yugoslavia and, in Somalia, where its troops were mired in a 
criminal scandal. Moreover, Canada’s domestic political and economic atmosphere were clouded 
by the Quebec referendum and fiscal deficit. Canadian troops were also overstretched and 
underfunded. These conditions led the Chrétien administration to pull Canada out of 
peacekeeping role. But the administration didn’t want to abandon internationalism which is why 
it introduced less efficient approach in the form of soft power by advocating noble concepts like 
human security and the responsibility to protect without backing its principled rhetoric with 
principled action. Although the Martin administration tried to build the military, it, nonetheless, 
followed a similar approach in regards to peacekeeping.  
When the Harper administration took power, however, Canada exited peacekeeping in 
the earnest sense. The Harper government saw peacekeeping as a Liberal myth and legacy that 
Conservatives should overthrow and replace with militarism. In addition to Canada’s war in 
Afghanistan following 9/11, Harper also opposed Chrétien’s decision not to engage Canada in 
the Iraq war. When he became a Prime Minister in 2006, therefore, the Harper government 
reduced Canadian peacekeeping to a historic low level while boosting the military budget and 
glorifying Canada’s heroism of the past and present.  
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Meanwhile, several polls showed that Canadians have repeatedly expressed their desire to 
reinstate Canada as a peacekeeping nation. Yet, they are also satisfied with Harper’s economic 
performance after the global financial crisis. They also support his recent foreign policies in 
Middle East, in Ukraine, and the fight against ISIS. For this reason, it seems Canadian 
peacekeeping will continue to remain insignificant. But the strengthening of Canadian military 
for the war effort has equipped it with much needed unique capabilities which could be 
translated into productive use in peace operations in marginalized parts of the world. In order for 
this to happen, however, either the Conservative government needs to adjust its existing 
paradigm or Canadians need to find enough reason (besides peacekeeping neglect) to vote it out 
of the office. But as far as the relation between public opinion and peacekeeping decision goes, 
the public-government divide has persisted from the early 1990s to date while the potential for 
Canada to become a leader in peacekeeping continues to strengthen. So the role of public opinion 
in Canadian government’s peacekeeping decision since the early 1990s remains very weak.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 
CHAPTER 6: LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND PEACEKEEPING DECISIONS: THE CASE 
OF CANADIAN PRIME MINISTERS 
 
This chapter tests the hypothesis that Canadian Prime Ministers whose personality traits 
dispose them towards peaceful foreign policy (PFP) are more committed to peacekeeping than 
leaders exhibiting a disposition towards warlike foreign policy. It seeks to test the hypothesis by 
profiling four Canadian Prime Ministers (Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, and Harper) selected on 
the basis of their long tenure in office and the availability of sufficient interview transcript (5000 
words or more) to meet the validity criteria stipulated by Hermann (2006). This study collected 
more than 35,000 word interview transcripts given by the Prime Ministers from Canadian and 
U.S media sources available in the Internet.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section reports the LTA scores of the 
four Prime Ministers to determine whether they are disposed towards PFP or WFP. The second 
section will examine qualitative data available on the foreign disposition of the four Prime 
Minister to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the quantitative results 
reported in section one. By comparing quantitative results (LTA scores) with qualitative 
evidence, triangulation “reduces the risk of chance associations and of systematic biases due to a 
specific method and allows a better assessment of the generality of the explanations that one 
develops” (Maxwell, 2008, p. 245). The third section explores the relative commitment of each 
Prime Minister to international peacekeeping. This step furnishes a reference ground for the 
fourth section which tests the hypothesis on whether Prime Ministers reflecting PFP traits are 
more committed to peacekeeping than their counterparts. Finally, the fifth section will explore 
the implication of the study from theoretical and policy vantage points.  
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The goal of this chapter is to determine whether leaders disposed toward peaceful foreign 
policies show greater commitment to peacekeeping. It will test this hypothesis by following five 
step procedures which include ranking four selected Canadian Prime Ministers (Trudeau, 
Mulroney, Chrétien, and Harper) on whether they reflect the traits associated with PFP 
orientation, introducing qualitative evidence to support the results, and reviewing the 
peacekeeping legacy of the four Prime Ministers to determine whether leaders exhibiting 
peaceful foreign policy disposition also showed a greater commitment to peacekeeping than their 
counterparts. 
Personality disposition toward peaceful foreign policy: LTA score results  
 
This section reports the Leadership Trait Assessment (LTA) scores of four Canadian 
Prime Ministers (Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, and Harper), to determine whether they 
constitute personal attributes reflecting peaceful foreign policies (PFP) in comparison with the 
average LTA scores of 284 world leaders on five personality attributes, namely: low in-group 
bias, low need for power, high conceptual complexity, low task orientation, and low distrust for 
others. If a leader meets the PFP criteria, his score will be shaded in green but if he doesn’t, his 
score will be shaded in red (See Table 6.1). So, the more the number of green colors a Prime 
Minister gets, the more he reflects attributes associated with peaceful foreign policy.  
The LTA results in Table 6.1 showed that the two Liberal leaders (Trudeau and Chrétien) 
met three out the five PFP attributes. By contrast, none of the two Conservative leaders 
(Mulroney and Harper) met any of the five PFP attributes. None of the Prime Ministers met all of 
the five attributes associated with PFP. It appears that none of the Prime Ministers got below 
average scores on distrust toward others when compared with world leaders (N=284, Mn=.13, 
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SD=.13). In fact, Trudeau earned the highest score in distrust of others (Mn=.24) relative to the 
three Canadian Prime Ministers profiled in this study, followed by Harper (Mn=.17), and 
Mulroney and Chrétien (Mn=.14).  
The results in Table 6.1 show that the two Liberal leaders (Trudeau and Chrétien) 
exhibited higher disposition towards PFP than their Conservative counterparts (Mulroney and 
Harper). Trudeau emerged as the most PFP disposed leader by meeting four out of five criteria 
listed under PFP, followed by Chrétien who met three out the five traits. Mulroney turned out to 
be least disposed towards PFP by meeting only one criteria (In-group bias) while Harper came in 
a third place for meeting two of the five indicators of PFP disposed leaders.  
Trudeau exhibited a strong PFP disposition by meeting three out of the five PFP 
attributes. He reflected a low task orientation (Mn=.53) in comparison with 284 world leaders 
(Mn=.63, SD=.06) which indicates that he was more inclined towards relationship orientation. 
On the other hand, Trudeau scored an above average cognitive complexity score (Mn=.76) 
compared with other world leaders (N=284, Mn=.59, SD=.06) which implies that Trudeau 
tended to perceive reality as grey (complex) rather than as black and white (simplified 
contradiction). Further, Trudeau scored below average in need for power (Mn=.20) compared 
with other world leaders (N=284, Mn=.35, SD=.05) which shows that Trudeau was not inclined 
to dominate others.  
So, how can one interpret the results discussed above? Surely, the LTA results indicate 
that Trudeau was the most PFP disposed Prime Minister. But they also show that Trudeau was 
not naively altruistic. Instead, they indicate that Trudeau perceived the world the world as a 
complicated (high cognitive complexity, Mn=.76) and a dangerous (high distrust of others, 
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Mn=.24) place. However, the results also show that Trudeau was not interested in dominating 
others (low need for power, Mn=. 20). His low task orientation (Mn=.53) implies that Trudeau 
would hesitate to take measures that would compromise the harmony within a group even if he 
believed that taking that measure would help that group meet its goal. In sum, these three 
attributes render Trudeau as being disposed towards peaceful foreign policy (PFP). And if the 
hypothesis is correct, Trudeau would demonstrate the greatest commitment to international 
peacekeeping that other the three Canadian Prime Ministers profiled in this study. 
By contrast, if the hypothesis is right, one would expect Mulroney to exhibit the lowest 
commitment to international peacekeeping because he met none of the five attributes associated 
which a PFP disposed leader. Just like Trudeau, Mulroney had an above average score in need 
for power (Mn=.32) compared with world leaders (N=284, Mn=.26, SD=.05). He also got the 
highest score in task orientation (Mn=.70) alongside Harper. Further, Mulroney didn’t meet the 
PFP criteria with regard to conceptual complexity because his score was identical with the 
average score for world leaders (N=284, Mn=.59, SD=.06).  
So, what kind of leader was Mulroney? Mulroney was ready to promote Canada’s interest 
even if it might compromise other countries’ interest (low in group bias, Mn=.10). He was also 
skeptical of others (low distrust of others, Mn=.14). On the other hand, Mulroney’s grasp of 
complexity of issues compared to world leaders was average (Mn=.59). Yet, he exhibited a 
strong interest to influence others (high need for power, Mn=.32) and push his group members 
towards achieving a task at any cost (high task orientation, Mn=.70). These attributes render 
Mulroney as the least PFP disposed Prime Minister. So, in order for the hypothesis to be right, 
Mulroney would demonstrate the least commitment to international peacekeeping. 
 
 
 127 
Chrétien demonstrated a significant disposition towards PFP by meeting three out of the 
PFP criteria. This was because his task orientation score was less than the average score for 
world leaders (Mn=.67). Compared with his three Canadian counterparts, Chrétien also scored 
the lowest in-group bias (Mn=.05) and need for power (Mn=.19) attributes while earning the 
highest score (together with Trudeau) in cognitive complexity (Mn=.76). The overall LTA scores 
indicate that Chrétien knew the world was both complex (high cognitive complexity, Mn=.76) 
and dangerous place (high distrust of others, Mn=.14) where he should play a part in fixing 
problems (high task orientation Mn=.14) in a manner that accommodated others (low in-group 
bias, Mn=.05) while avoiding the spotlight (low need for power, Mn=.19). Hence, if the 
hypothesis is to remain feasible, Chrétien’s peacekeeping commitment would be greater than 
Mulroney and Harper.  
Just like Mulroney, Harper did not satisfy any of the five attributes associated with PFP 
disposition. When compared with 284 world leaders, Harper’s in-group bias (Mn.12), need for 
power (Mn=.22), cognitive complexity (Mn=.58) scores were average. But when compared with 
the three Canadian Prime Ministers, Harper had the highest in-group bias and the lowest 
cognitive complexity scores. He also demonstrated the highest task orientation (Mn=. 70) among 
his Canadian counterparts. 
When compared with the three Prime Ministers, Harper perceived the world as a 
dangerous place (Mn=.17) comprised of opposite forces (cognitive complexity, Mn=.58). His 
high task orientation (Mn=.70), on the other hand, indicates his willingness to push his group 
achieve its goal at the expense of group harmony. However, Harper had little interest in 
dominating others (low need for power, Mn=.22) or in promoting Canada’s interest at the 
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expense of other countries (low in-group bias, Mn=.12). So, for the hypothesis to work out, 
Harper, just like Mulroney, is expected to demonstrate the least commitment to peacekeeping 
than Trudeau and Chrétien.  
Table 6. 1 LTA scores of Canadian Prime Ministers disposition towards PFP 
Leaders In-Group 
Bias 
Need for 
Power  
Conceptual 
Complexity 
Task 
Orientation 
Distrust of 
Others 
World Leaders 
(N=284) 
Mn = .15 
SD = .05 
Mn = .26 
SD = .05 
Mn = .59 
SD = .06 
Mn=.63 
SD=.06 
Mn =.13 
SD=.06 
Pierre Trudeau Mn = .10 Mn = .20 Mn = .76 Mn=.53 Mn=.24 
Brian Mulroney Mn = .10 Mn = .32 Mn = .59 Mn=.70 Mn=.14 
Jean Chrétien Mn = .05 Mn = .19 Mn = .76 Mn=.67 Mn=.14 
Stephen Harper Mn = .12 Mn = .22 Mn = .58 Mn= .70 Mn=.17 
 
To conclude, this section measured the PFP disposition of four Canadian Prime Minister 
using Hermann’s five LTA attributes. It ranked them on the number of attributes they met in the 
PFP criteria. Accordingly, the two Liberal leaders, i.e., Trudeau and Chrétien emerged as the 
most PFP disposed leaders for meeting three out the five PFP attributes. By contrast, the two 
Conservative leaders, namely; Mulroney and Harper were the least PFP disposed leaders for 
failing to meet any of the five attributes associated with PFP disposition. Hence, for the 
hypothesis to work, one would expect the two Liberal leaders to demonstrate a greater 
commitment to peacekeeping than their Conservative counterparts.  
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Foreign Policy Disposition of Canadian Prime Ministers: Qualitative evidence 
 
This section looks for evidence supporting the LTA results reported in the previous 
section ranking Canadian Prime Ministers according to their PFP disposition. It argues that 
Trudeau exercised a peaceful foreign policy intended to reconcile the communist nations with 
their capitalist counterparts while calling for cooperation among industrialized nations with poor 
countries. Similarly, Chrétien tried to prevent Canada from engaging in conflicts and cut down 
its military budget. Mulroney, by contrast, believed in a strong military and personal diplomacy. 
But he was also open to public criticism which ultimately led increase Canada’s peacekeeping 
operations. Harper, on the other hand, boosted Canada’s military budget and readily set Canadian 
Forces in major military operations conducted by NATO after 9/11.  
Trudeau’s foreign policy disposition 
 
Trudeau (1993) described his intention to pursue peaceful foreign policy. He wrote: “I am 
for peace before I entered politics and I’m not going to wait until I’m out of office before 
speaking out and trying to get things changed” (1993, p. 335-36). Trudeau embraced an idealistic 
foreign policy and rejected realism. He believed that Canada’s foreign policy should be the 
projection of its domestic policy which he thought should be based on a just society. Trudeau 
was convinced that Canada was incapable of projecting its influence using force because of its 
middle power status which is why he cut down Canada’s military budget and made it the first 
nuclear free country in the world. When he heard Pearson announced Canada’s nuclear program, 
Trudeau postponed his decision to join the Liberal Party because he was against nuclear 
weapons. He pointed out that Canada would have a greater influence by projecting its ideals of a 
just society which is why he took an initiative to start a dialogue to end the Cold War tensions 
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between the communist and capitalist nations. Trudeau attested his disposition towards peaceful 
foreign policy in his memoirs: 
Overall, I think it’s fair to say that my approach to international relations was really 
based on my approach to the Canadian community. The community of man should 
be treated in the same way you would treat your community of brothers of fellow 
citizens. It was an idealistic approach as opposed to realpolitik approach. I felt it was 
the duty of a middle power like Canada, which could not sway the world with the 
force of its armies, to at least try to sway the world with the force of its ideals. I 
wanted to run Canada by applying the principles of justice and equality, and I wanted 
our foreign policy to reflect similar values (Trudeau, 1993, p.224). 
There are several examples which show that Trudeau had a peaceful foreign policy 
disposition. In the 1960s, the Diefenbaker government bought weapon system like F-104 
Starfighters, BOMARC B and Honest John Missile. In order to be functional, these weapons 
needed nuclear warheads. When Trudeau took office, he phased out the BOMARC and Honest 
John Missiles while replacing Canada’s Starfighter’s armaments with conventional armaments. 
Trudeau replaced Canada’s Voodoo CF-101 interceptors with F-18 in the early 1970s and made 
Canada a nuclear weapon free country (Broomke & Nossal, 1983/84). He also proceeded to cut 
Canada’s Forces by 20 percent to 80,000 and fixed the defense budget at $1.8 billion, thereby 
reducing Canada’s NATO commitment by 50 percent.  
Besides curbing Canada’s military posture, Trudeau also tried to reconcile the communist 
powers with capitalist power and advocated cooperation among rich and poor countries. Despite 
US resistance, Trudeau visited the communist regime in Cuba. He also signed the “Protocol on 
Consultations” with the Soviet Union (Granatstein, 2011). Trudeau also pressure G7 members to 
increase development aid by forming the North-South dialogue while establishing the Canadian 
Development Cooperation at home (Kirton, 1985; Trudeau, 1993). During his final years in 
office, Trudeau launched the “peace initiative”. Reikhoff and Singler (1985) stated the objectives 
of the peace initiative as follows: 
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 to establish a forum where the five nuclear powers could negotiate global limits of 
their nuclear weapons; 
 to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime; 
 to help create a balance of conventional forces in Europe by providing a fresh 
impetus to the stalled mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) negotiations at 
Vienna and by commencing the Stockholm Conference on European Security and 
Disarmament at a high level of political representation; and 
 to help suffocate the strategic arms race by an international ban on the testing and 
deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, by restricting mobile 
international ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to agreed zones in order to aid verification, 
and by establishing a code of conduct to assist the verification of new weapons 
systems (Riekhoff & Singler, 1985, p. 59). 
  
Before Canada launched the peace initiative in 1983, no major Western country 
attempted to initiate a dialogue between East and West. In the following year, however, the US 
and Soviet leaders began to believe that dialogue could lead to a better world. Trudeau was 
convinced that Canada’s initiative inspired the two superpowers to coordinate in ending the Cold 
War. He wrote: 
The fact remains that in the fall of 1983 no major Western power except Canada had 
any peace initiative under way, and by the fall of 1984 there were many new ideas in 
the air. We aimed far and high, but we did not miss the mark (Trudeau, 1993, p.340). 
During the end of his tenure in office, Trudeau was satisfied with Canada’s pursuit of 
peaceful foreign policy. He noted that Canada never betrayed its friends and listened to its 
adversaries with an open mind. By doing so, Trudeau was convinced that Canada has done 
its best in offsetting confrontation between the two superpowers. Trudeau summarized his 
foreign policy orientation in a House of Commons speech that he gave on February, 1983: 
 …a fitting epitaph not only to the peace mission but also more generally to the 
whole of our foreign policy from 1968 to 1984: “Let it be said of Canada and of 
Canadians that we saw the crisis; that we did act; that we took risks; that we were 
loyal to our friends and open with our adversaries; that we have lived up to our 
ideals; and that we have done what we could to lift the shadows of war” (Trudeau, 
1993, p.341). 
 
 
 132 
In conclusion, Trudeau’s world view as well as his actions demonstrate that he was 
disposed towards peaceful foreign policy. Trudeau postponed his decision to join the Liberal 
Party due to Pearson’s initial stance to preserve Canada’s nuclear weapons. After he took office, 
Trudeau adopted an idealist foreign policy based on justice and equality while rejecting realism. 
He implemented his philosophy in practice by making Canada the first nuclear free country by 
phasing out Canada’s nuclear weapon system. Trudeau also pressured G7 members to increase 
development aid while establishing Canadian Development Cooperation at home. He also visited 
Cuba and signed a protocol of understanding with the Soviets. Trudeau also pioneered the peace 
initiative between East and West which inspired the beginning of a dialogue between the two 
superpowers that led to the ending of the Cold War. All of these factors show that the LTA 
scores which portrayed Trudeau as a PFP disposed leader were correct. 
Mulroney’s foreign policy disposition 
 
There is ample evidence to suggest that Brian Mulroney pursued a confrontational 
foreign policy. This disposition is apparent in his assertive personal interaction with world 
leaders, in his effort of militarizing the Canadian Forces, and in his assumption of an 
independent (sometimes lonely) stance on international issues. Mulroney’s strong personal 
friendship with President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher is often misconstrued as 
subordinate submission when, in fact, he confronted them to secure Canada’s national interest 
(Nossal & Michaud, 2007). Mulroney also reversed Trudeau’s defense policy by pursing an 
assertive policy of securing Canada’s sovereignty in the Oceans by strengthening the navy. 
Mulroney never hesitated to pressure world leaders to impose sanctions on the apartheid regime 
of South Africa and openly condemned the Chinese government for suppressing the student 
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protest in Tiananmen Square by force.  In short, Mulroney confronted anyone (friend or foe) 
whom he thought had jeopardized either Canada’s domestic interest or its universal values. 
Mulroney regretted the fact that the media portrayed him as a submissive leader when he 
really was a tough Prime Minister because he maintained close friendship with the leaders of the 
United States and the United Kingdom. If they knew how he actually dealt with foreign leaders, 
he wrote: “they would be astonished at what I actually say and do. My only interest is the 
advancement of Canada’s interest” (Mulroney, 2007, p. 498). This discomfort shows that 
Mulroney believed a leader should be tough where he believed that “unbridled, stubborn 
ambition is the currency of political leaders”-perhaps showing his above average need for power 
(Mn=.32) (2007, p.194). The following quote captures how Mulroney could be combative 
whenever he deems Canada’s interest was undermined. 
I forcefully walked the vice-president [Bush Sr.] through our concerns. “Acid rain: I 
don’t think the president [Reagan] understands it’s the litmus test. Free trade: [US 
negotiator] Murphy has displayed persistent insensitivity. Arctic sovereignty: I’d like 
to remind you we have two neighbors and I’m talking to one of them. We’ve got to 
have a movement. These are grave issues that are getting worse. Unless the United 
States comes through, you’ll never have a more friendly prime minister for decades-
and beyond” (Mulroney, 2007, p.491-92). 
In addition to personal assertiveness which he endorsed, Mulroney’s defense policy also 
reflected warlike tendency by reminding Canadians that “the world is not always benign or 
predictable as we would wish, [and] that the specter, if not the reality, of violence is ever-present 
and that those who do not look to their military forces can become the victims of the forces of 
others” (CDP, 1987, p.96). Based on this warlike assessment, his government pledged to reverse 
the Liberal governments’ neglect of the military and “create a modern navy capable of operating 
in the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic [and to]…bolster [Canada’s]…capability for 
surveillance and defense of Canadian territory” (CDP, 1987, p.89).  
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But most of his proposals were later cancelled due to unfavorable domestic and 
international circumstances rather than his own change of mindset. For example, Mulroney 
cancelled his decision of purchasing 12 nuclear submarines (SSN) costing $10 billion because of 
strong public opposition and the subsequent decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s (Byers 
& Webb, 2013). It was not just the fear of Soviet aggression that induced Mulroney to strengthen 
Canada’s military but Mulroney was also alarmed by a possible US or other European nations’ 
claim over Canada’s claims in the Arctic, the Pacific, and the Atlantic oceans (Lajuenesse, 
2008). Mulroney was also drawn to cooperation with US over building space based anti-ballistic 
defense system but he later withdrew from the arrangement because of negative public opinion, 
weak balance sheet, and the realization that the US didn’t take the project seriously (Mulroney, 
2007). 
In addition to securing Canada’s interest via building a strong military, Mulroney also 
confronted other countries whom he judged as promoting antithetical policies to Canada’s 
universal values of human rights and good governance. He strongly criticized the fact that the US 
and Britain appeased the apartheid regime in South Africa by avoiding sanctions against it and 
supported Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union while urging the international 
community at the United Nations to intervene in the civil wars and humanitarian crises of 
Yugoslavia and Somalia respectively. He also led Canada in the US led Desert Storm Operation 
to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. Mulroney (2007) expressed pride in pursuing an 
assertive foreign policy by saying: 
The government I had the privilege of leading never wavered when it came to 
placing the cause of human rights and social justice at the top of the agenda in both 
domestic and foreign policy. I am proud of this legacy, and look back on our 
accomplishments with a great deal of satisfaction (Mulroney, 2007, p.424) 
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All in all, Mulroney was disposed to WFP. When he took office, Mulroney sought to 
equip the Canadian military to defend its claims in the Oceans against other countries. He ended 
up abandoning this project because of negative public opinion and a weak balance sheet. 
Mulroney also coalesced with the US to build a joint airspace defense program that he stopped 
because the US didn’t demonstrate strong commitment. Although Mulroney’s defense projects 
didn’t come to fruition, he nonetheless pursued an assertive foreign policy where he confronted 
other countries, including members of the UN Security Council, whenever he believed they 
transgressed universal principles of human right. He urged the US and UK to step up and impose 
sanction on South Africa, he supported Ukraine’s independence against Russia, criticized the 
Chinese government for suppressing university student’s protest by force, pleaded the 
international community to intervene in Yugoslavia and Somalia, and fought in the Desert Storm 
to reverse Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. These actions show that Mulroney was indeed disposed 
towards WFP. But this is not to imply that Mulroney was a war monger or pursued a destructive 
or provocative foreign policy. Instead, it is to stress the fact that Mulroney exhibited a 
willingness to use force or pursue an assertive diplomacy to protect or project Canada’s interests 
and values. 
Chrétien’s foreign policy disposition 
Chrétien was disposed towards PFP. This disposition is reflected in his rhetorical support 
for internationalism and his cutting down of Canada’s military budget. Unlike Trudeau and 
Mulroney, however, Chrétien didn’t pursue grand visions which he considered as unnecessary 
and undoable. Instead, Chrétien (2007) stressed on projecting his values of “defending the 
underdog” (2007, p.44). He noted:  
The basic problems of government almost always come down to questions of money. 
You can have all the dazzling visions and bright ideas you want, but they are next to 
 
 
 136 
finding enough money to do what you want, establishing proper priorities, and 
exercising sound judgment in pursuit of a better society. As a result, every leader 
ends up confronting the same complex problems and unpredictable crises that make 
visions virtually impossible to realize or sustain (Chrétien, 2007, p. 43-44). 
The foreign policy of the Chrétien administration was strongly influenced by the 
economy. As Cohen (2003) put it “to read that White Paper, which still remains the basis of 
Canada’s foreign policy, is to see the world in starkly economic terms” (2003, p. 83) When he 
took office in 1993, the Canadian economy was mired in a budget deficit. So, his top priority was 
reducing the deficit to three percent of the Gross Domestic Product in three years. This priority 
affected his foreign policy in at least three ways (Keating, 2006). First, Chrétien focused on 
boosting Canada’s export by opening up new market in Asia by forming up and leading a crew 
of provincial premiers and business leaders called Team Canada to make trade and investment 
deals. Second, while setting up his first cabinet, he assigned MacLaren who was a strong 
proponent of free trade and believed that “foreign policy is a trade policy” but didn’t give 
Axworthy, who was an ardent internationalist, the foreign minister position until the economy 
recovered in the late 1990s (Cohen, 2003, p. 116). Third, while giving rhetorical support to 
internationalism, Chrétien failed to provide the means by cutting Canada’s foreign aid, 
diplomatic corps, and the military budget in the name of reducing the deficit. For example, 
Chrétien justified his decision to cut the military budget as follows: 
During the period of high deficits and major cutbacks, it was hard as a matter of 
principles, politics, and the heart to buy new equipment for the military while 
reducing assistance to the poor, and the old. Nor was it clear that wars of the future 
would require the same equipment as the wars of the past. If a rogue nation chose to 
drop nuclear missile on New York, if a stateless terrorist cell chose to blow up the 
Parliament Buildings, or if the United States chose to invade Canada, a few dozen 
more tanks or jets fighters wouldn’t make much difference (2007,p.303).   
During the Chrétien era, Canada lacked the resources affect change outward. Canada’s 
international role was reduced to a rhetorical level. The Chrétien administration strongly 
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advocated the human security agenda where it called for countries assume the responsibility of 
protecting civilians oppressed by other governments; however, it didn’t treat the governments 
having a poor human rights record in the same way. While openly criticizing the Nigerian 
government for passing a death sentence on a human rights activist, it avoided criticizing the 
Chinese government for its stringent human rights record. This was because Chrétien didn’t want 
to jeopardize the trade relations and didn’t believe Canada had the clout to influence Chinese 
leaders. Chrétien said: 
I’m the Prime Minister of a country of twenty million people. He’s [Jiang Zemin] is 
the President of a country with 1.2 billion. I’m not allowed to tell the Premier of 
Saskatchewan or Quebec what to do. Am I supposed to tell the President of China 
what to do? (Burton, p.41)  
Although Chrétien participated in numerous international summits, he seldom advocated 
a new agenda. Most of Canada’s important global initiatives during his tenure including the 
international protocol to ban land mines and the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court were attributable to his second foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy. Chrétien didn’t back 
these diplomatic initiatives with tangible resources. Even after the Canadian economy recovered 
in the late 1990s, the Chrétien administration didn’t increase the resources needed to sponsor 
Canadian internationalism.  
But when terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, Chrétien readily 
joined the US led war in Afghanistan. On the other hand, when the US decided to fight Iraq 
without UN endorsement, Chrétien (2007) refused to get involved in the war but told President 
Bush that “Canada is willing to donate more than its fair share to help the people of Iraq rebuild 
their society” (2007, p. 317). He was also skeptical about US intentions in that war: 
I’m still puzzled why the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq. If it was to 
establish democracy, that’s a long shot, especially when you’re supported by kings. 
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Or was it, as I had suggested to Tony Blair, because of oil? Or was it that the 
Americans were under pressure from their generals and weapon lobbyists to use their 
expensive, high-tech arms? Or was it to defeat terrorism? If so, military might alone 
wasn’t likely to succeed (2007, p.317).  
All in all, Chrétien wasn’t as disposed towards PFP as Trudeau. His prime focus was 
reducing the budget deficit and rebuilding the economy. This priority confined his foreign policy 
to concentrate on expanding Canada’s market. This priority also cut down the resources allocated 
to Canadian foreign aid, diplomatic corps, and military budget and left his government unable to 
go beyond giving lip service to international cooperation. His government’s decision to advocate 
human security, its initiative to ban land mines and establish the International Criminal Court, 
and its opposition of the Iraq war indicate that Chrétien had a PFP disposition. However, his 
“pinch-penny diplomacy”; i.e., unwillingness to back human security rhetoric by committing 
resources (Nossal, 1998) make him what Keating (2006) called a “passive internationalist” 
(Keating, 2006). 
Harper’s Foreign Policy Disposition 
 
Harper’s foreign policy inclination was closer to confrontation that it is to peaceful 
coexistence. From the outset, Harper intended to replace the internationalist policy which 
Liberals introduced after the Second World War with an “ideologically conservative” foreign 
policy. According to Ibbitson (2014), Harper’s conservative foreign policy rests on five pillars. 
First, his foreign policy is dictated by conservative values which Harper advocated openly and 
without compromise. Second, Harper sought to erect a new image of Canada as a warrior nation 
by revising its history and boosting Canada’s military strength as well as combat role. Third, 
Harper intended to stir patriotism by asserting Canada’s territorial claims. Fourth, his 
administration reduced Canada’s rationale for international engagement in multilateral 
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organizations to national interest. Finally, Harper pursued a nationalist trade policy that stressed 
on creating jobs at home while selling Canadian products elsewhere.  
 Harper’s foreign policy was guided by conservative values. Harper (2003) adopted 
Russell Kirk’s definition of conservatism as “the preservation of the ancient traditions of 
humanity”. Harper (2003) divided conservatism into economic and social branches whereby 
economic conservatism cherishes the values of “individual freedom, and to that end private 
enterprise, free trade, religious toleration, limited government and the rule of law”, and social 
conservativism emphasizes on “respect for customs and traditions (religious traditions above all), 
voluntary association, personal self-restraint reinforced by moral and legal sanctions of 
behavior”. According to Harper, conservatism offers a better insight into understanding 
contemporary international conflicts as a clash of civilizations and justified the use of force to 
alongside likeminded actors when necessary. He said:  
We also need to rediscover Burkean conservatives because the emerging debates on 
foreign affairs should be fought on moral grounds…We understand that the great 
geopolitical battles against modern tyrants and threats are battles over values. We 
can disagree vehemently with the values of our civilization’s opponents, but that 
does not deny the validity of the cause in their eyes. Without clear values, our side 
has no purpose, no meaning, no chance of success. 
Conservatives must take the moral stand, with our allies, in favor of the fundamental 
values of our society, including democracy, free enterprise, and individual freedom. 
This moral stand should not just give us the right to stand with our allies, but the 
duty to do so and the responsibility to put “hard power” behind our international 
commitments (Harper, 2003). 
Harper exercised his conservative ideology in foreign policy by taking a pro-British 
monarchy, a pro-American, and pro-Israel stands. He also increased Canada’s commitment to 
NATO which he perceived as homogenous while reducing his role in the United Nations because 
it was too diverse to command his trust. Furthermore, Harper never hesitated to criticize great 
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powers like China and Russia for their breach of human rights and led the way in the fight 
against terrorist organizations worldwide.  
As a conservative, Harper revered Canada’s past transitions, especially its colonial ties 
with the British Empire. He made his first business trip to the United Kingdom as soon as he 
became a Prime Minister in 2006. During that visit, Harper attributed Canada’s “parliamentary 
democracy, a commitment to basic freedom, the industrial revolution, and the entrepreneurial 
spirit and the free market” to the British crown. Harper also stressed that Britain ruled over 
Canada with magnanimity where it secured the rights of French Canadians and the First Nations 
while peacefully allowing Canadians to govern themselves independently. Harper declared these 
facts justify why England’s Queen remains Canada’s Queen as well by saying: 
Now I know it’s unfashionable to refer to colonialism in anything other than negative 
terms. And certainly, no part of the world in unscarred by the excesses of empires. 
But in Canadian context, the actions of the British Empire were largely benign and 
occasionally brilliant. The magnanimous provisions of the Quebec Act of 1774 
ensured the survival of the French language and culture in Canada-to the everlasting 
benefit of our country. And the treaties negotiated with the Aboriginal inhabitants of 
our country, while far from perfect, were some of the fairest and most generous of 
the period. The genius of governance shown by the mother country at the time no 
doubt explains in part why Canada’s path to independence was so long, patient and 
peaceful. And it explains why your Queen is still our Queen, and why our “bond of 
comradeship remains as sturdy today as it was in Mr. Churchill’s time (Harper, 
2006).  
During his tenure in office, Harper took several measures to preserve symbols of 
Canadian colonial ties. He discarded Canada’s military insignia which used to be a maple leaf, 
he reinstated the word “Royal” in the official names of Canada’s embassies, the federal offices, 
and the military branches such as the navy and the air force. In addition to ordering Canada’s 
embassies to display Queen Elizabeth II’s portrait, Harper also told his diplomats to share an 
office space with their British counterparts (Hepburn, 2012). Harper implemented these 
measures against the opinions of 63 percent of Canadian respondents surveyed by Forum 
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Research on July 2013 who wanted Canada’s head of state to be a Canadian citizen (Bozinoff, 
2013). 
Harper was also determined to strengthen Canadian relations with United States. Before 
he took office, Harper was against Chrétien’s refusal to participate in the Iraq war of 2003. So, 
when he became a Prime Minister, Harper stepped up to NATO’s request by providing more 
troops in the Afghan war. He made this decision in spite of leading a minority government and 
implemented it because Liberals were divided over Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan 
(Saideman & Aueswald, 2012).Harper ensured Canada’s military readiness by crafting a new 
defense strategy which sought to increase Canada’s defense budget by $5.3 billion over five 
years. The strategy aimed at: 
 Increasing the number of military personnel to 70,000 Regular Forces and 30,000 
Reserve Forces,  
 Replacing the Forces’ core equipment fleets, including: 
o 15 ships to replace destroyers and frigates; 
o 10 to 12 maritime patrol aircraft; 
o 17 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft; 
o 65 next-generation combat vehicles and systems, and 
o A fleet of land combat vehicles and systems. 
 Strengthening the overall state of the Forces’ readiness to deploy, and their 
ability to sustain operations once deployed; and 
 Improving and modernize defense infrastructure (CDS, 2006, p. 4) 
 
After 2006, Harper made Canada the most successful economy among the G7 countries 
and established a majority government in 2011, which led him to conclude that Canada’s future 
risks were externally induced economic crises and terrorist attack. Harper is aware that Canada’s 
exports heavily depend on the US market, which is why he: initiated Beyond Border Vision 
(BBV), pushed for Keystone XL crude oil pipeline from Alberta to Gulf of Mexico, and 
maintained concern over US fiscal management while working in concert with US authorities to 
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prevent terrorist attacks in both countries as recently witnessed in the Boston bombing (Harper, 
2013; Moens & Fleet, 2013).  In short, Harper acknowledged that the US was an indispensable 
partner of Canada. He told Robert Rubin, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Affairs: 
I tell people from around the world, Canadians always compare themselves to the 
Americans, and it’s the only real comparison that matters to us. And we’re proud of 
that comparison…in spite of the fact I value the differences we have as Canadians, 
I’m an enormous admirer of this country…particularly the American business 
community (Harper, 2013).    
Harper’s top foreign policy priority is economic in essence. It focused on securing a 
viable market for Canada’s exportable goods and services. In the political realm, it intended to 
protect Canada against terrorism by allying itself with governments that shared Western values. 
This is the main reason why Harper (2013) supports Israel in the Middle East where he described 
it as “the one strong, stable, democratic, Western ally that we have in this part of the world”. 
This is also the reason why Harper (2013) believed Iran’s nuclear program was “the biggest 
single threat to the globe today”, and severed ties with the Hamas-led government in Palestine. 
Some scholars (Barry, 2010; Dart, 2012) wrongly argued that Harper supports Israel because he 
needs the Canadian Jewish vote to win elections. If Harper were solely interested in expanding 
his electoral support base, he would have attempted to negotiate with the leaders of French 
Canadians and First Nations just like Mulroney did in the 1980s. Harper’s support for Israel 
springs from his conviction that Israel, like Canada, embodied a fair share of Western-
conservative elements. 
The tendency to classify his encounters into friends and foes has estranged Harper from 
the United Nations. Canada lost its bid for a temporary seat at the U.N Security Council for the 
first time after making six successful contests since 1948-49 (Kerckhove, 2013). Although the 
argument that a substantial number of countries were run by unelected dictators who likely cast 
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their votes in exchange for pledges, it is fair to conclude that Harper’s ideologically propelled 
and outspoken criticism of regimes he considered were bad, his unconditional support for Israel, 
and his refusal to sign UN indigenous rights act have contributed to his falling out with most U.N 
member countries (Coyne, 2010, Stairs, 2011; Smith, 2012; Kerckove, 2013).  
Overall, Harper’s foreign policy is driven by a conservative value system which classifies 
international actors into friends and enemies. Due to this, Harper’s foreign policy is friendly 
towards countries which he considered as sharing Western conservative values and confronts 
those whom he thinks hold anti-Western conservative sentiments. This selective approach has 
rendered Harper towards a confrontational foreign policy. However, unlike Mulroney who 
challenged his allies whenever he believed they transgressed universal values, Harper never 
opposed his allies. Due to this, Harper’s level of confrontation was limited to non-Western 
countries.  
This section examined the foreign policy disposition of Canadian Prime Ministers using 
qualitative evidence. It showed there is an evidence to support the LTA results reported in the 
previous section. This section demonstrated that Trudeau was indeed disposed towards peaceful 
foreign policies as he projected his vision of a just society to abridge the divisions between 
communist and capitalist forces and improve cooperation between poor countries and 
industrialized nations through development aid. It also showed that Chrétien was disposed 
towards internationalism; however, his excessive focus on balancing the budget deficit impeded 
him from backing his rhetoric with meaningful action since he cut down resources for Canada’s 
foreign, diplomatic corps and the military. By contrast, Mulroney exhibited warlike foreign 
policy by taking initiatives to build the military and challenge allies and non-allies on human 
rights grounds. Harper also reflected similar disposition. However, his confrontation was not 
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inspired by universal human rights. Instead, it was conditioned on whether countries shared 
conservative values or not. Accordingly, Harper remained unconditionally loyal to NATO, Great 
Britain, Israel, and the United States while confronting the UN, non-Western countries, and non-
state actors he deemed as hostile to the West. Harper strengthened the Canadian military by 
allocating $1 billion a year and engaged Canada several NATO led military operations. Now that 
the quantitative results have been triangulated with qualitative evidence, the following section 
will proceed to testing the hypothesis that Canadian Prime Ministers disposed towards PFP more 
committed to peacekeeping than WFP disposed leaders by examining the peacekeeping 
contributions of the four Canadian Prime Ministers.  
The Peacekeeping legacy of Canadian Prime Ministers 
 
In order to compare the peacekeeping legacy of Canadian Prime Ministers, it is important 
to assess the international peacekeeping environment during their tenure, their foreign and/or 
defense policy documents during their tenure in office, and their actual personnel (troops and/or 
civilians) contribution to international peacekeeping in terms. The following sections will review 
the relative contributions of Prime Ministers Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, and Harper during 
their years in office based on the three criteria mentioned herein. 
Trudeau’s contribution to Canadian Peacekeeping  
 
When Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968, the euphoria over peacekeeping had 
changed to frustration. Despite Canada’s contributions to end the Suez Crisis in 1956, President 
Nasser expelled Canadian peacekeepers from Egypt, ended the UN Emergency Forces mission, 
and declared a war on Israel (Carroll, 2005). Canada’s first non-UN mission in 1954, the 
International Control Commission (ICC), in Vietnam also failed due to vague terms of agreement 
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and Cold War stalemate (NDCF, 2008). In light of these developments, Trudeau demoted 
peacekeeping from the top spot ascribed to it by his predecessor, Lester B. Pearson. 
The foreign and defense policies of the Trudeau government were inward looking. On 
June 1970, the Trudeau government announced its “Foreign Policy for Canadians” which 
stipulated six different priorities. These were: “economic growth, social justice, quality of life, 
sovereignty and independence, peace and security, and harmonious natural environment” 
(Brown, 1981). A year later, his government issued its first defense policy which subordinated 
international peacekeeping as the last priority following the monitoring of Canadian border, 
defending North America in collaboration with the US, and fulfilling Canada’s commitment to 
NATO (CDP, 1971).  
Further, the 1971 defense policy reviewed Canada peacekeeping “experience 
[as]…frustrating and disillusioning” because of vague mandates, absent political will among 
world leaders, and minimal financial and logistic support (CDP, 1971, p.39). So, the Foreign 
Minister, Mitchell Sharp, declared the following eight criteria should be fulfilled before Canada 
participates in peacekeeping. These are: 
 There should exist a threat to international peace and security 
 The peacekeeping endeavor should be associated with an agreement for political 
settlement, or at least a reasonable expectation of a negotiated settlement 
 The peacekeeping organization should be responsible to a political authority, 
preferably the United Nations 
 The peacekeeping mission should have a clear mandate adequate to permit it to 
carry out its assigned function 
 The parties to the conflict accept the presence of the peacekeeping missions and 
agree to maintain a ceasefire 
 Canadian participation in the operation is acceptable to all concerned 
 There should be an agreed and equitable method of financing the operation 
(Delvoie, 2000, p.17). 
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The above conditions did not prevent the Trudeau government from participating in 
further peacekeeping missions. The international community put heavy pressure on Canada to 
participate in subsequent peacekeeping missions because its reputation as a relatively neutral 
actor remained intact. Besides, Canada’s military capability could only be matched by the great 
powers who could not participate in peacekeeping because of the Cold War. So, besides the 625 
peacekeepers already deployed elsewhere in 1971, Canada sent 240 peacekeepers to the 
International Control Commission in Vietnam, 850 logistic officers to the second UN Emergency 
Force in Egypt in 1973, 19 UN peacekeepers between Syria and Israel in 1974, and another 150 
Canadian peacekeepers to Lebanon in 1978 (CDP, 1971, Conrad, 2012). For the next decade, the 
United Nations did not launch any mission, hence, sparing the Trudeau government from further 
hesitation. 
In conclusion, the Trudeau government did not prioritize peacekeeping. It responded to 
Canada’s frustration over previous peacekeeping missions by relegating it to a lower foreign and 
defense policies’ priority. Trudeau’s government also delineated eight criteria which must be 
fulfilled before Canada agrees to participate in peacekeeping. Despite its reluctance, however, 
the Trudeau government submitted to heavy international pressure and demand for Canada to 
engage in peacekeeping. Because Trudeau stepped down from office in 1984, it is impossible to 
foretell whether he would have agreed to participate in subsequent peacekeeping endeavors since 
the UN itself stopped launching new peacekeeping missions for a decade between 1977 and 
1988. 
 
Mulroney’s contribution to Canadian Peacekeeping  
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During the first term of Mulroney’s tenure in office, the United Nations did not launch a 
new peacekeeping operation. However, 960 Canadian peacekeepers were serving in five UN-led 
and one non-UN led peacekeeping missions worldwide (CDP, 1987). In the meantime, 
Mulroney’s defense policy dismissed Trudeau’s introspective approach by setting three 
priorities, namely: “defense and collective security, arms control and disarmament and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes” (CDC, 1987, p.10). In this context, the Mulroney government 
considered peacekeeping as a critical instrument of resolving disputes before it creates conflict 
among Canada’s allies and/or from escalating into superpower conflict (CDC, 1987). 
Mulroney’s administration also revised Sharp Principles of peacekeeping by stripping out 
the preference for peacekeeping and stressing that the missions should not harm Canada’s 
relations with its allies (CDC, 1987). These criteria are listed below: 
  Whether there is a clear and enforceable mandate 
 Whether the principal antagonists agree to a ceasefire and to Canada’s 
participation in the operation 
 Whether the arrangements are in fact likely to serve the cause of peace and 
lead to a political settlement in the long term 
 Whether the size and international composition of the force are appropriate to 
the mandate and will not damage Canada’s relations with other states 
 Whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the 
operation and influence the disputants 
 Whether the participation is adequately and equitably funded and logistically 
supported (CDC, 1987, p. 38). 
 
Tessier and Fortmann (2001) rightfully argue that Mulroney’s contribution to 
international peacekeeping became unprecedented during his second term in office (1988-1993). 
They indicate that the Mulroney government participated in 18 peacekeeping missions in just 
five years which is equal to the aggregate number of missions Canada participated in the 
previous four decades (1947-1986). During these five years, the total number of Canadian 
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peacekeepers also more than quadrupled from 960 to 4000. In addition, Tessier and Fortman 
(2001) noted that Mulroney allocated $200 million budget annually for peacekeeping and 
committed 10 percent of the total UN peacekeepers, hence making Canada, “the world’s 100th 
largest army” in 1992 (Jung, 2009, p.69), among the top ten peacekeeping contributors to the 
UN.  
All in all, the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney made the greatest 
commitment to peacekeeping of any Canadian Government. Many scholars argue that 
Mulroney’s initiatives were not premeditated but came forth in response to international 
developments (Michaud & Nossal, 2001). However, nobody anticipated that the Cold War would 
end so soon with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the resurgence of the United Nations 
peace interventions. The most important thing is that, during its second term, the Mulroney 
government welcomed the change and readily assisted the United Nations to keep the peace 
worldwide. 
Jean Chrétien and Canadian Peacekeeping (1993-2003) 
 
The greatest decline of Canadian international peacekeeping took place during Chrétien’s 
term as a Prime Minister. However, Canada’s exit from peacekeeping was not apparent because 
the Chrétien administration refrained from declaring its intent to quit peacekeeping. By contrast, 
in 1994, despite cutting the defense budget by $2 billion, the Defense White Paper pledged to 
increase Canada’s available force for peacekeeping up to 10,000 from its December, 1994’s level 
which was 2,811 (CDP, 1994). Besides, Canada’s active diplomacy in controlling landmines, 
setting up peacekeeping training centers, promoting human security, and establishing a 
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multinational brigade to conduct traditional peacekeeping eclipsed the fact that it was 
abandoning international peacekeeping participation in terms of providing peacekeepers abroad.  
During the first five years of his term in office, the Chrétien administration preferred to 
train peacekeepers and stick to traditional peacekeeping rather than participate in 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, it established the Pearson Peacekeeping 
Center in 1994; opened the Peace Support Training Center in 1996; and, initiated the UN 
Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) to execute traditional peacekeeping missions 
together with other middle powers in 1997. In the meantime, it reduced the average number of 
Canadian peacekeepers serving under the United Nations by two-thirds from over 2,800 in 1999 
to less than 950 in 1997 (UN, 2013). 
Canada’s peacekeeping experience during the early 1990s was frustrating. This began in 
the UN mission in Somalia where the torture and murder of a Somali teenager by Canadian 
peacekeepers damaged Canada’s long held reputation as a helpful fixer (Razack, 2003). Later, 
Canada sent its general to lead the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Rwanda while ignoring his 
incessant request for more troops and/or intelligence assistance to prevent genocide that took 
over 500,000 civilian lives (Dallaire & Beardsley, 2005).  
In 1996, the safety of Canadian peacekeepers and the participation of the Canadian 
government in resolving the crisis in Bosnia was jeopardized by the conflicting parties as well as 
NATO allies. As Jung (2009) put it “Ottawa learned that when push came shove, the safety of its 
peacekeepers came second to what the major power in the alliance [NATO] deemed to be their 
interest” (2009, p.64). Although this was a NATO mission, i.e., different from UN’s traditional 
peacekeeping, the Chrétien (2007) government was convinced that peacekeeping has changed 
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after the Cold War. As a result, Canada’s contribution to the UN between 1996 and 1997 fell 
from 4 percent to 2 percent. 
Canada’s role in UN peacekeeping continued to nosedive during Chrétien’s second term 
in office. Between 1997 and 1998, the total number of the yearly average number of Canadian 
peacekeepers fell from 940 to 286 (UN, 2013). Canada has provided 650 peacekeepers to the UN 
mission in East Timor and another 450 peacekeepers to the UN mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
However, in 2003, the percentage of Canadian peacekeepers relative to the total UN supply of 
peacekeepers has dropped to 0.64 percent.  
To conclude, the Chrétien government did not want to engage Canada in peacekeeping. 
Instead, it sought to participate in peacekeeping indirectly by training others. The Chrétien 
administration did not evacuate Canadian troops from peacekeeping missions openly or at one 
period of time. Rather, it made a quiet and gradual exit from UN peacekeeping over a decade. In 
this manner the annual average number of Canadian personnel who served in UN peacekeeping 
decreased from 2,846 (4 percent of total UN peacekeepers) in 1993 to 251 (0.64 percent of total 
UN peacekeepers) in 2003. As the following discussion will illustrate, ever since 2003, Canadian 
role in UN peacekeeping has never recovered. In the meantime, Canada’s armed forces declined 
only by 33 percent from its peak of 120,000 soldiers in 1991 to 87,700 in 2006 (Park, 2008). But 
this significant decline (threefold) is far less proportionate than its rate of retreat from the UN, 
which is over tenfold decline. 
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Stephen Harper and Canadian Peacekeeping 
 
Prime Minister Harper thought that Canada’s peacekeeping role is exaggerated. In the 
meantime, he was also convinced that Canada’s combat role in major global conflicts remained 
underappreciated. For Harper, the major culprits behind this imbalance were some Liberal 
governments which underfunded the Canadian Forces. When Harper took office in 2006, 
Canada’s average contribution to role in peacekeeping had been reduced to 150 personnel 
(around 2 percent of the total UN peacekeeping force). Harper did not resurrect Canadian 
peacekeeping in the UN but reduced it further to a mere 0.12 percent in 2013 (UN, 2013).  
Prime Minister Harper did not criticize Canada’s role in UN peacekeeping openly, but 
paid lip service without making tangible commitment. Since he took office in 2006, Harper never 
failed to issue a statement every year commemorating Canada’s peacekeeping day of August 9. 
His latest statement, for example, honors the “tens of thousands” Canadian soldier who served as 
peacekeepers and the 275 Canadian citizens who have sacrificed their lives in peacekeeping 
mission. It also celebrates Canadian peacekeepers currently serving in Haiti, Israel, Cyprus, and 
South Sudan. When Harper issued that statement, the number of Canadians who served under 
UN peacekeeping was just 158 out of the total 97,175 UN peacekeepers (UN, 2013). Yet, Harper 
never addressed this shortage in any of his peacekeeping day statements. 
Although it has been difficult to find out why Harper ignores peacekeeping, on one 
occasion, Whyte (2011) asked him why he avoided describing Canada as a peacekeeping nation 
while knowing that “Canadians are really accustomed to thinking themselves” as such. Harper’s 
reply, clearly depicts his interpretation of Canadian history and image: 
Well, not recently, but in fact Canada has proud military history, beginning with the 
War of 1812 that essentially began to establish our sense of national identity…let me 
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give you the two big threats of the 20th Century. First, fascism. Canada, next to its 
big-three allies, played one of the largest roles…obviously the most robust military 
engagement anyone’s ever been involved in. And then through a different kind of 
engagement, the long, sustained state of alert against Communism, the other great 
threat…In spite of, quite frankly, the ambivalence of some Liberal governments 
toward that, Canada, in fact, remained engaged in that from the beginning to the very 
end. I’m not dismissing peacekeeping…but the real defining moments for the 
country and for the world are those big conflicts where everything’s at stake and 
where you take a side and show you can contribute to the right side (Whyte, 2011). 
 As mentioned above, Harper did not agree that Canadians thought of their nation as a 
primarily peacekeeping nation. A 2012 poll conducted by Environics, on the other hand, showed 
that most Canadians thought peacekeeping was the most important image of their country. 
Although the largest group of Canadians perceived their country primarily as a peacekeeping 
nation, Environics (2012) revealed that the proportion of this group has declined from 40 percent 
in 1990 to 20 percent in 2012. So, Harper’s expression, “not recently”, has some grain of truth 
because Canadian peacekeeping is not as popular as it was in 1990 where it shouldered 10 
percent of total UN peacekeepers. 
 Unlike his predecessors who at least mentioned peacekeeping in their defense policies, 
Harper’s 2008 first defense policy never used the term (CFDS, 2008). The first defense strategy 
announced an ambitious plan to boost Canadian Forces with a grand budget of $490 billion 
spread across two decades mainly to purchase aircraft, tanks, ships, trucks, etc. The strategy also 
pledged to increase the number of active duty Canadian troops to 70,000 and maintain 30,000 
reservists. Apart from stressing the fact that the world has become more dangerous and that 
Canadian Forces should become combat capable, the strategy never hints at the possibility of 
deploying Canadians on a peacekeeping mission. Instead, it set six main priorities for the 
Canadian troops which are listed as follows: 
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 Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including the Arctic and 
through NORAD 
 Respond to a major terrorist attack 
 Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster 
 Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period 
 Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the word for shorter periods 
(CFDS, 2008, p.10) 
 
In sum, Harper avoided UN peacekeeping not because of the operational difficulties it 
entailed but because he had a different strategic goal for Canada Forces. As explained above, 
Harper believed that Canadian identity was forged by the force of arms, not by contribution to 
peacekeeping. He was convinced that building a combat capable force was imperative. Harper 
did not have to make drastic reduction in Canadian peacekeeping because Chrétien has already 
done that. But he ended the Afghanistan combat engagement after 2011 due to strong public 
disapproval whereby a 2009 poll by Angus Reid (2009) showed that only 7 percent support 
extension of the mission after 2011. Nonetheless, even if Canada’s combat commitment 
subsides, his leadership is unlikely to increase its support for peacekeeping. 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that there is no significant relation between personality attributes 
that dispose leaders towards a peaceful foreign policy and their commitment to peacekeeping. 
Even though Prime Minister Trudeau exhibited three out of the five personality traits reflecting a 
peaceful foreign policy disposition, he was initially reluctant to engage Canada in peacekeeping. 
By contrast, Mulroney didn’t reflect any of the personality attributes associated with peaceful 
foreign policy disposition. Yet, he demonstrated the greatest commitment to peacekeeping than 
his counterparts by devoting the largest number of troops to international peacekeeping. On the 
other hand, Chrétien met three out of the five attributes associated with peaceful foreign policy 
disposition. Nonetheless, he reversed Canada’s leadership status as a peacekeeping nation by 
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continuously decreasing its contribution to UN peacekeeping. The only exception was Harper 
who satisfied none of the five personality attributes associated with peaceful foreign policy 
disposition while containing Canada’s international peacekeeping role at a historic low level. 
The implication of the results is that leaders who pursue a peaceful foreign policy do not 
necessary implement their policies in the realm of international peacekeeping. Instead, they 
could implement significant foreign policies tailored towards peace and cooperation. For 
instance, Trudeau’s initiatives to make Canada a nuclear free country, to start a dialogue between 
communist and capitalist countries, his promotion of development cooperation among 
industrialized and developing countries while increasing Canadian development aid show that 
Trudeau pursued a peaceful foreign policy other than international peacekeeping. 
Chrétien’s foreign policy was also oriented towards peaceful cooperation. Even though 
Chrétien cut down Canada’s role in international peacekeeping, his government played an 
important role in ratifying the international treaty banning landmines, in establishing the 
International Criminal Court, in promoting the concept of human security among world leaders, 
in the formation the short lived of international peacekeeping standby brigade (SHIRBRIG) with 
other middle powers, in training peacekeeping troops by establishing the Pearson Peacekeeping 
Institute, and in refusing to engage Canada in the Iraq war because it was not endorsed by the 
UN.   
Mulroney’s LTA scores didn’t meet any of the personality attributes associated with 
peaceful foreign policy disposition. There are also evidences showing that Mulroney pursued a 
confrontational foreign policy through his plan to purchase expensive equipment for the military 
to protect Canada’s sovereignty. Mulroney didn’t compromise his stand on human rights even 
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when it set him in a direct confrontation with great powers such as the United States, the UK, 
China, and Russia. Mulroney believed that sovereignty shouldn’t serve as a pretext to appease 
governments that abuse their citizens’ human rights. His confrontational attitude didn’t prevent 
Mulroney from playing a leading role in international peacekeeping. Mulroney played an 
important role strengthening the UN peacekeeping mission by contributing up to 10 percent of 
the total UN peacekeeping forces. 
Just like Mulroney, Harper’s personality attributes didn’t indicate that he was disposed 
towards peaceful foreign policy. Unlike Mulroney, however, he was not interested in 
contributing to UN peacekeeping. Instead, Harper wanted to play a leading role in NATO led 
combat missions in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq and Syria. Harper distanced himself from the UN 
because he believed it was too diverse, where dictators sat side by side with democratic leaders. 
Moreover, Harper considered Canadian peacekeeping image an overblown Liberal value which 
should be replaced with Canada’s image as a warrior nation (MacKay & Swift, 2012).  
The other important implication that must be understood rests in the important role of 
systemic and domestic factors in affecting the peacekeeping decisions of Canadian Prime 
Ministers. Trudeau took power in a period where Canadian peacekeeping raised suspicions. In 
particular, the frustrations caused by the mission in Congo, in Egypt and in Indo-China have 
raised suspicions over the effectiveness of peacekeeping in Canada which convinced the Trudeau 
administration to relegate peacekeeping in its Defense White Paper to a fourth priority. 
Nonetheless, Trudeau was willing to send Canadian peacekeepers in the limited number of peace 
operations in the 1970s.  
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The domestic and systemic factors also affected Mulroney’s foreign policy. He gave up 
his plan to boost the Canadian military by purchasing expensive weapon because of negative 
public reaction. Similarly, the strong Canadian public opinion towards peacekeeping encouraged 
Mulroney to embrace UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, the ending of the Cold War rekindled the 
international (including Canada’s) enthusiasm towards peacekeeping. So, the domestic as well as 
international context encouraged Mulroney to play an active role in peacekeeping. 
By contrast, the domestic and international environment that Chrétien inherited were less 
favorable to peacekeeping. During the early 1990s, international peacekeeping was a risky and 
complicated endeavor. Canadian peacekeeping operations that Mulroney initiated rendered 
Canadian forces to get caught in the line of fire (in the former Yugoslavia) and caused huge 
scandal (Somalia). The genocide in Rwanda also showed the severe nature of intra-state conflicts 
after the Cold War. Above all, one wonders if Chrétien would have abandoned Canadian 
peacekeeping if Canada didn’t sink in a budget deficit and if the referendum in Quebec didn’t 
take place. Perhaps, if the fiscal deficit and the risk to internal unity didn’t overwhelm the 
Chrétien administration, Canada might have shouldered its international responsibilities by 
providing peacekeepers.  
Harper came to power determined to replace Canada’s image as a peacekeeping nation 
with Canada’s portrait as a warrior nation. But Canada’s prolonged engagement in the war 
against terror in the 21st has served as pretext for Harper to justify his new image for Canada. 
Harper’s stellar performance in managing the Canadian economy amidst the global financial 
crises as well as his stand against ISIS in Syria has earned him sufficient support to win election. 
Nevertheless, Harper deliberately distanced Canada away from peacekeeping because he 
perceived peacekeeping as a Liberal myth that Conservatives should evade. 
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
 
This study began by asking why countries show a varied commitment to peacekeeping 
over time. It selected Canada as a case to examine why it started as a leading peacekeeping 
nation between 1948 and 1996 and became a token contributor to international peacekeeping 
since then. In order to address this variation, the study focused on understanding Canadian 
peacekeeping decisions by framing peacekeeping participation as part of a foreign policy 
decision making. In order to conduct a systematic analysis of Canadian governments’ 
peacekeeping decisions, the study adopted Waltz’s schema comprising systematic, domestic, and 
individual levels of analyses.  
The literature review section showed that most scholars interpreted Canada’s 
peacekeeping decisions at the systemic level of analysis. They utilized the major theories of 
international relations, namely: realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical theories to 
explain Canada’s peacekeeping decisions. Realists attributed Canadian peacekeeping role as a 
strategic means of strengthening the Western alliance and containing the spread of communism 
in conflict ridden countries. Liberals attached Canada’s peacekeeping engagement to a faith in 
international cooperation and loyalty to the United Nations. Constructivists didn’t stress on the 
rationale of Canadian peacekeeping but acknowledged that Canada played a leading role in 
advocating and implementing the concept of peacekeeping. Finally, critical theories framed 
Canadian peacekeeping as a manifestation of capitalist powers to exploit the livelihood of 
working people across the world.  
Although the systemic level interpretations provided a useful insight to the understanding 
of Canadian peacekeeping, they overlook the complexity within the government and diversity of 
their society. The systemic level doesn’t explain the process through which governments 
 
 
 158 
undergo in making foreign policy decisions. In reality, governments (especially democratic 
governments) make decisions after different branches of the government as well as the 
departmental offices within a cabinet debate and make compromises. The role of bureaucratic 
bargaining in Canadian peacekeeping decisions has not been studied sufficiently. This study has 
attempted to briefly highlight the conflict between the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and 
Development (DFATD) and the Department of Defense (DND) clashed over peacekeeping 
decisions. For instance, the chapter on the history of Canadian peacekeeping discussed how 
officials from DND convinced their DFATD counterparts that the Canadian Forces were 
underequipped and overstretched to undertake the Namibian peace operation which they also 
presented as being too risky. It also explained how the Canadian parliament affected the 
Mulroney and Chrétien governments by stipulating the criteria for peacekeeping and in 
determining whether Canada should embrace or reconsider its peacekeeping role. The role of 
bureaucratic bargaining in Canadian peacekeeping deserves more analysis. This study didn’t 
make an in depth study of this factor because it demands the collection of primary data depicting 
the bargaining process among Canada’s senior government officials as they decided to send 
peacekeepers abroad. The researcher couldn’t access this vital data.  
However, there is an equally vital aspect of peacekeeping decision at the domestic level 
of analysis where access to a data is not difficult, namely: public opinion. The role of public 
opinion in democratic countries like Canada cannot be undermined. After all, it is the people 
who elect and empower government officials to make key domestic and foreign policy decisions, 
including peacekeeping participation. In the meantime, governments also need to convince their 
population to endorse their decisions by, inter alia, setting an agenda by conducting public 
opinion polls.  
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This study hypothesized that the Canadian public has a significant impact on Canadian 
government’s peacekeeping decision because of democratic system in Canada as well as the 
shared reverence of the Canadians and most of their governments to international peacekeeping. 
The chapter on the role of public opinion on Canadian peacekeeping decision reviewed the origin 
of Canadian functionalist foreign policy as well as the public opinion poll results since the early 
1940 to determine if public opinion has affected Canadian peacekeeping decision.  
The findings showed that the origin of Canada’s functionalist policy is attributed to 
international circumstances like that of US Civil War and the two World Wars. It also stressed 
that Canada’s top diplomats convinced their leaders to adopt functionalism. This approach 
ensured that Canada exercised an independent foreign policy by shouldering international 
responsibilities by employing its unique capabilities as a middle power. The Canadian 
government began conducting public opinion polls long after it adopted its functionalist foreign 
policy. The King administration decided to launch public opinion to set an agenda rather than 
base its policy on public opinion. Nonetheless, the public opinion polls conducted in the early 
1940s showed that the Canadians welcomed the establishment of an international police force 
after the Second World War. The public and government’s attitude towards peacekeeping were 
similar. But, during that period, public opinion did not influence Canadian government’s 
decision to participate in peacekeeping. 
The domestic power transition after the Second World War boosted Canada’s 
internationalism. After serving for over almost three decades, Prime Minister King retired in 
1949 and was succeeded by Louis St. Laurent. In turn, St. Laurent appointed Lester B. Pearson 
as his foreign minister. The two leaders abandoned Prime Minister King’s tendency towards 
isolationism and increased Canada’s role in world affairs. St. Laurent outlined his five pillars of 
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Canada’s foreign policy in the Grey Lecture in 1947. One of these pillars was the sharing of 
international responsibilities. Although the public was supportive of Canada’s internationalism, it 
was Canadian diplomats like Riddell who played a critical role in shaping this policy by drafting 
this lecture after conducting thorough consultation with other officials and academicians. The 
parallel continuum between public opinion and Canadian government’s foreign policy continued 
without neither contradicting nor influencing each other. It was under this circumstance that 
Canada found itself in the Suez Crisis. 
St. Laurent and Pearson were angered by the bold action taken by British, France, and 
Israel to invade the Suez Canal. They were alarmed by the confrontation created between 
Canada’s closest neighbor and ally (the United States) and its mother countries (Britain and 
France). As a result, St. Laurent sent Pearson in a hasty trip to the United Nations headquarters in 
New York and met his US counterpart to resolve this problem against the will of his Cabinet 
members. Pearson’s goal was to facilitate the exit of the three aggressors (Britain, France, and 
Israel) without losing face by proposing an intervention by an international peacekeeping force. 
The Canadian public supported Pearson’s proposal. But it did not trigger St. Laurent to dispatch 
Pearson to New York and nor did it influence Pearson to propose the peacekeeping plan. The UN 
General Assembly endorsed Pearson’s proposal and send the UN Emergency Force to keep the 
peace while the three aggressors evacuate Egypt. After Pearson won a Nobel Peace Prize, 
Canadians support for UN peacekeeping strengthened.  
The Diefenbaker government continued to send Canadian Forces to important UN 
peacekeeping missions like the Congo and Cyprus. Although Diefenbaker was skeptical over the 
sustainability of peacekeeping missions, he believed that it was an important instrument of 
managing international conflict. However, evidence of the Congo peacekeeping decision at the 
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Cabinet level showed that his government consider the state of Canadian public opinion as a 
decision factor.  
Canada continued to participate in peacekeeping during Pearson’s years as a Prime 
Minister (1963-68). However, Canada was frustrated over the ineffectiveness of the Cyprus 
mission and the bias allegations it encountered in Indo-China (today’s Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Laos). Above all, Canada was disappointed when Nasser expelled UN peacekeepers from Egypt. 
These bad experiences triggered a suspicion especially within the Canadian intelligentsia. So, 
when Pearson retired in 1968, the Trudeau government revisited Canadian peacekeeping and 
concluded that the demand for Canadian peacekeeping in the 1970s will decline. Trudeau 
relegated peacekeeping from a top priority in the Defense White Paper during the Pearson 
government to a fourth place. But the Canadian public opinion towards peacekeeping remained 
so strong that Trudeau’s top diplomats decided to halt Canada’s retreat from peacekeeping. 
Canada participated in every UN peacekeeping missions, including non-UN mission in Indo-
China during Trudeau’s period in office. In this manner, public opinion had a positive impact on 
the Canadian government’s peacekeeping decisions during the Trudeau era. 
When Mulroney took office, his was initially interested in strengthening the Canadian 
military by purchasing expensive weapons. At the same time, however, Mulroney also took 
initiative to gauge public opinion on Canadian foreign policy. Canadians were against 
Mulroney’s weapons acquisition project while showing a strong support for the Canadian 
peacekeeping legacy. Accordingly, Mulroney adhered to public interest by cancelling his 
weapons program and lending a strong support to peacekeeping. During Mulroney’s tenure in 
office, Canada became a leading peacekeeping contributor to the United Nations. So, just like 
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Trudeau’s years in office, the Canadian public had a positive effect on the Canadian 
government’s decision to participate in peacekeeping operations. 
The increased riskiness of peace operations after the Cold War, the budget deficit in 
Canada, and the referendum in Quebec contributed to Canada’s retreat from peacekeeping during 
Chrétien’s term in office. Canada’s peacekeeping experience in the early 1990s was not 
satisfactory. In Somalia, Canada’s soldiers were mired in a scandal for torturing and killing a 
Somali teenager for allegedly stealing items from their camp in Somalia. Also, in the former 
Yugoslavia, Canadians were exposed to fighting and held hostage by the conflicting parties. 
These experiences led Canada to reconsider its role in peacekeeping. Furthermore, the 
accumulating budget deficit endangered the Canadian economy. Chrétien’s primary goal was to 
restore the Canadian economy to maintaining a balanced budget. The referendum in Quebec also 
threatened the Canadian unity in the 1990s. Chrétien’s second major preoccupation was therefore 
the preservation of Canadian peacekeeping.  
Even though Canadians continued to express their support for Canadian peacekeeping, 
the Chrétien administration pursued a different mode of internationalism. Chrétien’s second 
foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy played a significant role by advocating the concept of human 
security which urged for the right of other countries to intervene in events that governments 
violently abuse the human rights of their citizens. Axworthy also played an instrumental role in 
the ratification of the international ban on landmines treaty as well as in the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court which prosecuted leaders for crimes against humanity. It was also 
during Chrétien’s term in office that Canada opened the Pearson Peacekeeping Center to train 
soldiers from other countries on peacekeeping operation. These initiatives indicate that 
Chrétien’s government was fundamentally internationalist. However, the international and 
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domestic challenges that took place in the 1990s obliged Chrétien to cut down Canada’s 
participation in international peacekeeping.  
Canada continued to retreat from peacekeeping during Harper’s term in office. However, 
this did not take place because of international or domestic challenges. Instead, Harper’s retreat 
from peacekeeping was made deliberately. Harper believed that Canadian peacekeeping was a 
Liberal narrative that must be replaced with a brand new Conservative image that portrays 
Canada as a warrior nation. The Harper government offered an alternative narrative of Canadian 
history by glorifying Canada’s heroic role in the 1812 War with the US, the Boer War in South 
Africa, and the two World Wars. It also took an initiative to strengthen the Canadian Force by 
laying a plan to increase the military by $5.3 billion for five years.  
Harper’s defense policy priority focused on the North American defense cooperation, on 
defense of the arctic region, and the fight against. It doesn’t mention peacekeeping. Canada has 
played an active role in the Afghanistan war since 2001, in the combat operation in Libya, and 
the ongoing war against ISIS. Harper’s foreign policy priority also emphasized on strengthening 
trade relations with the United States and with Asia and on promoting democracy, human rights, 
and international development. It never mentioned peacekeeping.  
In the meantime, the Canadian public expressed a strong interest in witnessing the 
Canadian Forces playing a peacekeeping role rather than combat missions. This indicates that 
Canadian public opinion had no major impact on Harper’s peacekeeping decisions. However, 
polls also revealed that Canadians are supportive of Harper’s management of the Canadian 
economy, Canada’s policy towards Israel as well as Canada’s ongoing fight against ISIS. These 
factors have enabled the Harper administration to win a majority seat in 2011.  
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The discussion on the role of public opinion in Canadian government’s peacekeeping 
decisions at the domestic level of analysis shows that Canadian leaders responded differently to 
public opinion. St. Laurent, Diefenbaker, and Pearson made a decision to participate in 
peacekeeping without necessarily consulting public opinion. Trudeau and Mulroney changed 
their initial retreat from peacekeeping because of the strong public opinion for peacekeeping in 
Canada during that time. By contrast, Chrétien and Harper decreased Canada’s peacekeeping 
role despite a strong public support for the endeavor.  
The literature review section showed that political psychology offers a significant insight 
in explaining peacekeeping decisions under particular circumstances. Canadian Prime Ministers 
wield enormous executive power in making foreign policy decisions, including peacekeeping 
participation. Hermann’s Leadership Trait Assessment (LTA) provides a useful tool by profiling 
leaders based on three personality attributes, namely: motivation, cognitive style, and 
interpersonal approaches. She further classified leaders into dispositions towards peaceful 
foreign policy and warlike foreign policies based on their personality traits. According to 
Hermann, leaders exhibiting peaceful foreign policies tend to have a low in-group bias, low need 
for power, high cognitive complexity, low task orientation, and low distrust of others. This study 
sought to utilize this insight by framing a hypothesis that Canadian Prime Ministers reflect 
personality traits associated with peaceful foreign policy disposition also exhibit a strong 
commitment to international peacekeeping than others who don’t share these qualities. 
The chapter on leadership trait assessment (LTA) of Canadian Prime Ministers 
hypothesized that leaders disposed towards peaceful foreign policy (PFP) were showed greater 
commitment to international peacekeeping than others. It profiled the leadership personality of 
four Prime Ministers, namely: Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien and Harper across five attributes. 
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The results showed that the two Liberal leaders, i.e., Trudeau and Chrétien met three of the five 
personality attributes associated with PFP disposition while their Conservative counterparts 
(Mulroney and Harper) failed to satisfy any of the PFP disposition attributes. The study also 
solicited qualitative evidence to support the LTA results and discovered ample evidence showing 
that Trudeau and Chrétien actually pursued a peaceful foreign policy while Mulroney and Harper 
implemented a confrontational foreign policy.  
Based on these encouraging results, the study went on further to find out if Trudeau and 
Chrétien exhibited a stronger commitment to international peacekeeping than Mulroney and 
Harper. However, the results revealed unexpected results. Mulroney dispatched the largest 
number of Canadian troops to UN peacekeeping while satisfying only one out of the five 
attributes associated with international peacekeeping. By contrast, Chrétien cut down the number 
of Canadian peacekeepers to the UN even though he met three out the five personality traits 
associated with peacekeeping. Trudeau began his term by relegating peacekeeping priority to a 
last place in his defense white paper. However, he was the most peacefully disposed Prime 
Minister for meeting four out the five personality traits associated with a peaceful foreign policy 
disposition.  
Harper’s personality profile, his foreign policy orientation as well as his approach to 
peacekeeping didn’t contradict. Harper personality profile showed that he was least disposed 
towards peaceful foreign policy. His foreign policy orientation also indicated that he was more 
interested strengthening the Western alliance than in sharing international responsibility by 
supporting the United Nations. Due to these factors, the hypothesis didn’t expect Harper to 
exhibit a strong commitment to international peacekeeping. The results also showed that this was 
indeed the case.  
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Hence, 44with the exception of Prime Minister Harper, the hypothesis that Canadian 
Prime Ministers disposed towards peaceful foreign policy are also strongly committed to 
international peacekeeping was not correct. This shows that Canadian Prime Ministers who 
pursue a peaceful foreign policy could overlook peacekeeping while implementing other 
peaceful foreign policy strategies. For example, while he wasn’t eager to embrace peacekeeping 
instantly, Trudeau took a leading initiative to ending the Cold War through dialogue, in making 
Canada free from nuclear weapons, and in launching international development aid. Chrétien 
also decreased Canada’s peacekeeping role; however, it was during his term that Canada 
established a peacekeeping training center, ratified international treaty banning landmines, and 
forming the International Criminal Court. On the other hand, Mulroney abandoned his military 
program and embraced peacekeeping because he adhered to Canadian public opinion. However, 
he didn’t compromise his confrontational foreign policy when great powers like the US, UK, 
Russia, and China espoused policies that contradicted against Canada’s values.  
All in all, this study attempted to challenge the contemporary overemphasis on the 
systematic level of analysis to explain Canadian peacekeeping decision by introducing variables 
from the domestic (public opinion) and individual (leadership personality/foreign policy 
disposition) levels of analyses. By doing so, the study offers a comprehensive model for studying 
peacekeeping combining all aspects of foreign policy decision making, namely: international 
relations, domestic political environment, and the personality of key leaders. This model helps 
scholars to explain peacekeeping decisions of different countries in our turbulent world where 
capable peacekeepers like Canada are needed more than ever before. This study can be further 
strengthened by soliciting primary data from key decision makers and government document 
archives. It can also be improved by profiling the leadership personality of all Canadian Prime 
 
 
 167 
Ministers after the Second World War. A multivariate comparative analysis of a sample of 
nations (for example, middle powers) could present a greater insight in explaining the variation 
of countries’ contribution to international peacekeeping.   
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